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Abstract
Managerial decision making and control contain various challenges. One aspect that is
increasingly becoming the focus of accounting research is the fact that individuals tend
to behave differently than predicted by “homo oeconomicus” models. Selected examples
of psychological issues and other-regarding preferences influencing managerial decision
making and control in the context of accounting are examined in this dissertation.
The dissertation is cumulative and consists of four essays. In particular, the essays analyze
• how to design incentive contracts, when decision makers bear the psychological pres-
sure of knowing that they are held accountable for their performance regarding
project selection and project implementation;
• the determinants of accountability and perceived justification pressure, i.e., if there
are differences in the decision making when deciders know that they are held ac-
countable for either the project selection or the outcome of a project selection, and
to what degree performance-based bonuses or information about the preferences of
superiors/firm owners change this decision making;
• the type and extent of earnings management in family firms during changes in own-
ership and control, when the decision maker is sensitive to socioemotional wealth
and has to choose between different succession scenarios;
• whether leniency in subjective evaluations can be explained by reciprocally acting
employees and how discretion over the performance measure can be used to influence
profit.
Keywords
agencies, contracts, incentives, behavioral accounting, experiments, project selection, ac-
countability, earnings management, family firm succession, inheritance taxation, subjec-
tive performance evaluation, reciprocity.
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Preface
The purpose of an accounting system is to provide information to various users inside and
outside the firm. Accounting information generates knowledge that is used to facilitate
decision-making and helps to control behaviors and to coordinate processes. There are
several challenges related to the management of an accounting system and its informa-
tion. For example, ensuring that the right information is provided to a particular user at a
specific time can already be a difficult task. It becomes more complex if one intends to an-
ticipate incentives and consequences that result from providing an information. These and
other issues are extensively investigated in the accounting literature. Usually, (analytical)
accounting research relies on economic theory, which assumes that individuals follow the
principles of the “homo oeconomicus”, i.e., act as purely self-interested Bayesian informa-
tion processors with stable preferences.1 In recent years, however, the focus of accounting
has widened and the awareness has increased that there are challenges, which might not
be captured and solved by the classic approach. One example is, that the processing of
accounting information can be impaired by cognitive errors or might create emotion that
influences decisions. Taking into account that individuals, groups or even organizations
may be prone to these kinds of psychological issues, as well as to other-regarding prefer-
ences, is important, as effectiveness and efficiency of accounting methods, processes, and
instruments may be crucially affected.
“Behavioral accounting” is an approach that combines psychology, sociology, and account-
ing in order to address these additional challenges. It relaxes the assumptions of the “homo
oeconomicus” and, thus, examines effects when users of accounting information show “lim-
itations and complications”.2 So far, the majority of behavioral accounting research is
based on empirical and experimental methods, fewer studies apply analytical approaches.
This cumulative thesis examines selected accounting issues where incentives arise due to
1 See p. 660 in Rabin, M. (2002). “A perspective on psychology and economics”. European Economic
Review, 46 (4-5), 657–685.
2 The wording is based on Mullainathan, S. and R. H. Thaler (2001). “Behavioral economics”. Interna-
tional Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, 1st edition, 1094-1100.
For definitions and overviews of behavioral accounting see Birnberg, J. G. (2011). “A proposed frame-
work for behavioral accounting research”. Behavioral Research in Accounting, 23 (1), 1-43,; or
Trotman, K. T., Tan, H. C. and N. Ang (2011). “Fifty-year overview of judgment and decision-making
research in accounting”. Accounting and Finance, 51 (1), 278–360.
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behavioral influences. The essays apply concepts from psychology and sociology to either
predict how managerial decision making might be influenced or to add explanations for
patterns already identified in accounting practice or theory. The thesis mainly focuses
on behavioral management accounting, however, one essay also considers some aspects of
behavioral financial and tax accounting, respectively. The research methodology used is
analytical and experimental. In the following an overview of the contents is provided.
Essay I
It is common practice to align interests of the firm and managers by means of performance-
based compensation contracts. Another way of influencing managerial behavior is to
implement reporting regimes, where the decision maker is held accountable under specific
conditions. However, knowing that one is held accountable can lead to cognitive dissonance
with various effects on the quality of decisions.3 Regarding project management, two
specific tasks might be affected: the selection of a project and the implementation of the
project once it is chosen. So far, the literature on project management has either addressed
these two issues separately or without relating them to accountability.
The analytical model of Essay I examines accountability and its effects on project choice,
project implementation and contract design. In particular, it is analyzed how ex post
accountability for project performance influences the ex ante selection of a project and
the provision of effort in the project. Accountability is modeled as the psychological cost
of having to justify oneself, that affects the manager whenever a predetermined project
outcome benchmark is not reached.
It is shown, that accountability has two effects: firstly, it incentivizes the manager to select
projects with a low risk and return because these projects usually cause lower justification
pressure than visionary projects with higher risk-return profiles. Secondly, once the project
is chosen accountability increases the effort provided in implementing the project, as this
decreases the probability for lower outcomes that would make a justification necessary.
However, it can be impossible to induce a value-maximizing project choice by means of
an outcome-based contract, as well as it could take a bonus rate that is higher than the
3 Examples are McMackin, J. and P. Slovic (2000). “When does explicit justification impair decision
making?”. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 14 (6), 527–541.; or
Vieider, F. M. (2009). “The effect of accountability on loss aversion”. Acta psychologica, 132 (1), 96–101.
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optimal project-specific rate would be.
In summary, the model suggests that accountability might have both advantageous and
disadvantageous effects. It also provides an explanation for high bonuses, e.g., in the
financial sector. Consequently, firms should consider psychological issues of accountability,
especially when designing compensation contracts and/or reporting regimes.
Essay II
There is consensus view that managerial decision making is affected when the correspond-
ing individuals or groups know that they might be held accountable. However, there are
ambiguous findings concerning the factors that determine how accountability influences
decision making.4
Essay II continues the analysis of Essay I in that it addresses further issues around the
topic of accountability by means of laboratory experiments. Content wise, it investigates
effects of justification pressure on investment choices, as well as determinants of perceived
justification pressure and instruments to encounter effects of accountability. The essay
distinguishes itself from other experimental studies in that it considers different incentive
structures (exogenously given asymmetric payoffs) and also introduces instruments to
control investment decisions.5
In each experiment an agency situation is created where pairs of subjects interact over
several decision sets. Subjects responsible for undertaking the investments (the managers)
choose from a set of projects. The projects differ in terms of risk and return. An instru-
ment that may influence managerial decision making in that it might change the effects
of accountability are the payoffs from the available projects. In order to analyze their
influence payoffs vary over the decision sets. Another means that might control invest-
ments to a particular extent is to establish that firm owners are able to communicate their
preferred business strategies to the managers before the investments are undertaken. This
is also taken into account by means of upfront recommendations, which are communicated
4 An overview is given by, e.g., Lerner, J. S. and P. E. Tetlock (1999). “Accounting for the effects of
accountability”. Psychological Bulletin, 125 (2), 255–275.
5 For a comparison see Pahlke, J., S. Strasser, and F. M. Vieider (2012). “Risk-taking for others under
accountability”. Economics Letters, 114 (1), 102–105.; or
Pollmann, M. M. H., J. Potters, and S. T. Trautmann (2014). “Risk taking by agents: the role of ex-ante
and ex-post accountability”. Economics Letters, 123 (3), 387–390.
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to subjects in the role of a manager. Accountability is incorporated in two ways: either
the manager has to justify any decision that is made (decision accountability) or when
project choices turn out to generate low profits (outcome accountability). This allows for
examination of how the reporting regimes interact with upfront recommendations, i.e.,
whether there are differences in compliance.
It is found that accountability increases the probability of investments in projects with
low risk-return profiles. However, to a particular extent this effect can be mitigated
by the following controlling instruments: a higher profit share induces the manager to
choose value-maximizing investments. Even more effective is to ensure the firm owner
communicates the preferred investment strategy, which also reduces perceived justification
pressure significantly. Moreover, it seems to hold that the higher the frequency with
which agents are held accountable, the lower the perceived justification pressure, i.e.,
effects of accountability may diminish with familiarity of being in a justification situation.
Regarding the different types of accountability, results indicate that a higher compliance
with investment preferences is reached with a stricter reporting regime, i.e., employers
should hold employees accountable for each decision, not for bad outcomes.
Essay III
There is considerable evidence that family firms are involved in different earnings manage-
ment strategies than publicly listed firms.6 A commonly mentioned explanation for these
differences is that family firms are less affected by agency problems, as ownership and
control are not separated. However, more recent literature also considers the behavioral
concept of socioemotional wealth (SEW) to explain differences.7 The theory describes
how family members derive utility from non-economic aspects of the business. Two im-
portant elements of SEW are altruism between family members and dynastic motivations
for inter-generational sustainability.8 Given the economic impact of family firms and the
6 For example, Jiraporn, P. and P. J. DaDalt (2009). “Does founding family control affect earnings
management?” Applied Economics Letters, 16 (2), 113–119.
7 See Achleitner, A.-K., N. Gu¨nther, C. Kaserer, and G. Siciliano (2014). “Real earnings management and
accrual-based earnings management in family firms”. European Accounting Review, 23 (3), 431–461.
8 See Go´mez-Mej´ıa, L. R., C. Cruz, P. Berrone, and J. de Castro (2011). “The bind that ties: socioemo-
tional wealth preservation in family firms”. The Academy of Management Annals, 5 (1), 653–707.; and
Berrone, P., C. Cruz, and L. R. Go´mez-Mej´ıa (2012). “Socioemotional wealth in family firms: theoretical
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fact that there is no analytical accounting research on earnings management of family
firms, it appears reasonable to address the issue.9 Of particular interest is to examine
earnings management incentives during the transition of ownership and control. Firstly,
this is because the risk of misconduct is generally increased during these periods. Secondly,
it opens the door for considerations with respect to inheritance taxation.
Correspondingly, Essay III investigates earnings management practices of family firms
during changes in ownership and control, how SEW relates to the decision making, and
whether incentives change in different succession scenarios. A two-period model is con-
sidered, in which a SEW sensitive firm founder can engage in real and accrual earnings
manipulations before the succession takes place. Besides determining the extent of earn-
ings management, the founder has to decide whether the firm is owned and managed by
a family member in the following period, or just owned by the family member while an
external manager has control over the operational business.
The main result is that earnings management is driven by SEW in that it induces the
founder to shift earnings in the period after the succession, in which a family member
is the new owner of the firm. The motivation behind this is to lower the inheritance
tax payment of the succeeding family member. For the same reason, the founder over-
invests in the capital stock, which also increases earnings in the post-succession period.
If operations after the succession are run by an external manager, the investment level
decreases. Finally, besides the productivity of the person in charge after the succession,
inheritance taxation and SEW may affect the founder’s decision which succession scenario
is implemented. In summary, the model shows that SEW is able to increase the time
horizon of decision-makers and, by this, also explains some empirical patterns.
Essay IV
An important psychological driver of action is fairness. This is also true for managerial de-
cisions and the perceived fairness of an accounting system.10 When incentive compensation
dimensions, assessment approaches, and agenda for future research”. Family Business Review, 25 (3),
258–279.
9 Information about the prevalence of family firms is given by, e.g., Anderson, R. C. and D. M. Reeb
(2006). “Founding-family ownership and firm performance: evidence from the S&P 500”. The Journal
of Finance, 58 (3), 1301–1328.
10See Libby, T. (2001). “Referent cognitions and budgetary fairness: a research note”. Journal of Man-
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is implemented through subjective performance measures, it is often true that discretion
over the evaluation result is accompanied by inaccuracies that impair the quality of the
assessment. A phenomenon observable in practice is the so-called leniency bias. Although
it might be beneficial in terms of compensation or career perspectives, leniency can also
affect the fairness perception of the one who is evaluated. As the topic is a recurring issue
in business practice, accounting research is examining it closely.11
Essay IV adds an explanation for leniency in subjective performance evaluations. It in-
vestigates analytically if and how leniency might be related to fairness considerations and,
furthermore, examines determinants and economic consequences of the bias. More pre-
cisely, it is assumed that the evaluator anticipates a reaction from the evaluated manager,
which is partly based on fairness perception. Thus, besides facing the classic incentive-
risk trade off, the evaluator has to deal with the additional obstacle of reciprocal behavior,
which might affect the outcome of a project. The analytical model considers both positive
and negative reciprocal reactions, i.e., productive (rewarding) and unproductive (punish-
ing) actions.
It is shown that biasing the evaluation can be the rational choice for an evaluator if s/he
is the residual claimant of the project payoff. Moreover, it is found that the manipulation
of the evaluation result has diverse effects on the manager’s motivation to reciprocate.
However, through the right bias an evaluator can provoke a positive reciprocal reaction
from the manager, which increases payoff compared to the case without fairness consid-
erations and reciprocity. The reason is that the bias serves as an additional device in the
optimization of the payoff and, thus, allows to provide incentives more precisely. However,
in the model at hand the bias is not able to decrease agency cost.
In summary, the essays provide the following conclusions:
• Firms should be aware that post decision accountability may lead to behavioral com-
plications with respect to project selection and implementation. The psychological
pressure of being held accountable for deviations from a predetermined performance
agement Accounting Research, 13 (1), 91–105.
11See, e.g., Bol, J. C. (2008). “Subjectivity in compensation contracting”. Journal of Accounting Litera-
ture, 27, 1–24.
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threshold can have both negative and positive effects. Contracts are not always able
to induce desired decision making effectively or efficiently. Therefore, the effects of
accountability on the mindset of managers should not be underestimated, as it may
result in an increased cost of incentive provision.
• Perceived justification pressure of ex post accountability influences investment choices
significantly. Instruments that influence the effects of accountability on project
choice are bonus contracts and communication policies. Effects change for repeated
accountability. Compliance with firm policies is higher under stricter reporting
regimes.
• Socioemotional concerns of family firm founders are able to create incentives for real
and accrual-based earnings management prior to changes in ownership and control.
If the utility from altruistic and/or dynastic socioemotional wealth of founders is
sufficiently high, it leads to investment strategies and earnings management practices
that reduce the future inheritance tax base of the successor. The extent to which a
founder engages in these activities depends on whether the firm is led by an external
party or by a family member.
• Leniency in subjective performance evaluations might be the result of a conscious
and rational decision. If employees are affected by fairness considerations when
being evaluated, biasing the result of the evaluation may motivate them to engage
in rewarding reciprocal responses, which might positively affect payoff.
As a closing remark it should be noted that three out of the four essays in this thesis have
an analytical methodology. Only in one case some implications derived from a model are
validated by means of laboratory experiments. It is, thus, suggested that, in order to ensure
valuable insights in terms of internal and external validity, future research may control
the remaining analytical conclusions on behavioral incentives in managerial accounting
decisions by using different approaches and methods.
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Essay I
Title
Accountability in an agency model: project selection, effort incentives, and contract design
Co-authors:
Christian Lukas, Jens Robert Scho¨ndube
Note:
This essay has been published in Managerial and Decision Economics (2019), 40(2), 150-
158.
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Accountability in an agency model: project selection, effort
incentives, and contract design
Abstract
We analyze an agency model of project choice and implementation where the agent is held
accountable for his performance. We show that implementation of the ex ante efficient
project may be impossible, irrespective of how the principal sets fixed wage and bonus
rate. If it is possible, the principal may be forced to increase the bonus rate above the
optimal project-specific rate. The higher profit share compensates the agent for pressure
he faces when he has to justify/explain his performance.
Keywords:
agency; project selection; accountability; behavioral accounting
JEL-Classification:
C72, D01, D81, M40, M52
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1 Introduction
Managerial services to a company consist, among others, of two important tasks: (1)
managerial effort to supervise ongoing projects and (2) selection of new projects (Penrose,
2009, (ch. 3); Ross, 2014). The latter implies that managers have responsibilities to
influence the environment in which their companies operate. Agency literature usually
considers only the first task. This is somewhat surprising given the evident interrelation
between (1) and (2); and given that the critique of focusing on only (1) is not new. As
Kaplan, (1984, p. 405) notes, “[agency theory] misses the options for entrepreneurial
managers to make major changes in their environment [...]”.
A common means to control behavior of managers are outcome controls. In addition,
accountability may be effective in that respect. According to Lerner and Tetlock, (1999,
p. 255), “accountability refers to the implicit or explicit expectation that one may be called
on to justify one’s beliefs, feelings, and actions to others”. To provoke a justification it takes
the joint presence of three factors (Nippa and Petzold, 2005): (i) decision ambiguity, i.e.,
the optimal decision or course of action is not obvious and there is substantial uncertainty;
(ii) dependence of the decision maker on third parties; and (iii) demand of justification,
i.e., the decision maker expects that third parties actually call for a justification.
Being required to justify performance to superiors, shareholders, or the public is a common
phenomenon and mirrors real-life experiences of managers. It may impose a substantial
pressure on them. For example, Elon Musk is explicit about this pressure in his an-
nouncement to take Tesla private: “Being public [...] puts enormous pressure on Tesla
to make decisions that may be right for a given quarter, but not necessarily right for
the long-term”.1 As a consequence, the pressure to possibly justify a decision ex post
certainly influences decisions ex ante. Decision making may improve because on second
thought the optimal decision could differ from what was initially thought to be optimal
(Vieider, 2009; Pahlke et al., 2012; Pollmann et al., 2014). However, accountability could
also deteriorate judgment and decision making (Weigold and Schlenker, 1991; McMackin
and Slovic, 2000). One possible reason is the shift of attention “from good performance
1 https://www.tesla.com/de DE/blog/taking-tesla-private; accessed: 2018-08-14
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to good justification of performance”.2 It is the objective of the present paper to analyze
the effect of justification on managers’ project choice and effort provision.
In this paper, we develop a model where the agent selects one project from a set of projects
and then manages the chosen project by providing effort. Incentivizing effort is captured by
a standard hidden action model with limited liability protection for the agent. Additional
frictions may arise from the agent’s project choice. The innovative feature of our model is
that it incorporates accountability on the agent’s side. Therefore, when selecting a project
and providing effort the agent knows that he will be held accountable for the results. This
pressure of being obligated to justify poor performances is modeled as a psychological cost
imposed on the agent. The cost eventually incurred by the agent depends on the deviation
of the actual outcome from a threshold outcome and a project-specific pressure parameter.
Considering linear incentive contracts (fixed payment plus bonus) we analyze two types of
contracts: project-specific contracts and outcome-based (non-project specific) contracts.
In our model, projects differ in terms of mean and variance of profitability and with respect
to pressure the agent faces when held accountable for the outcome. The accountability
effect may distort the agent’s project choice. As a novelty we show that there can be
both an “impossibility result” and a “money buys efficiency result”. The former means
that there exist cases where, irrespective of how the principal sets fixed pay and bonus
rate, the agent never prefers the project the principal finds optimal. The latter shows that
in order to induce the value-maximizing project choice, the principal may need to offer
the agent a larger profit share than an otherwise optimal contract would require. Notice
that a higher justification pressure ceteris paribus induces a higher effort and therefore
decreases the optimal project-specific bonus rate. However, to induce the agent to select
a highly profitable project with strong justification pressure, the principal has to increase
the bonus rate above the optimal project-specific rate. Only a sufficiently high bonus
rate incentivizes the wealth-constrained agent to incur the high psychological costs of
accountability related to the project.
Our paper is related to and contributes to three streams of literature. In analytical models
of project choice (Lambert, 1986; Hirshleifer and Suh, 1992; Sung, 1995; Flor et al.,
2014) the compensation contract usually serves the dual purpose of inducing effort and
2 Ashton (1990, p. 156), italics in original.
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of selecting the optimal project. Two findings of these models stand out: First, principal
and agent may prefer different projects so that the agent possibly takes excessive risk
or too little risk (Lambert, 1986). Second, the jeopardy of improper project choice can
lead to limiting the variable pay component in some form. For example, in Sung (1995)
low sensitivities of variable pay to outcome from ongoing operations can turn out to be
optimal because otherwise the agent selects only low-risk/low-return projects. Flor et al.
(2014) find that setting an upper limit for compensation prevents excessive risk taking
on the agent’s side. Accountability and its effect on project choice and contract design
has to our best knowledge not been analyzed analytically. Therefore, our novel analytical
model contributes to the literature on project choice by incorporating accountability in an
agency context. The effect of accountability or justification pressure is different from the
risk effect. While the risk-incentive trade-off calls for a low pay-performance sensitivity to
induce risky project choices, we show that high pay-performance rewards might be optimal
if accountability exists.
The present paper also contributes to the growing literature on analytical research in
behavioral contract theory and behavioral accounting. In these models psychological phe-
nomena and their effects on decision making and contract design are analyzed. Examples
include identity or engagement with the firm (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2005; Heinle
et al., 2012) or utility from status (Marino and Ozbas, 2014). Both identity and status
incentives can help the principal to reduce expected costs of implementing a given action.
Other work considers reference-dependent preferences (Englmaier and Wambach, 2010;
Herweg et al., 2010; Ockenfels et al., 2015), e.g. contracting with loss averse agents.3 In
our model, risk-neutrality paired with justification pressure that depends on the devia-
tion from a threshold creates a utility function which resembles the one that characterizes
loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991; Herweg et al., 2010). However, the evalua-
tion of risky alternatives is fundamentally different. For a loss-averse agent any possible
(probability weighted) difference in outcomes matters. In our setting only the (expected)
deviation from the threshold is relevant.
Finally, our paper is also related to the job assignment literature, in particular to the liter-
ature that investigates a trade-off between providing effort incentives and job assignment.
3 See Ko¨szegi (2014) for a review on behavioral contract theory.
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In the presence of this trade-off what is usually considered as being inefficient in task
assignment may turn out to be beneficial. For example, Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991)
show that increasing the bonus and allowing the agent more personal business may be
beneficial because the agent’s focus is directed more to his main task. Koch and Nafziger
(2012) demonstrate that to induce employees to work hard it may be optimal to promote
them to jobs for which they are less talented.4 We, in contrast, show that ”inefficiently”
high bonus rates may be optimal to ensure optimal project selection.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. In the following
sections we present the first-best solution (section 3) and the second-best solution (section
4). Section 5 discusses the model assumptions and the final section concludes.
2 The model
We consider a principal-agent model with hidden action and limited liability. A manager
(agent) is responsible for project selection and implementation, i.e., after deciding which
project to initiate the manager provides effort to turn the project into a success. There
are two projects {PA, PB} available. The agent can at most select one of them. If he does
not select a project the firm’s gross payoff from the agency is zero. The returns from the
projects (e.g., net present values) are xA and xB, respectively, with
xi = θiei (1)
where ei ≥ 0 is the agent’s effort in project i. Providing effort is costly to the agent, the
cost is given by c(ei) =
1
2e
2
i . The marginal contribution per unit of effort in project Pi is
θi > 0. The parameter θi is a random variable a priori. Its realization is unknown at the
time the contract is signed. Both the density and the distribution function of θi, fi(θi)
and Fi(θi), respectively, are common knowledge a priori. We assume that θA and θB are
stochastically independent. After a project selection but before choosing his effort ei, the
agent privately observes the realization of θi for the selected project (private pre-decision
information).
4 Further papers that analyze the interrelation of job assignment and incentive provision include Scho¨ttner
(2008), Ratto and Schnedler (2008), and Rohlfing-Bastian and Scho¨ttner (2017).
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The agent is accountable for his decision making, or, in other words, faces pressure by
investors or the public to take responsibility for the firm’s performance. The (dis)utility
from accountability depends on the deviation of the actual outcome from an exogenously
specified threshold outcome xi > 0 for each project. Formally, it is defined as
JPi = (xi − xi)ϕi,
with 0 < ϕi < 1.
5 Intuitively, investors’ expectations of a firm’s performance are to
some extent exogenous; or, the firm’s profit target breaks down to targets for individual
divisions and employees so that the threshold is exogenous to the contractual relation
between employee and immediate superior.6
Similar to psychological costs from deviating from norms (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2005;
Heinle et al., 2012), accountability can be interpreted as a psychological cost imposed
on the agent.7 It is a cost that goes beyond possible monetary costs of justification
by documenting available project options. If the actual outcome exceeds the threshold,
xi > xi, JPi becomes negative, which means the manager realizes a psychological benefit
from outperforming the benchmark. This can be interpreted as self-enhancement.8
Each project may have a specific performance level xi such that the pressure comes into
being if the actual performance realization xi is below the threshold xi. Furthermore, the
projects may differ in how strong one unit deviation from the threshold xi influences the
perceived pressure, i.e. ϕA 6= ϕB. For example, justifying poor performance if a visionary
strategy has been chosen may put more pressure on the agent than explaining low profits
5 Note that ∂JPi
∂ei
= −ϕiθi < 0. The term ϕiθi represents the reduction in the justification pressure per
unit of effort. We have to assume ϕi ≤ 1. Otherwise the marginal impact of one unit of effort on the
reduction of pressure would be higher than the agent’s marginal project productivity θi.
6 We do not consider an endogenous determination of the threshold. Given our assumptions, the agent
would select the lowest possible threshold and the principal could enforce any project choice by properly
setting project-specific thresholds. To have the agent or principal determine a threshold or reference
point based on past expecations about future outcomes (Ko¨szegi and Rabin, 2006) would have required
additional assumptions.
7 Regular investor calls or annual shareholders’ meetings are examples for this. More generally, any
employee who will be held accountable for her/his performance may face justification pressure if poor
performance has to be explained to superiors, investors, or the public.
8 Self-enhancement is a psychological pattern of causal reasoning where favorable outcomes are attributed
to oneself. Self-serving attributions constitute a form of retrospective rationality which serves to maintain
one’s ego and cognitive functioning (see e.g. Staw and Ross, 1978; Bettman and Weitz, 1983; or Staw
et al., 1983).
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if the standard strategy (“wisdom of the crowd”) has been adopted. In our model different
settings can be captured by different combinations of (xi, ϕi) for i = A,B.
Both contracting parties are risk neutral. The agent is protected by limited liability. Be-
cause effort is unobservable, the principal motivates the agent by offering output-dependent
compensation. We analyze two different kinds of linear compensation contracts in the
model: project-specific contracts and outcome-based (non project-specific) contracts.9 A
project-specific contract S = (SA, SB) consists of a menu of two linear contracts which are
defined by
Si = wi + vixi
for each project i = A,B that will potentially be chosen. wi is a fixed payment and vi is
the incentive rate, i.e., vi determines the share of profit that the agent receives as variable
compensation. Project-specific contracts would require (i) ex ante a single contract for all
possible projects and (ii) ex post verification of the project actually chosen. In practice,
(i) could easily amount to a considerable number of contracts which might be too costly to
implement, and (ii) could be impossible. For this reason, we also consider outcome-based
contracts that rely only on the final outcome x ∈ {xA, xB, 0},
S = w + vx.
Outcome-based contracts do not require ex post verification of the particular project
chosen. In the sense of Hirshleifer and Suh (1992) we assume that the principal is not able
to select the project herself.10
Due to his limited liability the agent only accepts contracts with wi, vi ≥ 0 or w, v ≥ 0,
respectively. This assumption captures real compensation contracts by assuming that the
agent is neither willing to pay an up-front payment to the principal, nor does he accept
negative bonus coefficients. Formally, non-negativity of the contracting variables ensures
that ”selling the firm to the agent” is not a solution to the incentive problem. The agent’s
reservation utility is normalized to zero. We also make the standard assumption that if the
9 The approach is similar to Hirshleifer and Suh (1992), who distinguish between observable project choice
and unobservable project choice. Observable project choice allows for project-specific contracts, unob-
servable project choice does not.
10We discuss project selection by the principal in Section 5.
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agent is indifferent with regard to an act he decides in the best interest of the principal.
At the beginning of the game the principal offers a compensation contract to the agent. If
the agent accepts the offer he makes his project decision. He selects a particular project
only if the contract warrants positive expected compensation for that project. After the
agent has selected a project i he privately observes the project’s true productivity θi. In
the next step the agent decides about his effort ei and at the end of the game the project
outcome will be realized and the agent will be compensated according to the compensation
contract in place.
3 Benchmark solution
As we focus on the consequences of accountability on effort incentives, project choice, and
contract design, we consider a benchmark solution where accountability is absent. Stated
differently, our benchmark is the basic hidden action agency model with risk neutrality
and limited liability combined with a project decision. Provided the agent has selected
project Pi and observed θi he chooses effort ei to maximize his expected utility:
max
ei
Ui(ei, θi) = E [Si|θi]− c (ei)
= viθie+ wi − e
2
i
2
.
Optimizing this expression for ei, the agent’s optimal effort decision is given by
ei (θi) = vi · θi. (2)
The agent’s effort is increasing in both the incentive rate vi and the productivity θi which
is similar to the result in standard linear models (see e.g. Baker, 1992).
For a given project Pi the principal sets the incentive rate vi and fixed payment wi so that
her expected net surplus is maximized given (2), that is:
max
vi, wi
Vi = E
[
θie (θi)−
(
wi + viθie (θi)
)]
(3)
= (1− vi)Hi · vi − wi
with Hi ≡ E
(
θ2i
)
= E (θi)
2 + V ar (θi), subject to a participation constraint,
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E (Ui (ei (θi) , θi)) ≥ 0 for all i, and a limited liability constraint, wi, vi ≥ 0 for all i.
We denote Hi as the aggregate risk-return measure of project i. In general, higher returns
are associated with higher risk. The measure Hi is increasing in both risk - as measured by
V ar(θi) - and return - as measured by E(θi)
2. However, the model also captures situations
where one project has a higher return and lower risk than the other. Hi critically influ-
ences the equilibrium payoffs of the principal and the agent. Interestingly, the principal’s
surplus of a given project is increasing in the variance of the agent’s productivity. This
is because ex ante the value of information with regard to θi is the higher the higher the
dispersion of θi. For small values of V ar (θi), observing θi before the effort decision has
only little value compared to an effort decision based on E (θi).
The solution to (3) is standard: Assuming a binding liability constraint - otherwise there
is no friction in this incentive problem - the fixed payment is zero, wBMi = 0, so that
vBMi =
1
2 and e
BM
i =
1
2θi. The principal’s expected net surplus from project i amounts to
V BMi =
1
4
Hi
so that the principal always prefers the project with the higher risk-return measure. The
agent’s expected payoff equals
UBMi = E
[
vBMi θie
BM
i + w
BM
i −
(eBMi )
2
2
]
=
1
8
Hi
which implies the agent also prefers the project with the higher risk and return - and there
is no conflict of interest concerning project choice.
To summarize the benchmark case, the optimal incentive rate does not depend on project
parameters and the expected payoff for both principal and agent is increasing in the
project’s measure for risk and return so that efficient project choice is ensured. So far,
in this section, we considered project-specific contracts. However, the result extends to
an outcome-based contract, too. The reason is that independently of the project, the
optimal project-specific incentive rate equals 12 such that the optimal incentive rate with
an outcome-based contract must equal vBM = 12 , too.
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4 Justification pressure and optimal contracts
In this section, we determine optimal bonus contracts in the presence of accountability.
In section 4.1 we assume the principal offers a menu S of two contracts, each contract
specifying a linear contract Si based on the outcome of project i. If the agent accepts S
the project choice determines the final contract Si.
4.1 Project-specific contracts
Derivation of contracts
We proceed similar to the benchmark solution. The agent’s utility with project i after
having observed θi now also comprises the accountability term JPi = (xi − θiei)ϕi and is
given by
Ui (θi, ei) = wi + viθiei − e
2
i
2
− (xi − θiei)ϕi. (4)
He chooses effort to maximize utility in (4) which implies
ei (θi) = (vi + ϕi)θi. (5)
It is apparent from a comparison of (2) and (5) that being held accountable leads to a
higher optimal effort level. Given the optimal effort choice, the agent’s utility then denotes
Ui (θi, ei (θi)) = wi +
1
2
θ2i (vi + ϕi)
2 − xiϕi (6)
As the project choice must be made before θi is observed, we build expectations over θi
which leads to
Ui = wi +
1
2
Hi(vi + ϕi)
2 − xiϕi. (7)
Ui is the agent’s expected payoff from project i at the project-choice stage, anticipating
the optimal effort choice (5) connected with project i.
The principal’s problem is to determine contract-specific payments so that the expected
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surplus is maximized:
max
vi,wi
Vi = E(xi)− wi − viE(xi) (8)
subject to
ei (θi) = (vi + ϕi)θi (9)
wi +
1
2
Hi(vi + ϕi)
2 − xiϕi ≥ 0 (10)
vi, wi ≥ 0 (11)
To generate frictions in the model, in what follows we again assume that the limited liabil-
ity constraint with regard to the fixed payment is binding at the optimum: w∗i = 0. This
is true if and only if 12Hi
(
1
2(1 + ϕi)
)2−xiϕi ≥ 0 holds true for i = A,B. This assumption
implies that the participation constraint (10) is also fulfilled at the optimum. By inserting
the agent’s effort choice into the principal’s objective function Vi, the principal’s objective
function can now be written as
Vi = E(xi) (1− vi) = (vi + ϕi)Hi(1− vi).
This expression is maximized for
v∗i =
1− ϕi
2
. (12)
v∗i is the optimal incentive rate set by the principal for project i if she would induce the
choice of project i. We call v∗i the project-specific optimal incentive rate (for project i).
It is apparent from (12) that the incentive rate is decreasing in ϕi, a higher accountability
reduces the optimal incentive rate. For ϕi = 0, it follows v
∗
i = v
BM
i . Substituting (12)
into (5) gives the optimal action e∗ (θi) = 1+ϕi2 θi.
The principal’s corresponding payoff with project i is
V ∗i = Vi (v
∗
i ) = Hi
(
1
2
(1 + ϕi)
)2
and the agent’s equilibrium payoff is
U∗i = Ui (v
∗
i ) =
1
2
Hi
(
1
2
(1 + ϕi)
)2
− xiϕi.
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Project selection
The principal prefers project i over project j if
V ∗i = Hi
(
1
2
(1 + ϕi)
)2
> Hj
(
1
2
(1 + ϕj)
)2
= V ∗j (13)
holds. Without loss of generality we assume HB > HA. To simplify the analysis we
further assume ϕB ≥ ϕA.11 The project with the higher risk-return measure entails a
justification pressure rate that is at least as high as for the project with the lower risk-
return measure. Intuitively, we assume that justification of low performance given that
a risky strategy was chosen is not “easier” than justifying low performance if a low-risk
strategy was chosen. Moreover, to give account for high performance resulting from a
visionary strategy is at least as self-enhancing as reporting high performance resulting
from the standard strategy. Empirical evidence that ambiguity aversion increases in peer
effects and accountability pressure (Trautmann et al., 2008) supports our assumption if
one interprets the visionary strategy as an ambiguous choice.
Given HB > HA and ϕB ≥ ϕA, the principal always prefers project B over project A. In
particular, if both projects had the same risk-return measures HB = HA, the principal
would like the manager to select the project with the higher justification pressure rate ϕi.
The reason is that a higher justification pressure rate makes the agent’s effort less costly
and the non-controllable pressure parameter Γi ≡ xiϕi > 0 is not carried by the principal
in equilibrium.
The agent prefers project B over project A
1
2
(
1
2
(1 + ϕB))
2HB − ΓB ≥ 1
2
(
1
2
(1 + ϕA))
2HA − ΓA.
As stated above, the principal always prefers project B over project A. She can induce
the optimal project choice via setting vA = 0.
We summarize our results from the analysis of project-specific contracts in the following
proposition:
11Conditions can be derived such that the results can still hold if ϕB < ϕA. In this paper we focus on the
case that appears empirically most relevant.
I – 13
Proposition 1:
a) Under project-specific contracts the principal always prefers the project with the higher
risk-return measure Hi and the higher pressure rate ϕi (that is PB in our setting).
b) The optimal project decision can always be induced by setting no incentives (v−i = 0)
for the non-preferred project −i and vi = v∗i for the preferred project i.
c) The optimal incentive rate is decreasing in ϕi and the equilibrium effort is increasing
in ϕi.
4.2 Outcome-based contract
Assuming a single bonus rate v on the final outcome x and making use of the derivations
from the previous section, we obtain expected surpluses for the principal and the agent
from a specific project i as:
Vi (v) = (v + ϕi)Hi(1− v)
Ui (v) =
1
2
Hi(v + ϕi)
2 − Γi
The principal wants the agent to select the project with the highest expected surplus for
her. Let
∆V (v) = VB (v)− VA (v) = (1− v) [(v + ϕB)HB − (v + ϕA)HA] .
By assumption HB > HA and ϕB > ϕA. It follows ∆V (v) > 0 for all v ∈ (0, 1) – the
principal prefers project B over project A for any v. When does the agent select project
B? Again, let
∆U (v) = UB (v)− UA (v)
=
1
2
HB(v + ϕB)
2 − ΓB −
(
1
2
HA(v + ϕA)
2 − ΓA
)
(14)
=
1
2
(HB −HA) v2 + (HBϕB −HAϕA) v + 1
2
(
ϕ2BHB − ϕ2AHA
)−∆Γ
where ∆Γ = ΓB − ΓA.
The following lemma derives the incentive compatibility constraint for the agent’s project
decision by relating the bonus rate to a specific project decision:
I – 14
Lemma 1:
The agent selects PB for all v ∈ (0, 1) unless
HBϕB−HAϕA <
√
D
holds with D = HBHA (ϕB − ϕA)2 +2∆Γ (HB −HA) > 0. In this case there exists a
critical value v̂ such that the agent selects PA for 0 ≤ v < v̂ and PB for v ≥ v̂. The critical
incentive coefficient is given by
v̂ =
√
D − (HBϕB −HAϕA)
HB −HA .
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 2:
With an outcome based contract the optimal bonus rate is given by
v∗ =

1−ϕB
2
v̂
1−ϕA
2
(a) if the agent selects PB for all v ∈ (0, 1) , or if v̂ < 1−ϕB2
(b) if 1 > v̂ > 1−ϕB2
(c) if v̂ ≥ 1.
v∗ induces the agent to select PB in cases (a) and (b), and PA in case (c).
Proof: See the Appendix.
Given our assumption HB > HA and ϕB ≥ ϕA, the higher v the higher the agent’s surplus
difference, ∆U (v) = UB − UA. Proposition 2 distinguishes three cases of exogenous
parameter constellations. In the first condition of case (a) the uncontrollable part of
accountability ΓA from project A is significantly higher than from project B, ΓB, such
that UB > UA for all v ∈ (0, 1) holds. As the principal prefers project B the optimal
bonus rate is given by the project-specific optimal incentive rate for project B, 1−ϕB2 .
If the uncontrollable part of justification pressure from project B, ΓB, becomes higher
relative to ΓA there exists a critical value v̂ such that ∆U (v̂) = 0. For all v < v̂, the agent
selects project A, and for all v ≥ v̂, the agent selects project B. If v̂ ≤ 1−ϕB2 the optimal
incentive rate is still 1−ϕB2 ; this is the second condition of part (a). However, v̂ may be
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larger than 1−ϕB2 . For 1 > v̂ >
1−ϕB
2 (case b)), the principal sets the minimum incentive
rate that induces choice of project B, v∗ = v̂. Due to the concavity of her surplus function
every higher v would lead to a higher deviation from the optimal project B-related surplus.
Thus, the principal has to raise the bonus rate over its project-specific optimal level in
order to induce a proper project choice. If v̂ ≥ 1 applies (case (c)), the principal would
have to set v ≥ 1 to induce the agent to select PB which would lead to a negative surplus.
Hence, the principal induces selection of project A via the corresponding project-specific
optimal incentive rate 1−ϕA2 . Since the principal cannot implement project B in this case
we call the result the “impossibility result”.
Case (b) of Proposition 2, which we label the “money buys efficiency result”, is of special
interest. If a potentially highly profitable project with correspondingly high justification
pressure (in case it fails) is to be induced, it requires ceteris paribus a higher bonus rate.
The result is noteworthy for two reasons: first, a higher bonus rate increases the agent’s
expected payoff for both projects; second, higher potential justification pressure ceteris
paribus lowers the optimal bonus rate (see (12)): From the analysis of project specific
contracts we know that for a given project a higher justification pressure comes along
with a lower incentive rate to control effort optimally. However, delegation of the project
choice to the agent under outcome-based contracts necessitates an increase in the bonus
rate so that the agent is willing to select the project with the higher justification pressure.
The increase in the bonus rate enhances the gross profit for the principal but it leaves
her with a smaller share of it such that the net surplus relation VB (v̂) < VB (v
∗
B) holds
because VB is maximized at v
∗
B =
1−ϕB
2 .
To exemplify the three parts of Proposition 2 we present three numerical examples, which
are depicted in Figure 1.
The first example focuses on the second condition of part (a) of Proposition 2, v̂ ≤ 1−ϕB2 .
Let HB = 9, HA = 6, ϕB = 0.3, ϕA = 0.25,ΓB = 1.8, and ΓA = 1. For these parameters we
obtain the project-specific optimal incentive rate for project B as 1−ϕB2 = 0.35 and for the
critical value we obtain v̂ = 0.3405. Thus, the agent prefers project A for v < 0.3405 and
project B for v ≥ 0.3405. The principal in contrast always prefers project B. Hence, the
optimal bonus rate is v∗ = 0.35. In the second example, the “money buys efficiency result”
reflecting part (b) of Proposition 2, letHB = 21, HA = 18, ϕB = 0.13, ϕA = 0.1,ΓB = 3.25,
and ΓA = 1.9. Now v̂ = 0.6585 >
1−ϕB
2 = 0.435. Here the optimal bonus rate is
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Figure 1: Surplus functions of agent (Ui, in gray) and principal (Vi, in black) contingent
on project A (dashed) or B (solid)
v∗ = v̂ = 0.6585. In the last example, the “impossibility result” reflecting part (c) of
Proposition 2, assume HB = 19.5, HA = 18, ϕB = 0.05, ϕA = 0.01,ΓB = 2, and ΓA = 0.4.
Now we have v̂ = 1.0137, i.e., the agent can only be induced to select PB for a bonus rate
v ≥ 1.0137 which would lead to a negative surplus for the principal. Thus, the principal
induces selection of PA via v =
1−ϕA
2 = 0.495. Here project B is marginally advantageous
over project A with respect to risk-return measure H and marginal reduction of pressure
via effort, ϕ. However, the non-controllable part of justification pressure ΓB is significantly
higher than ΓA. As the agent has to carry the cost of the non-controllable justification
pressure, only for very high incentive rates he would be ready to select project B.
5 Discussion of model assumptions
In our model we assume linear incentive contracts. However, also in a contracting frame-
work with a more general compensation function s(x) (under outcome-based contracts)
the main frictions of our model still arise. In our setting frictions stem from the agent’s
limited liability. Due to this liability constraint the agent receives a rent that decreases
in the accountability parameter Γi. The effect of Γi on the agent’s utility may distort
his project choice. Furthermore, the limited liability constraint induces inefficient effort
incentives.12 Now consider the setting with a general compensation function s(x). If the
12Due to the limited liability constraint, the principal’s equilibrium payoff V ∗B = HB
(
1
2
(1 + ϕB)
)2
if she
chooses the desired project B (or, equivalently, if she induces it via project-specific contracts) does not
correspond to the first-best surplus. In the first-best solution there is no incentive constraint. Thus,
there always exist values v ≥ 0 and w ≥ 0 such that the agent’s participation constraint has no slack
I – 17
limited liability constraint, s(x) ≥ 0 for all x, makes the agent’s participation constraint
slack, the principal does not completely internalize the agent’s costs from accountability.
Thus it may become costly or impossible to induce the desired project.
We also assume in our model that the agent chooses the project. In real world firms, often
divisional managers decide on smaller projects while larger projects lie in the responsibility
of corporate management or the board of directors (Marshuetz, 1985; Taggart, 1987;
Alonso and Matouschek, 2007). Marshuetz (1985), for instance, describes which levels
of managers have the authority to approve investment projects at American Can. For
example, for projects larger than $3 million the board of directors is responsible for the
project decision. Consequently, if we assume large projects and the divisional manager is
the agent in our model, the principal should be responsible for the project decision. If
she chooses the project the optimal solution from the analysis of project-specific contracts
results under outcome-based contracts. The reason is that under project specific contracts
the principal can always induce the agent to choose the desired project without any agency
costs related to the project decision. Given the optimal project can be induced, the only
thing that matters is the incentive problem with regard to the agent’s effort. However,
separating selection and implementation of projects may have effects on accountability -
is a bad outcome the consequence of a bad selection or implementation? Furthermore, the
optimal project selection by the board would in turn pose a contracting problem for the
owners that bears similarity to the problem we analyze in this paper.
Finally, we assume that the agent learns his effort productivity θi for project i after the
project choice but before his effort choice. If the agent can observe his effort productiv-
ity in both projects θA and θB before the project choice, he can condition his project
decision on this information. As before, for a given project i the agent selects his ef-
fort as e (θi) = (v + ϕi) θi. His corresponding utility is again given by (6) which for an
outcome-based contract with w = 0 results as Ui (θi, ei (θi)) =
1
2θ
2
i (v + ϕi)
2 − Γi. Sim-
ilarly, the principal’s utility from project i conditional on θi anticipating e (θi) is given
by Vi (θi) =
1
4θ
2
i (v + ϕi)
2. Thus, the principal prefers always the project with the higher
actual marginal effort productivity. Assume θi > θj . Then the agent selects project i for
at the optimum. In the first-best solution optimal effort for project B is eFBB = θB (1 + ϕB) and the
principal’s corresponding surplus is V FBB =
1
2
HB (1 + ϕB)
2 − ΓB . Due to our assumptions about the
parameters that lead to frictions in the model, V FBB > V
∗
B .
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all values of the incentive rate v if Γi ≤ Γj . If, in contrast, Γi > Γj holds, the agent may
select project j for some v or it might be even impossible to induce the desired project.
Thus, with regard to the project decision, similar insights as in our model setting can be
derived. The main difference, however, is that as the project decision can be conditioned
on θA and θB the principal’s preferred project also depends on these values. As θA and
θB are the agent’s private information, the incentive rate cannot be made contingent on
them. Thus, to solve for the optimal v we need to specify the probability distributions of
θA and θB.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we develop a novel agency model to analyze effects of accountability and
justification pressure on project choices and implementation effort. Justification becomes
necessary when the agent’s project choice turns out to generate low profits. It is modeled
as a psychological cost the agent has to bear. Accountability has two distinct effects in
the model: on the one hand it pushes project choices towards those with a low risk and
return (because these projects usually come along with lower justification pressure); on
the other hand accountability reduces the costs of effort implementation because the agent
would like to avoid low outcomes he has to justify. The principal’s contract offer needs
to accomplish both proper selection and proper implementation of a project. High costs
of accountability decrease the agent’s incentives to select a particular project. The agent
needs to be compensated for the potential justification pressure, and the principal can
achieve that through proper determination of variable pay (instead of fixed pay). Raising
the variable component of pay induces the agent to choose the principal’s preferred project
(“money buys efficiency result”). However, this may not work in every instance; it may be
impossible for the principal to induce the agent to select the principal’s preferred project
(“impossibility result”). Both results imply that accountability pressure may not lead to
lower costs of incentive provision. This is noteworthy because in light of high bonuses
in, e.g., financial institutions some argued that committed, responsible employees should
be hired who do not focus too narrowly on monetary incentives. Our analysis shows
that project selection and accountability may interact in disadvantageous ways. Even
committed employees with high susceptibility to accountability pressures need to be paid
high bonuses to induce proper project or strategy choice.
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Overall our results suggest that firms should be aware of post decision routines that might
affect ex ante decision making. Since accountability affects both project selection and effort
concluding reporting procedures should be conducted with care. More precisely, perceived
pressure at the stage of finding and initiating a project might harm entrepreneurial think-
ing as managers focus on strategies that bear the least risk. However, once a project
is implemented exerting pressure increases effort and performance. Therefore, with re-
sponsibility of project selection being a crucial factor, accountability may be desirable or
undesirable.
As our model considers an aggregate measure for risk and return, experimental research
could examine more closely how the obligation to justify project outcomes is related to the
selection of specific risk-return profiles and if incentive pay is able to mitigate potential
adverse effects. In addition to that it could be analyzed how accountability interacts with
communication policies and if variations in accountability change compliance with these
policies.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Assume HB − HA > 0 and ϕB ≥ ϕA. The equation ∆U (v) = av2 + bv + c = 0 with
a = 12 (HB −HA) > 0, b = (HBϕB −HAϕA) > 0 and c = 12
(
ϕ2BHB − ϕ2AHA
) −∆Γ has
two (one, no) solution(s) iff D = b2 − 4ac > (=, <) 0. If D < 0 one of the two parables
UB (v) and UA (v) is located strictly above the other. Then the agent chooses the upper
one, which must be the one which has the higher slope dUj/dv = (v + ϕj)Hj for all v
∈ (0, 1), i.e. the one where Hjϕj − Hiϕi > 0. This is UB in our setting. If D > 0 the
equation has two real solutions, namely
v1 =
−b+√D
HB −HA , v2 =
−b−√D
HB −HA .
As each parable UB (v) and UA (v) has its minimum at v = −ϕj < 0 at least one of the
solutions (v1, v2) has to be negative. Since HB −HA > 0 and v2 < v1 hold, it follows that
v2 < 0. Thus, if there is an intersection of UB and UA (a positive null of ∆U), then it is
v̂ = −b+
√
D
HB−HA . A special case is D = 0 where v1 = v2 = v̂.
Now assume D ≥ 0 and b ≥ √D. Then v̂ ≤ 0 and the agent selects PB for all v ≥ 0
as right from the intersection the parable with the higher slope UB (v) leads to a higher
surplus for the agent. If D ≥ 0 and b < √D, v̂ > 0 holds and UB (v) > UA (v) for v > v̂
and UB (v) < UA (v) for 0 ≤ v < v̂. 
Proof of Proposition 2
(a) According to Lemma 1 for D < 0 and for b ≥ √D the agent chooses PB for all v ∈ (0, 1).
Here the principal sets the incentive coefficient that maximizes VB (v) : v
∗ = 1−ϕB2 . If
b <
√
D according to Lemma 1 the agent selects PA for 0 ≤ v < v̂ and he selects PB for
v ≥ v̂ with v̂ =
√
D−b
HB−HA . Thus, while the principal prefers project B for all v ∈ (0, 1) the
agent prefers project B only for v ≥ v̂. If v∗B = 1−ϕB2 ≥ v̂ the optimal incentive coefficient
is 1−ϕB2 .
(b) If v̂ exists and v∗B < v̂ < 1, the optimal incentive coefficient is v̂ as for v < v̂ the
agent would select PA but the principal prefers PB for all v ∈ (0, 1) and VB (v) is a strictly
concave function with a unique maximum at v∗B.
(c) If v̂ exists and v̂ ≥ 1 holds true, there is no v ∈ (0, 1) such that the agent can be
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induced to select PB; the principal could not earn any positive surplus via inducing PB.
Thus, the best the principal can do is to set the incentive coefficient v∗ = v∗A =
1−ϕA
2 that
maximizes VA and induces selection of PA. 
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Abstract
We investigate how decision making is affected when the decider knows s/he is held ac-
countable for the decision or outcome. In a series of laboratory experiments we analyze
different treatments where agents have to make an investment decision from a set of
projects. In one setting agents face pressure to justify their project choice if profits are
too low. In another setting agents have to justify their decisions irrespective of the project
outcome. We test hypotheses derived from a simple model and find support for them: ac-
countability reduces the likelihood of value-maximizing project choices though the extent
depends on the type of accountability; however, higher profit shares for the agent or a
project recommendation by the principal can offset that effect.
Keywords:
agency; project selection; accountability; behavioral accounting; incentives; experiment
JEL-Classification:
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1 Introduction
It is commonplace that managers or companies are held accountable for their decisions
and the results of their decisions. Accountability refers to a decision maker’s expectation
that he or she may be obliged to justify his/her decisions to others (Lerner and Tetlock,
1999). Accountability may be effective both ex post and ex ante, i.e., after a decision
has been made or before it. Self-serving attributions represent an example of an ex post
effect and they can be found both at the level of the individual (Ilgen, 1980) and at the
corporate level (Bettman and Weitz, 1983). An ex ante effect occurs if the expectation
to justify a decision itself influences the decision-making process. This influence can be
ambiguous. Knowing that one is held accountable could lead to better decisions (or more
effort in carrying out a task) because of more rigorous deliberation before taking action
(DeZoort et al., 2006; Vieider, 2009; Rausch and Brauneis, 2015; Xiao, 2017). However,
accountability entails an adverse influence if it shifts the focus from optimal decisions to
decisions that can be easily justified; as, for example, in Weigold and Schlenker (1991) or
McMackin and Slovic (2000).
It is the objective of our paper to investigate effects of accountability on investment deci-
sions and to identify factors that affect perceived justification pressure. For this purpose,
we conduct a series of computerized laboratory experiments. We define an agency sit-
uation where the agent is responsible for investment choices. The agency incorporates
accountability on the agent’s side, i.e., the agent knows ex ante that he will be required to
justify either the project performance if it falls below a predetermined level or the project
choice itself.
In the experiments there are two projects, a visionary project with a higher mean return
and variance than a second (standard) project. Intuitively, visionary projects can (but do
not need to) lead to higher justification pressure than standard projects. On the basis of a
simplified version of the analytical model in Lukas et al. (2019), we derive the hypothesis
that justification pressure may prevent optimal project choices from the principal’s point
of view. This hypothesis finds support in the experiment.
Pairs of principal and agent are formed who interact over several decision rounds. In
each round the agent selects one out of the two projects. The ex ante efficient (visionary)
project entails a loss for the principal if the bad state of nature realizes. There are three
manipulations in the experiments: firstly, we vary payoffs from the available projects;
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secondly, we alter the need to justify decision making or performance; and thirdly, - as
a novel feature - we change the principal’s opportunity to recommend a project choice
to the agent. Varying payoffs for agent and/or principal allows us to get further insights
into the impact of payoff differences on project choice. We find support for our hypothesis
that a higher profit share induces the agent to choose value-maximizing projects. And,
as predicted, the principal’s recommendation moderates justification pressure and fosters
efficient project choice. The recommendation turns out to be more effective if the agent
is held accountable for decisions instead of being held accountable for poor outcomes. It
suggests that the type of accountability matters.
There is a growing literature on accountability. Early contributions include Bettman and
Weitz (1983) and Staw et al. (1983), who show that corporations use self-serving patterns
of attributions when they explain their performance to shareholders. Recent contributions
include, for example, Aerts et al. (2013) who show that the way chosen to justify perfor-
mance depends on the institutional setting; Aerts and Zhang (2014) demonstrating that
firms use causal reasoning to influence investors’ interpretation of the firms’ performance;
or Zhang and Aerts (2015) documenting a link between causal language intensity and the
jeopardy of not meeting performance targets. Besides these field studies of accountability
(effects) at the corporate level there are numerous experimental studies at the individual
level. They document positive effects of accountability. For example, justification pressure
may reduce loss aversion (Vieider, 2009; Pahlke et al., 2012), preference reversals (Viei-
der, 2011), overconfidence or order-effects (Ashton, 1990; Jermias, 2006), and inaccurate
judgments (Ashton, 1992); or, Xiao (2017) finds that subjects are more likely to conform
to audience expectations when justification is required, which may lead to less selfish be-
havior (even in the absence of negative consequences for violations). Moreover, Webb
(2002) and Arnold (2015) investigate the effect of perceived pressure to justify decisions
or financial pressure on budgeting decisions. They find that it reduces slack and increases
cooperation. Stated differently, accountability increases the likelihood for efficient deci-
sions that may entail losses. Finally, responsibility effects may be sensitive to loss or gain
frames of decisions under consideration (Pahlke et al., 2015).1
1 DeZoort and Lord (1997) review research on pressure effects in accounting which includes but is not
limited to justification pressure effects.
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Our paper contributes to the experimental literature on accountability for choices of risky
alternatives. In studies that investigate justification pressure effects on loss aversion or risk
aversion (Vieider, 2009; Chakravarty et al., 2011; Pahlke et al., 2012; Polman, 2012; Poll-
mann et al., 2014; Andersson et al., 2016) payoffs are symmetric; this means the payoffs
for the person who decides and for the other passive person are the same for each potential
choice. In our experiment we introduce asymmetric payoffs in an accountability context.
Asymmetric payoffs mirror a characteristic feature of managerial investment decisions:
variable pay arrangments typically award management a different share of the investment
returns than owners receive.2 In contrast to prior literature, we find that justification pres-
sure (i.e., accountability) reduces the likelihood of efficient decisions. Furthermore, to the
best of our knowledge, there seems to be little specific work on methods and devices that
lead to desired decision making under accountability. One example is Ashton (1992), who
finds that people are (partially) reluctant to rely on recommendations of technical aids
(e.g., key performance indicators (KPIs)). With respect to investment decisions and post-
decisional accountability, we introduce upfront communication of firm policies/preferences
as an alternative device. We find that managers comply with the recommendations and
that this process offsets justification pressure to some extent. Finally, since we compare
two closely related experimental settings, we are able to analyze how differing justifica-
tion/reporting regimes and incentive contracts change the way accountability influences
investment decisions. Therefore, our paper also contributes to ongoing research on con-
trolling investment decisions (e.g., Reichelstein, 2000; Pfeiffer and Schneider, 2007; Ortner
et al., 2017). Besides the choice of performance measures or particular depreciation sched-
ules (e.g., Reichelstein, 1997; Rogerson, 1997) a more or less stringent reporting regime
may be effective as well.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple model that allows us to
derive testable hypotheses. The experiment and its results are presented in sections 3 and
4. The final section concludes.
2 Pollmann et al. (2014) also utilize asymmetric payoffs but the agent’s material payoff depends on the
principal’s decision to reward the agent after the project choice.
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2 The model
Let xi be the outcome of Project i = A,B. Each project has two possible outcomes such
that xi ∈ {Li, Hi} with Hi > Li. The probability that the high outcome is realized is 0.5
under both projects. In what follows we distinguish between the two projects as follows:
we call Project A the ”standard project” and Project B the ”visionary project”. We
assume that Project B has the higher expected outcome but at the same time also the
higher outcome variance. Hence,
E (xA) = 0.5 (HA + LA) < 0.5 (HB + LB) = E (xB)
V ar (xA) = 0.5 (HA − LA)2 < 0.5 (HB − LB)2 = V ar (xB) .
We further assume that LA ≥ 0 and LB ≤ 0. Thus, (only) the visionary Project B leads
with a probability of 50 percent to a negative outcome.
The agent’s wage wi is partly project-specific: The agent obtains a fixed payment f that is
not contingent on the project choice; in addition he receives a project-specific bonus viHi
if the high project outcome is realized under project i. The factor vi can be interpreted as
the agent’s share of the high project outcome under project i. Thus, the agent’s expected
compensation if he chooses project i is given by
E (wi) = f + 0.5viHi.
As the agent is responsible for the project choice, he is held accountable for bad project
performance and/or for the project choice itself. This justification pressure is captured as
a psychological cost JPi on the agent’s side. For example, if he has to justify the project
choice, JPi may be considered as a deterministic variable depending on the characteristics
of the project. Therefore, the visionary Project B might have a higher justification pressure
than Project A, JPB > JPA. JPi may also depend on the firm’s strategy and its
communication. If, however, the agent has to justify the bad outcome (Li), JPi could be
considered as an expected ”value” of the justification pressure, where the psychological
cost only occurs if Li is realized. Incorporating the justification pressure into the agent’s
preference function, the agent’s overall surplus Ui from selecting project i consists of his
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expected compensation less the justification pressure
Ui = f + 0.5viHi − JPi.
The principal’s surplus Vi if project i has been selected consists of its expected outcome
0.5 (Hi + Li) less the agent’s expected compensation. Thus,
Vi = 0.5 (Hi + Li)− f − 0.5viHi = (1− vi) 0.5Hi − 0.5Li − f .
We assume that the agent is protected by limited liability such that vi ≥ 0 and f ≥ 0
need to hold true.
Which project does the agent select? Notice that if the bonus coefficients vi are equal
for both projects, the expected compensation for the agent is higher under Project B.
Nonetheless, the agent may prefer the choice of Project A if JPB is significantly higher
than JPA. However, the choice of Project B might be incentivized by raising the share
vB the agent receives from the good outcome of Project B; or it may be encouraged by
reducing justification pressure JPB by means of communicating the preferred investment
strategy (Project B) to the agent.
3 Design of the experiments and derivation of hypotheses
We conduct the experiments in order to examine if and how investment decisions are
affected by accountability. We test the assumption that accountability causes negative
utility on the agent’s side and therefore could lead to decisions that do not maximize total
surplus. We also extend the basic framework of our model and investigate how justification
pressure and a firm’s investment strategy might interact. More precisely, we add project
recommendations from the principal to the experiments. These recommendations can be
seen as a potential remedy for justification pressure.
Our main experiment shows a 6x2x2 factorial design with between-subject and within-
subject analyses. We manipulate the existence of accountability (no obligation to justify
the result or the decision; obligation to justify the result or decision) and the information
about the principal’s preferred project (no recommendation to agent; recommendation to
agent). To study effects of differing bonuses, we vary the payoff schemes in the decision
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rounds within each treatment. Table 1 gives an overview of all treatments.
No justification Justification
No recommendation BL JP
Recommendation REC JP-REC
Table 1: Treatments
At the beginning of the experiment, pairs of principal and agent are formed.3 Pairs remain
unchanged in six decision sets (fixed matching). We vary the order of the payment schemes
over the six decision rounds.4 The agent selects one of two projects, Project A or Project
B, at the beginning of each decision round. There are two equally likely states of nature,
state 1 and state 2. Depending on the state, each project yields a project-specific low
outcome (in state 1) or a high outcome (in state 2). The payoff characteristics of the two
projects follow the description in the previous section. Given the agent’s limited liability,
the principal absorbs any negative outcome. High outcomes are shared between principal
and agent. The sharing rule is specific for each decision round, however, it always ensures
that Project B leads to a higher expected compensation for the agent than Project A and
that Project B leads to a higher surplus for the principal than Project A. Table 5 in the
appendix gives overview of the payoff schemes.
The majority of our analyses is based on the agents’ individual frequencies for selecting
Project B. In business life, investment choice can be thought of as a repeated decision
problem and repeated interaction between management and owners. The individual fre-
quency of selecting Project B can be interpreted as the “type” of manager where type
describes the inclination to select the (visionary) value-maximizing project instead of the
less risky standard project.
In our baseline treatment (BL), the setting is tested without any additional features.
If both principal and agent are expected payoff-maximizers they both prefer B over A.
In all treatments with justifications (JP and JP-REC), the agent is held accountable
3 In all sessions we use neutral language and refer to the agent as “Player 1”, and to the principal as
“Player 2”. The investment projects are accordingly labeled “Alternatives”. The appendix contains
complete instructions.
4 Within each treatment, approximately half of the principal-agent pairs face payoff schemes in ascending
order (payoff schemes 1 to 6 in the sets 1 to 6), the other half in descending order (payoff schemes 6 to 1
in the sets 1 to 6). For the purpose of statistical analyses the decision sets with the same payoff schemes
are matched.
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after decision making is done and project outcomes have been observed. Agents are
held accountable for (bad) project outcomes, i.e., they are obliged to justify the outcome
whenever the principal suffers a financial loss. Consequently, it is only Project B that
bears the risk of being held accountable. This mirrors the phenomenon in business life
that in many cases bad outcomes and especially losses need to be justified but not bad
project choices (as long as outcomes are satisfactory).5 Accountability is implemented
by a computer chat between principal and agent, where the agent must enter her/his
justification and the principal has the option to reply to the justification. We believe
that participants feel a sufficient extent of discomfort when they have to justify poor
project outcomes, although it is very clear from our design, that poor results are the sole
consequence of a selection decision and an act of nature.
Besides accountability, investment decisions by managers may be influenced by a number
of other factors. One factor very likely to influence decisions is the “preference” of owners.
Owners can communicate their preferred business strategy to managers by, for example,
stating that they want the management to pursue innovative projects. If owners prefer
a visionary strategy, it should be less stressful to report low outcomes that are due to
selecting higher-risk projects. Contrary to this situation, if managers know owners prefer
standard projects, it might be less pleasant to report bad outcomes for visionary projects,
and it might also require “better” explanations why higher-risk projects instead of standard
projects have been chosen.6 Hence, we expect that the communication of the owners’
investment preference can moderate the justification pressure for managers and increases
the probability that the preferred project is chosen. In order to gain some practical insights
on this aspect, we vary the assumption that agents are uninformed about the principal’s
preferences at the time of the decision, i.e., we allow for upfront communication of the
owners’ investment preferences. We implement this as follows: in treatments REC and
JP-REC the principal recommends a project to the agent before the agent selects a project.
The agent is free to follow the recommendation or to disregard it.
5 We believe that outcome accountability, where only bad outcomes need to be justified, is a realistic
scenario. However, in order to determine specific characteristics of accountability and its effects (e.g.
differences in the threat potential), we also consider decision accountability, where agents have to explain
themselves independently from the outcome, at a later stage (see Hypothesis 5).
6 Here the implicit assumption is that the actual implementation works without problems, so that a
potentially insufficient implementation is not the cause for a low outcome.
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The experiment features symmetric information about available projects. We choose this
approach because it simplifies the entire recommendation process. Another characteristic
of our experiments is, that bonus rates/payoff shares are not determined by the principal
but exogenously given. By doing so we can ensure variation in incentives. Moreover,
implementing the same variation within each treatment increases comparability.
On the basis of our model and the arguments above, we expect that accountability reduces
the frequency of Project B-choices in all conditions, and we expect that communication
of the preferred project influences project selection. We state this formally in Hypotheses
1 and 2.
Hypothesis 1 Being held accountable for a (bad) project outcome leads to a less frequent
choice of Project B compared to a situation without accountability.
Hypothesis 2 a) If principals prefer Project B, communication of that preference leads
to Project B being chosen more often. b) The more often Project B is recommended over
the course of the experiment the lower the perceived justification pressure.
Another factor that influences managers’ decisions is the compensation contract. Compen-
sation contracts are designed to give managers incentives for value-maximizing investment
decisions. According to our model there may be situations in which the principal needs
to raise the bonus rate to incentivize the agent to select the efficient project. To test this
effect in the experiment we vary the payoff shares the agent receives if Project B is chosen
(see Table 5). The increasing outcome share accruing to the agent mirrors the rise in the
bonus rate that is necessary to induce efficient project choice. Following our theoretical
model we predict a moderating effect of variable pay on project choice. This is stated in
Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 3 Raising variable pay mitigates the effect of justification pressure on project
choice and leads to Project B being chosen more often.
A different question in terms of accountability is how its effects change over time. Does a
manager get used to the procedure of justifying herself/himself the more often s/he faces
such a situation? Does accountability, thus, loose its threat potential? Or does it hold
that managers perceive more pressure when the number of justifications increases, as each
justification could, for example, damage the manager’s reputation even more? We believe
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that both scenarios can be true. Therefore, increasing the number of occasions where an
agent is held accountable in our experiment might result in two opposing effects. On the
one hand, perceived justification pressure decreases because the agent becomes familiar
with the situation to justify his decision making. One could describe this as something like
a habituation effect. On the other hand, being held accountable persistently might also
lead to increased discomfort. As a consequence, we are not able to formulate a directional
hypothesis, so we state it in null form.
Hypothesis 4 Increasing the frequency with which an agent is held accountable for a bad
project outcome leads to no effect in terms of perceived justification pressure.
According to Hypothesis 2 it should hold that the chance of a Project B-choice increases
if the corresponding investment preference is communicated by the principal. However, it
is still an open question whether the will to follow a recommendation (i.e., the compliance
rate) would change if accountability is implemented in a different way. An alternative type
of accountability would be, for example, a reporting regime where agents have to justify
their decisions (and not the outcomes). Does this lead to a higher or lower compliance?
In order to provide an answer to that question, we conduct an additional experimental
study. The major difference between our first experiment and the second one is that agents
instead of being held accountable for bad outcomes are now being held accountable for
their decision independent from the actual project result.7
We believe that the general impact of decision accountability on project choice is not
different to the effect of outcome accountability. However, we expect that being held
accountable for each and every decision results in an even higher compliance than being
held accountable for bad project results only. The reason for our expectation is, that the
former is a more stringent reporting regime than the latter, which might be perceived
similarly to a stronger monitoring. We correspondingly build the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5 Being obligated to justify project choices leads to a higher compliance with
Project B-recommendations than being held accountable for bad project outcomes.
7 In the following, we label our main study as Experiment 1. The additional experiment for decision
accountability is called Experiment 2. Experiment 2 comprises two treatments, BL and JP-REC. The
incentive structure in Experiment 2 (see Table 6) is slightly different from the one in Experiment 1.
This appears innocuous given that decisions in treatment BL do not differ between Experiment 1 and
Experiment 2.
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To increase the level of internal validity we also implement several additional control mea-
sures via computerized pre- and post-experimental questionnaires. Firstly, a risk attitude
test from the German Socio Economic Panel (SOEP)8 is applied to be able to distinguish
effects of our independent variables from influences of differences in risk attitudes. Sec-
ondly, since other-regarding preferences could affect decision making in our experiment,
a test for inequality aversion is incorporated as another measure. We use the test from
Fortin et al. (2007) to categorize participants into three classes of inequality aversion (low,
medium, and high) and are thus able to control for this influence. Thirdly, we test our
subjects regarding their “big 5 personality traits”. The corresponding measures are again
based on a test from the German SOEP and capture the extent of the following character
traits: conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, openness, and neuroticism.9 Other
influences which have to be considered result from the repeated interaction of the partici-
pants (several decision sets, fixed matching). The first such influence could be reputation
building. Since agent participants are the only players who make payoff-relevant decisions
we do not expect reputation effects here (similar to the situation in a repeated dictator
game). The second influence could be that participants are able to engage in cooperative
or retaliatory behavior in treatments with chat communication. To detect collusions or
retaliations and to distinguish them from behaviors induced by accountability, recommen-
dations, and the pay scheme, we analyze chat contents.
After arriving in the lab participants are randomly assigned a seat. A video film is played
in which an experimenter (who is not present during the experiment) reads the complete
instructions and explains screenshots from the upcoming experiment. Then participants
are asked to read the written instructions at their seats. Clarifying questions are answered
at participants’ seats. Before the actual experiment starts, participants have to answer a
number of control questions to make sure every participant has a sound understanding of
the experimental situation. The subjects of our experiments are compensated by means
of an initial endowment (30 Taler in Experiment 1 and 25 Taler in Experiment 2)10 and
8 Further information about the German Socio Economic Panel and its measures can be found in, e.g.,
Wagner et al. (2007) or Richter et al. (2013).
9 All questionnaires for the control variables can be found in the appendix.
10The experimental currency Taler has an exchange rate of 3 Taler per 1 Euro in Experiment 1, and 2.5
Taler per 1 Euro in Experiment 2.
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the payoff of one specific decision round. Paying one round instead of all rounds pre-
vents “wealth effects” (see Charness et al., 2016). This payoff-relevant round is publicly
and randomly selected after the experiment. The initial endowment for each participant
ensures that the sum of initial endowment and the payoff in the relevant decision round
cannot become negative, i.e., no participant could suffer a loss in the experiment.
4 Results of the experiments
Both experiments were conducted in the Leibniz Laboratory of Experimental Economics
of the Leibniz Universita¨t Hannover. For organization and administration processes the
software hroot (Bock et al., 2014) was used, and the experiments were programmed by
means of the software zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). In total 304 undergraduate and graduate
students (218 students in Experiment 1 and 86 students in Experiment 2) from various
fields of study participated. The average age of participants was 23.3 years. Experimental
sessions lasted approximately 60 minutes and earnings average 13.22 Euro.
We present a descriptive analysis of the experiments and results of statistical tests and
regressions. Non-parametric statistical tests follow Siegel (1957). Test results are labeled
statistically significant whenever p ≤ 0.1 in two-sided tests. In order to account for the
repeated interactions of pairs of subjects, our regressions are specified such that intra-
group dependencies are considered (clustered errors).
Figure 1 summarizes the major results concerning the agents’ Project B-choices in our
main Experiment 1.11
Two effects are apparent: firstly, if justification pressure is present, agents more often
select the less risky standard Project A. Secondly, the principals’ recommendations seem
to have an effect on the choices of the agents. Adding recommendations increases the
frequency at which Project B is chosen. This appears to be true also in the absence of
justification pressure.
To see whether those differences among the treatments reach a statistically significant level
we conduct non-parametric analyses (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, two-sided - WMW
11A detailed list of round-by-round results can be found in the appendix (see Table 7)
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Figure 1: Average frequencies of Project B-choices, Experiment 1
and/or Robust Rank Order test, two-sided - RRO).12
Regarding Hypothesis 1, which tests the effects of outcome accountability on project
choice, we find that agents select Project B less often in treatment JP as opposed to
treatment BL to a statistically significant extent (WMW: p=0.0302; RRO: p=0.0247).
Corresponding tests for the comparison between treatment REC and JP-REC show sig-
nificant differences as well (WMW: p=0.0072; RRO: p=0.0045). The difference between
REC and JP-REC is not driven by different types of recommendations because there is no
statistically significant difference between the distribution of individual recommendations
between these treatments (WMW: p=0.4336; RRO: p=0.4508). Regarding the extent to
which justification pressure affects project choices we find medium-sized effects (Glass’s
Delta, BL vs. JP: 0.6041; REC vs. JP-REC: 0.7891).
If we control for underlying recommendations the picture does not change. Figure 2 shows
that if Project B is recommended in the JP-REC treatment (JP-REC B), the average
rate at which agents follow this recommendation is significantly lower (WMW: p=0.0051)
compared to the REC treatment (REC B). Even though justifying the project outcome
is easier after a Project B-recommendation (”I only followed your recommendation”), a
significant part of agents still struggles to actually choose Project B. Consequently, justi-
fication pressure is not eliminated by recommendations but only mitigated. In summary,
the results confirm that the effect of accountability for project outcomes is unambiguous,
it decreases the likelihood of Project B being chosen.
12See Fligner and Policello (1981) as well as Feltovich (2003) for more information about the RRO test.
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Figure 2: Compliance with Project B-recommendations, Experiment 1
To get a more detailed understanding of the underlying drivers for the agents’ decisions we
conduct a series of regressions. Firstly, we run logit random effects regressions containing
data of all treatments, using a dummy variable (JustPresDum) to identify agents that
operate under accountability. Table 2 gives an overview of the regression results.13 Out-
come accountability affects the agents’ choices negatively to a quite considerable extent.
Expressing regression equation (1) in odds we find an odds ratio of 0.397 for JustPres-
Dum. This means under accountability we expect to find only 0.397 agents who would
select Project B for every agent choosing Project A. Other factors strongly influencing
the agents’ decisions are recommendations to choose Project B from the principals (RecB)
and the percentage share the agent receives from total project payoff if Project B is chosen
and state 2 realizes (PercShareB).
In order to assess the quality of these results, recall that the justification situation in
our setting is described in neutral language, completely anonymous and takes place via
computer chat. Therefore, the chances of creating psychological stress, i.e., justification
pressure, are rather small compared to a context-rich setting or a real business-life situa-
tion, where the involved person reports a) face-to-face and b) to probably more than one
supervisor, shareholder, etc. However, we still find some significant coherence between
fewer Project B-choices and justification pressure, which is a strong argument. More
context likely increases justification pressure (Haynes and Kachelmeier, 1998) and would
13A detailed description of variables used in tests and regressions can be found in the appendix.
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ChoiceB (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
JustPresDum -0.923*** -0.853*** -0.476* -0.595*
(0.351) (0.326) (0.288) (0.313)
RecB 3.768*** 3.686*** 3.692*** 3.657***
(0.760) (0.750) (0.737) (0.735)
JustPresDum RecB -0.899 -1.070 -1.251 -1.163
(1.003) (0.993) (0.975) (0.966)
PercShareB 4.592*** 4.576*** 8.407*** 8.454***
(1.247) (1.242) (2.313) (2.323)
WillRisk 0.151** 0.177** 0.102 0.065
(0.074) (0.085) (0.070) (0.067)
InequAveLevF -0.429** -0.527** -0.376* -0.360*
(0.193) (0.221) (0.204) (0.209)
Age -0.013 -0.003 -0.002 0.000
(0.020) (0.022) (0.026) (0.023)
Male 0.641** 0.499 0.449* 0.358
(0.288) (0.329) (0.268) (0.295)
Semester 0.053 0.044 0.057 0.050
(0.037) (0.043) (0.039) (0.038)
MaxOwnPay 0.272*** 0.251*** 0.243***
(0.057) (0.058) (0.060)
MaxOtherPay -0.040 -0.064 -0.074
(0.073) (0.068) (0.071)
PaySchemVar 0.004 -0.009** -0.009**
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
PartnPaySchemVar -0.001*** 0.001* 0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Open 0.007 -0.012
(0.042) (0.040)
Conscient -0.150** -0.035
(0.077) (0.074)
Extraver 0.016 0.053
(0.078) (0.078)
Agree 0.064 -0.043
(0.078) (0.059)
Neuro -0.168*** -0.108
(0.065) (0.067)
Standard errors in parentheses
N = 654, ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Table 2: Random effects logit regressions, all treatments, Experiment 1
probably lead to even stronger results (see also Lerner and Tetlock, 1999).
Given the evidence from non-parametric tests and regressions we consider outcome ac-
countability to be a crucial factor in the decision making of the agents. With respect to
Hypothesis 1 we thus conclude:
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Conclusion 1:
Experimental results give support for Hypothesis 1, i.e., outcome accountability reduces the
likelihood of value-maximizing project choices independently from recommendations.
Our results regarding Hypothesis 1 are in line with Adelberg and Batson (1978). They
find that only unaccountable agents make efficient decisions, as the desire for approval
shifts focus away from outcomes to justifiability of outcomes.
Hypothesis 2a) states that communication of Project B-preferences increases the frequency
with which agents select Project B. A first approach to test this is to compare Project
B-choices in treatments JP and JP-REC and control for the underlying recommenda-
tions. Figure 3 shows the percentage of Project B-choices in the JP treatment which are
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Figure 3: Frequencies of Project B-choices, Experiment 1
matched against Project B-choices of JP-REC, where the corresponding principals recom-
mend Project B (JP-REC B). Although recommendations are by no means binding it is
apparent that agents act on them. In the JP-REC treatment close to 80% select Project
B, whereas only 41% choose Project B without a recommendation. As the number of
agents choosing Project B is heavily increased compared to treatment JP, it indicates
that the negative impact of justification pressure on the value-maximizing project choice
is affected. However, there are still some agents selecting Project A although B was rec-
ommended. As mentioned earlier, the obvious reason for this is that justification pressure
remains a crucial factor. The differences in individual frequencies of Project B-choices
between treatments JP and JP-REC B are statistically significant (WMW: p=0.0000;
RRO: p=0.0000). Effect sizes again reach a medium level (Glass’s Delta: 0.6343). Thus,
Project B-recommendations indeed shift project choices towards value-maximizing de-
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cisions. Further evidence is provided by the regression outcome presented in Table 2.
Project B-recommendations clearly outweigh almost all other decision drivers and, thus,
affect the agents’ decision making to a significant extent.
As Project B-choices are heavily increased by Project B-recommendations, it appears in-
tuitive that recommendations reduce the impact of justification pressure. For example,
consider a situation where an employee reports project results to higher hierarchical levels.
Whenever a project fails to reach a predetermined benchmark, the employee’s perceived
stress from justifying the outcome decreases heavily if the preceding project decision ac-
cords with recommendations of the superiors as the recipients of the justification. The
crucial point is that the agent’s perceived responsibility for the project outcome falls short
of the level in a situation where the agent decides without recommendation.
In order to test this more closely, we make use of a measure from a post-experimental ques-
tionnaire, which captures the agents’ perceived justification pressure. Figure 4 presents a
comparison of the average levels of perceived justification pressure in treatments JP and
JP-REC. While the bar chart of the JP treatment considers all agents of the treatment,
the bar chart of the JP-REC treatment shows average perceived pressure of agents who
receive more than five consecutive Project B-recommendations.14
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
JP JP-REC B > 5
4.03
1.00
Figure 4: Perceived justification pressure with/without recommendations, Experiment 1
Apparently, an increased frequency of Project B-recommendations reduces the perceived
justification pressure (WMW: p=0.0677; RRO: p=0.0145). Therefore, it is a first indica-
14We expect that the effect of a Project B-recommendation is particularly strong if it is given continuously.
We thus consider only cases where agents receive recommendations for Project B more than five times
(JP-REC > 5).
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tion that Hypothesis 2b) finds support.
However, another reason for the high compliance could be uncertainty reduction. Since
agents are aware of the principals’ preferences after the recommendations are commu-
nicated, they can make their decisions with “clean conscience”. Thus, in order to fully
confirm Hypothesis 2b) one has to control for effects of uncertainty reduction. To do
so, we conduct another analysis where we regress perceived justification pressure on the
frequency of Project B-recommendations in the JP-REC treatment. The results are il-
lustrated in Table 3. Recommendations indeed have significant impact on the perception
of justification pressure. If the frequency of upfront Project B-recommendations is high,
the log odds that the agent perceives lower justification pressure are high as well. In
addition to that we find some cases in the computer chats where agents almost exactly
argue in a way mentioned above (“I only followed your recommendation”). With respect
to Hypothesis 2 we are therefore able to summarize the following:
Conclusion 2:
Experimental results support Hypothesis 2a) and 2b), principals’ recommendations of Project
B reduce justification pressure and increase the likelihood of value-maximizing project
choices to a statistically significant extent.
The result is in line with, e.g., Tetlock (1983) and Tetlock et al. (1989) who conclude that
conformity is the most efficient coping strategy. People simply adopt the position that is
most likely to gain the favor of those to whom they are accountable and they also avoid
unnecessary cognitive work (see also Lerner and Tetlock, 1999, p. 256).
Concerning Hypothesis 3 it is evident from Table 2 (variable PercShareB) that the agents’
relative payoffs from Project B in the good state significantly incentivize them to select
Project B. Since agents are protected by limited liability this result goes beyond the
classical “more pay for more risk” argument. Quite the contrary, it seems to be the case
that agents in our experiment show some reluctance to put the principals at risk. This
effect, however, is reduced by increasing payoff shares, which mirrors the ”money-buys-
efficiency result” from Lukas et al. (2019). As regressions in the BL treatment showed
significant effects as well, it seems that value-maximizing choices and the “willingness”
to inflict potential losses on the principal depend on the agent’s profit share even in the
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JustPresScore (1) (2) (3) (4)
FreqRecB -0.606** -0.860* -1.618*** -2.012**
(0.306) (0.457) (0.555) (1.002)
FreqJustReq -0.831 -1.424 1.420 -4.187*
(1.063) (1.370) (1.548) (2.352)
FreqJustReq2 0.171 0.429 -0.270 0.639
(0.254) (0.347) (0.426) (0.482)
FreqJustReq*NoCompl 0.178 -0.048 -0.406 4.279**
(0.717) (0.812) (0.875) (1.747)
InequAveLevF 0.320 1.165* -2.119
(0.624) (0.703) (1.389)
Age 0.208 0.438* 0.057
(0.230) (0.238) (0.383)
Male -0.103 -0.495 -4.227**
(0.936) (0.987) (1.771)
Semester -0.085 0.040 -0.384**
(0.110) (0.107) (0.194)
WillRisk -0.229 -0.528* -1.368*
(0.281) (0.319) (0.751)
MaxOwnPay 1.294*** 1.903**
(0.437) (0.857)
MaxOtherPay -0.109 -0.583
(0.328) (0.728)
Open 0.914**
(0.370)
Conscient 0.569
(0.372)
Extraver -1.898***
(0.578)
Agree 2.903***
(1.089)
Neuro -1.137*
(0.593)
Standard errors in parentheses
N = 23, ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Table 3: Ordered logit regressions, JP-REC, Experiment 1
absence of justification pressure and recommendations.15
Given the regression outcome we conclude as follows:
15These regression results are also available upon request.
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Conclusion 3:
Experimental results give support for Hypothesis 3, a higher profit share for the agent mit-
igates negative effects of accountability and increases the likelihood of a value-maximizing
project choice.
In order to analyze Hypothesis 4, we examine whether the perceived justification pressure
is correlated with the number of occasions the agent is held accountable for a bad project
outcome. Descriptive statistics in Figure 5 do not provide a very clear picture but indicate
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Figure 5: Perceived justification pressure, count of justifications, JP-REC, Experiment 1
that the two opposing effects we presume could exist.16 Perceived stress is the highest
after one justification, it decreases when agents become familiar with the situation, and it
increases again when agents are held accountable persistently. Consequently, there could
be an u-shaped relationship between perceived justification pressure and the number of
justifications that are required (as indicated by the trendline).
To come to a conclusion here we can refer to the regression analysis presented in Ta-
ble 3. One can see that the number of justifications significantly reduces the perceived
justification pressure. However, the regression fails to provide a clear significant effect
for the positive influence of “FreqJustReq2” (p=0.185), which would have confirmed the
u-shaped relation. Nevertheless, the coefficient points in the right direction. Another
factor influencing perceived justification pressure significantly proves to be the number
16Recall that we expected 1) the more often an agent is held accountable for his/her decisions, the more
likely it becomes a routine to justify poor results (dimineshed threat potential of possible justifications
in the future); or 2) being held accountable persistently increases justification pressure due to, e.g.,
reputational concerns.
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of justifications where the agent did not comply with the principal’s recommendation
(FreqJustReq*NoCompl). Furthermore, male participants felt much less pressure than
females. Similarly, participants with a higher willingness to take risks perceived less pres-
sure than the respective counterparts. A strong intention to maximize the own payoff, in
turn, leads to more perceived pressure. A possible interpretation of this result could be
that the agents feel guilt if they pursue their own goals while ignoring the possible losses
the principals are exposed to. It seems reasonable that feelings of guilt increase the stress
in the justification process. With respect to Hypothesis 4 we thus conclude:
Conclusion 4:
Perceived justification pressure seems to decrease the more often an agent is held account-
able. Regression results provide no significant results for an opposing effect.
Hypothesis 5 raises the question whether the type of accountability (for decisions vs.
for outcomes) affects compliance with recommendations. Figure 6 provides descriptive
statistics. It is clear to see that compliance rates in Experiment 2, where agents have to
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Figure 6: Compliance with Project B-recommendations, JP-REC, both experiments
justify each decision, are higher than compliance rates in Experiment 1, where bad project
results have to be justified. As the difference is significant (WMW: p=0.0624), it seems
that decision accountability is the more effective way of achieving compliance with respect
to innovative/risky investment politics.
However, besides being affected by the type of accountability, compliance rates could
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potentially be influenced by other factors. An example might be the respective payoff
scheme (see Tables 5 and 6). We know from the results related to Hypothesis 3 that a
higher bonus incentivizes agents to select Project B more often. Similarly, compliance
with a Project B-recommendation might increase if the payoff of Project B is particularly
high. As payoff schemes differ slightly between the two experiments compliance with a
Project B-recommendation might be affected differently. Other possible influences can
be related to the personal characteristics of the participants, which cannot be controlled
for in the non-parametric test above. In order to examine possible effects from these
factors, we run another regression analysis where the agents’ compliance with Project B-
recommendations is regressed on a selection of variables that (potentially) differ between
the experiments.
ComplB (1) (2) (3) (4)
DecisionAcc 1.958 2.098 2.454 12.502
(1.631) (2.005) (2.186) (9.944)
DeltaDiffBonusB -0.011 -0.026 -0.523
(0.103) (0.111) (0.427)
WillRisk -0.034 -0.892
(0.459) (1.143)
InequAveLevF 1.203 1.213
(0.961) (1.522)
Age -0.553* -1.648
(0.298) (1.103)
Male 1.178 1.178
(1.033) (2.248)
Semester 0.454** 1.146
(0.205) (0.899)
MaxOwnPay -0.514
(0.503)
MaxOtherPay 2.006
(1.234)
PaySchemVar -0.043
(0.049)
PartnPaySchemVar -0.004*
(0.003)
Standard errors in parentheses
N = 94, ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Table 4: Random effects logit regressions, JP-REC, both experiments
The crucial variable in Table 4 is DecisionAcc, which is a dummy that identifies the agents
of Experiment 2, where subjects are held accountable for there decisions. The influence
of decision accountability on the compliance with a Project B-recommendation shows the
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predicted direction; yet the influence only comes close to the conventional level of sta-
tistical significance (p=0.124). In the sense of Rosnow and Rosenthal (1989), the data
gives at least some support for our hypothesis.17 Furthermore, we control for potentially
deviating incentives from the payoff schemes by means of the variable “DeltaDiffBonusB”,
which measures the difference between the payoffs of the Project B-choices in the respec-
tive decision rounds in Experiment 1 and 2. The corresponding coefficient indicates that
differences in the compliance rates between Experiment 1 and 2 are not driven by the
differences between the payment schemes. Effects on the compliance are found to result
only from minor control variables (age, semester, and the variance in the partner’s pay-
off).18 Overall, we take the outcome of the non-parametric test and the regressions as an
indication that Project B-compliance is driven by the type of accountability. Regarding
Hypothesis 5 we thus conclude:
Conclusion 5:
Decision accountability leads to a higher compliance with Project B-recommendations than
outcome accountability.
Our conclusion is in line with other studies examining differences between outcome ac-
countability and decision accountability. For example, Simonson and Staw (1992) suggest
that outcome accountability increases the need for self-justification and, thus, produces
greater commitment to a prior course of action than decision accountability does. In our
experiment, the agent’s preferred project could be interpreted to correspond to the prior
course of action in Simonson and Staw (1992). Then the agent is more likely to stick to his
preferred project under outcome accountability than under decision accountability. Stated
differently, the agent’s willingness to accept recommendations from the principal is greater
under decision accountability - and this is what we find. Similarly, Siegel-Jacobs and Yates
(1996) find that outcome accountability increases judgmental inconsistency, which in our
experiment can be understood as switching between the options instead of staying with
the project choice that leads to the highest expected payoff (Project B).
17“God loves the 0.06 nearly as much as the 0.05” (Rosnow and Rosenthal, 1989, p. 1277).
18Note, that a regression of the big 5 personality traits was not possible.
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5 Summary and conclusion
In this paper we analyze effects of justification pressure on project choices. A justification
becomes necessary either when the agent’s project choice turns out to generate low profits
(outcome accountability) or when a decision is made (decision accountability). Justifi-
cation pressure is modeled as a psychological cost the agent has to bear. Hypotheses
derived from our model find support in the experimental results. Justification pressure
reduces the likelihood of value-maximizing investment choices. Higher bonus rates can
mitigate this effect to some extent. Recommendations from the principal are also effec-
tive in the hypothesized direction. Provided the effect carries over to a management-firm
context, it could suggest that communicating preferences, e.g., the owners express their
preferred investment strategy, is likely to be effective in directing management’s invest-
ment decisions. It may partially offset the effect of justification pressure and work in favor
of value-maximizing, risk-taking investment strategies. Results in terms of the frequency
with which agents are held accountable seem to indicate that perceived justification pres-
sure decreases the more often an agent is held accountable. Yet, the more effective way to
reach a high compliance with preferences over risky investments is to implement a stricter
reporting regime, i.e., employers should hold employees accountable for each decision, not
only for bad outcomes. This, however, raises the question of how decision quality can
be evaluated ex post. Finally, one should be aware that compliance with policies is the
highest for investment alternatives, which are most profitable from the perspective of the
decision maker. As justification pressure is the major driver behind our experimental
results, future research could examine its determinants in more depth. For example, in-
corporating multiple and more sophisticated measures of (perceived) justification pressure
in the experiment design would improve the understanding of its psychological perception
and possible implications on decision making compliance with recommendations.
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Appendix
Pre-experimental questionnaire (Experiment 1 and 2)
We kindly ask you to provide some demographic information:
1. How old are you?
2. Please tell us your gender.
3. What is your field of study? / What is the subject you are enrolled in (e.g. business adminis-
tration, engineering, etc.)?
4. How many semesters have you studied so far?
Please use the following scale to indicate the reliability of your answers.
Notes (not visible to the subjects):
Answer 1 was used to build the variable “Age”.
Answer 2 was used to build the variable “Male”.
Answer 3 was used to gather information for descriptive statistics.
Answer 4 was used to build the variable “Semester”.
Questionnaire risk attitude (Experiment 1 and 2)
How do you see yourself:
Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?
Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 0 means: ’risk averse’ and the value 9 means: ’fully
prepared to take risks’. You can use the values in between to make your estimate.
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Questionnaire inequality aversion (Experiment 1 and 2)
It is your job to divide an amount of money between two persons. Personally you are not affected by
the distribution!
You have three times the chance to choose among two kinds of distributions (either Alternative X or
Alternative Y).
Which alternative do you prefer?
Set 1 Alternative X Alternative Y
Share Player 1 Share Player 2 Total Profit Share Player 1 Share Player 2 Total Profit
50 50 100 55 65 120
Set 2 Alternative X Alternative Y
Share Player 1 Share Player 2 Total Profit Share Player 1 Share Player 2 Total Profit
50 50 100 45 70 115
Set 3 Alternative X Alternative Y
Share Player 1 Share Player 2 Total Profit Share Player 1 Share Player 2 Total Profit
50 50 100 35 85 120
Notes (not visible to the subjects):
Construction of an index (F) by means of three dummy variables (Vi). If Alternative X is chosen, then
Vi = 1
Low Aversion:
F = 0: If V1 = 0, V2 = 0 and V3 = 0
If V1 = 0, V2 = 0 and V3 = 1
High Aversion:
F = 2: If V1 = 0, V2 = 1 and V3 = 1
If V1 = 1, V2 = 1 and V3 = 1
Average Aversion:
F = 1: All other combinations
The total profit columns are not visible in the experiment
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Questionnaire big 5 personality traits (Experiment 1 and 2)
Please use the scale to determine to what extent these statements apply.
1 means: “does not apply to me at all”
7 means: “applies to me perfectly”
With values between 1 and 7, you can express where you lie between these two extremes.
I see myself as someone who. . . Dimension:
. . . is a thorough worker conscientiousness (+)
. . . is communicative, talkative extraversion (+)
. . . is sometimes somewhat rude to others agreeableness (-)
. . . is original, comes up with new ideas openness (+)
. . . worries a lot neuroticism (+)
. . . is reserved extraversion (-)
. . . is able to forgive agreeableness (+)
. . . tends to be lazy conscientiousness (-)
. . . is outgoing, sociable extraversion (+)
. . . values artistic, aesthetic experiences openness (+)
. . . gets nervous easily neuroticism (+)
. . . does things effectively and efficiently conscientiousness (+)
. . . is considerate and kind to others agreeableness (+)
. . . has an active imagination openness (+)
. . . is relaxed, handles stress well neuroticism (-)
Notes (not visible to the subjects):
The categorization of questions into dimensions is not visible to the subjects.
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Instructions Experiment 1
Welcome to the experiment!
You are participating in an experiment of economic research. Please read the instructions carefully.
All participants receive the same instructions. If you have any questions raise your arm to get in touch
with the instructor of your session. The experiment is conducted via computer. Please pay attention
to the information on your screen.
Before the start of the experiment we kindly ask you to complete some questionnaires and to answer
control questions. In order to assure that you understand the rules of the game, the experiment will
not start until all control questions have been answered correctly.
The experiment consists of six decision rounds. At the beginning of the session all participants are
grouped into pairs by the computer. You are assigned the role of either “Player 1” or “Player 2”. Pairing
and role assignment are completely random and never change over the course of the experiment. You
are informed about your role on the screen of your computer.
All players are initially endowed with 30 Taler (experimental currency). At the beginning of each
decision round both players are informed about the payment schemes of two the alternatives A and B
which are available for selection. An example for such payment schemes can be found below:
Alternative A Alternative B
State Total Profit Share Player 1 Share Player 2 State Total Profit Share Player 1 Share Player 2
1 5 5 0 1 0 5 -5
2 20 10 10 2 40 20 20
The payments for Player 1 and Player 2 depend on the chosen alternative and the state of the world.
State 1 occurs with a probability of 50 percent and with a residual probability of 50 percent state 2
occurs. In every decision round Player 1 chooses between the two alternatives A or B.
[Treatments REC and JP-REC only : Before that, Player 2 has the possibility to make a recommenda-
tion whether Player 1 should choose Alternative A or Alternative B. It is up to Player 1 whether he
follows this recommendation or not.]
After Player 1’s decision, the computer determines the state of the world with the specified probabilities.
You can identify the individual payoffs (in Taler) for Player 1 and 2 in the corresponding columns in
table “Alternative A” if A has been chosen, and in table “Alternative B” if B has been chosen.
[Treatments JP and JP-REC only : Whenever Player 2 experiences a loss in a given round, Player 1
has to justify his decision to Player 2. In the example above this would be the case if state 1 realizes
after Player 1 chooses Alternative B. The justification process is implemented by means of a chat. An
input mask appears on the computer screens in which Player 1 must enter the justification. Player 2
has the option to reply.]
This sequence repeats in the following decision rounds. The profits of Alternative A and Alternative
B for Player 1 and Player 2, respectively, may vary from round to round. At the end of each decision
round you will receive an overview of the results so far. This means, you are informed about the
alternative chosen by Player 1, the state which realized, as well as the corresponding total profit and
your own profit (all in Taler).
Your total payoff in Taler at the end of the experiment is the sum of your initial endowment of 30 Taler
and the profit in one randomly chosen decision round. For this purpose a dice is rolled publicly after
the experiment. The total payoff in Taler is converted into Euro at the exchange rate 3 Taler per Euro.
You will receive the amount in cash in a sealed envelope earmarked with your seat number.
Notes (not visible to the subjects):
Within a treatment, all players receive the same instructions. Instructions differ between treatments –
information in brackets is given in specified treatments only. Participants are called “Player 1” if they
are in the role of the agent, and “Player 2” if they are in the role of the principal.
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Instructions Experiment 2
Welcome to the experiment!
You are participating in an experiment of economic research. Please read the instructions carefully.
All participants receive the same instructions. If you have any questions raise your arm to get in touch
with the instructor of your session. The experiment is conducted via computer. Please pay attention
to the information on your screen.
Before the start of the experiment we kindly ask you to complete some questionnaires and to answer
control questions. In order to assure that you understand the rules of the game, the experiment will
not start until all control questions have been answered correctly.
The experiment consists of six decision rounds. At the beginning of the session all participants are
grouped into pairs by the computer. You are assigned the role of either “Player 1” or “Player 2”. Pairing
and role assignment are completely random and never change over the course of the experiment. You
are informed about your role on the screen of your computer.
All players are initially endowed with 25 Taler (experimental currency). At the beginning of each
decision round both players are informed about the payment schemes of two the alternatives A and B
which are available for selection. An example for such payment schemes can be found below:
Alternative A Alternative B
State Total Profit Share Player 1 Share Player 2 State Total Profit Share Player 1 Share Player 2
1 5 5 0 1 0 5 -5
2 20 10 10 2 40 20 20
The payments for Player 1 and Player 2 depend on the chosen alternative and the state of the world.
State 1 occurs with a probability of 50 percent and with a residual probability of 50 percent state 2
occurs. In every decision round Player 1 chooses between the two alternatives A or B.
[Treatments REC and JP-REC only : Before that, Player 2 has the possibility to make a recommenda-
tion whether Player 1 should choose Alternative A or Alternative B.]
After Player 1’s decision, the computer determines the state of the world with the specified probabilities.
You can identify the individual payoffs (in Taler) for Player 1 and 2 in the corresponding columns in
table “Alternative A” if A has been chosen, and in table “Alternative B” if B has been chosen.
[Treatments JP and JP-REC only : After the computer determined the state of the world, Player 1 has
to justify his decision to Player 2. The justification process is implemented by means of a chat. An
input mask appears on the computer screens in which Player 1 must enter the justification. Player 2
has the option to reply.]
This sequence repeats in the following decision rounds. The profits of Alternative A and Alternative
B for Player 1 and Player 2, respectively, may vary from round to round. At the end of each decision
round you will receive an overview of the results so far. This means, you are informed about the
alternative chosen by Player 1, the state which realized, as well as the corresponding total profit and
your own profit (all in Taler).
Your total payoff in Taler at the end of the experiment is the sum of your initial endowment of 25 Taler
and the profit in one randomly chosen decision round. For this purpose a dice is rolled publicly after
the experiment. The total payoff in Taler is converted into Euro at the exchange rate 2.5 Taler per
Euro. You will receive the amount in cash in a sealed envelope earmarked with your seat number.
Notes (not visible to the subjects):
Within a treatment, all players receive the same instructions. Instructions differ between treatments –
information in brackets is given in specified treatments only. Participants are called “Player 1” if they
are in the role of the agent, and “Player 2” if they are in the role of the principal.
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Payoff scheme in Experiment 1
Set 1: Project A Project B
State
Total Profit Profit Agent Profit Principal
State
Total Profit Profit Agent Profit Principal
1 0 0 0 1 -10 0 -10
2 10 5 5 2 30 6 24
Set 2: Project A Project B
State
Total Profit Profit Agent Profit Principal
State
Total Profit Profit Agent Profit Principal
1 0 0 0 1 -10 0 -10
2 10 5 5 2 30 9 21
Set 3: Project A Project B
State
Total Profit Profit Agent Profit Principal
State
Total Profit Profit Agent Profit Principal
1 0 0 0 1 -10 0 -10
2 10 5 5 2 30 12 18
Set 4: Project A Project B
State
Total Profit Profit Agent Profit Principal
State
Total Profit Profit Agent Profit Principal
1 0 0 0 1 -30 0 -30
2 10 5 5 2 60 12 48
Set 5: Project A Project B
State
Total Profit Profit Agent Profit Principal
State
Total Profit Profit Agent Profit Principal
1 0 0 0 1 -30 0 -30
2 10 5 5 2 60 18 42
Set 6: Project A Project B
State
Total Profit Profit Agent Profit Principal
State
Total Profit Profit Agent Profit Principal
1 0 0 0 1 -30 0 -30
2 10 5 5 2 60 24 36
Table 5: Payoff distributions in Experiment 1
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Payoff scheme in Experiment 2
Set 1: Project A Project B
State
Total Profit Profit Agent Profit Principal
State
Total Profit Profit Agent Profit Principal
1 5 5 0 1 0 5 -5
2 15 10 5 2 30 15 15
Set 2: Project A Project B
State
Total Profit Profit Agent Profit Principal
State
Total Profit Profit Agent Profit Principal
1 5 5 0 1 0 10 -10
2 15 10 5 2 40 20 20
Set 3: Project A Project B
State
Total Profit Profit Agent Profit Principal
State
Total Profit Profit Agent Profit Principal
1 5 5 0 1 0 15 -15
2 15 10 5 2 50 25 25
Set 4: Project A Project B
State
Total Profit Profit Agent Profit Principal
State
Total Profit Profit Agent Profit Principal
1 5 5 0 1 0 20 -20
2 15 10 5 2 60 30 30
Set 5: Project A Project B
State
Total Profit Profit Agent Profit Principal
State
Total Profit Profit Agent Profit Principal
1 5 5 0 1 0 25 -25
2 15 10 5 2 70 35 35
Table 6: Payoff distributions in Experiment 2
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Results of Experiment 1
BL REC JP JP-REC
Agents’ Choices Frequencies Project A Project B Project A Project B Project A Project B Project A Project B
Set 1 15 13 10 18 21 9 14 9
53.57% 46.43% 35.71% 64.29% 70.00% 30.00% 60.87% 39.13%
Set 2 13 15 8 20 16 14 9 14
46.43% 53.57% 28.57% 71.43% 53.33% 46.67% 39.13% 60.87%
Set 3 7 21 6 22 14 16 8 15
25.00% 75.00% 21.43% 78.57% 46.67% 53.33% 34.78% 65.22%
Set 4 14 14 12 16 19 11 13 10
50.00% 50.00% 42.86% 57.14% 63.33% 36.67% 56.52% 43.48%
Set 5 11 17 8 20 20 10 15 8
39.29% 60.71% 28.57% 71.43% 66.67% 33.33% 65.22% 34.78%
Set 6 10 18 11 17 16 14 13 10
35.71% 64.29% 39.29% 60.71% 53.33% 46.67% 56.52% 43.48%
BL REC JP JP-REC
Principals’ Preferences Frequencies Project A Project B Project A Project B Project A Project B Project A Project B
Set 1 7 21 10 20 12 16 13 10
25.00% 75.00% 33.33% 66.67% 42.86% 57.14% 56.52% 43.48%
Set 2 12 16 13 17 9 19 10 13
42.86% 57.14% 43.33% 56.67% 32.14% 67.86% 43.48% 56.52%
Set 3 10 18 14 16 11 17 11 12
35.71% 64.29% 46.67% 53.33% 39.29% 60.71% 47.83% 52.17%
Set 4 13 15 14 16 21 7 15 8
46.43% 53.57% 46.67% 53.33% 75.00% 25.00% 65.22% 34.78%
Set 5 17 11 15 15 17 11 14 9
60.71% 39.29% 50.00% 50.00% 60.71% 39.29% 60.87% 39.13%
Set 6 20 8 15 15 19 9 17 6
71.43% 28.57% 50.00% 50.00% 67.86% 32.14% 73.91% 26.09%
In the treatments BL and JP preferences of the principals are gathered without communicating them to
agents.
Table 7: Project choices and preferences by round and treatment in Experiment 1
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Results of Experiment 2
BL JP-REC
Agents’ Choices Frequencies Project A Project B Project A Project B
Set 1 7 15 8 13
31.82% 68.18% 38.10% 61.90%
Set 2 9 13 8 13
40.49% 59.09% 38.10% 61.90%
Set 3 7 15 9 12
31.82% 68.18% 42.86% 57.14%
Set 4 7 15 12 9
31.82% 68.18% 57.14% 42.86%
Set 5 8 14 13 8
36.36% 63.64% 61.90% 38.10%
BL JP-REC
Principals’ Preferences Frequencies Project A Project B Project A Project B
Set 1 9 13 11 10
40.91% 59.09% 52.38% 47.62%
Set 2 9 13 13 8
40.91% 59.09% 61.90% 38.10%
Set 3 8 14 10 11
25.00% 75.00% 47.62% 52.38%
Set 4 13 9 15 6
59.09% 40.91% 71.43% 28.57%
Set 5 10 12 14 7
39.29% 60.71% 66.67% 33.33%
In treatment BL preferences of the principals are gathered without communicating them to agents.
Table 8: Project choices and preferences by round and treatment in Experiment 2
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Post-experimental questionnaire (Experiment 1 and 2)
Please use the scales to indicate how much you think a particular factor influenced your decision making:
1. It was important to me to maximize my own payoff.
2. It was important to me to maximize the payoff of my partner.
3. It mattered to me that the payoffs of my partner and me were as equal as possible.
4. It was important to me that the selection of Alternative B could result in losses for Player 2.
[Treatments JP and JP-REC only :
5. It mattered to me that the decision making had to be justified.]
Please use the following scale to indicate the reliability of your answers.
Notes (not visible to the subjects):
Answer 1 was used to build the variable “MaxOwnPay”.
Answer 2 was used to build the variable “MaxOtherPay”.
Answer 3 was used to build an alternative variable for inequality aversion (“InequAveScore”). It served
as a comparison for the measure of Fortin et al. (2007).
Answer 5 was used to build the variable “JustPresScore”.
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Variables in tests and regressions (Experiment 1 and 2)
Variable Description
Age Years of age
Agree Self assessment score agreeableness SOEP (big 5 personality traits)
Choice Subject’s choice in the current decision round of the experiment (1 = Project A;
2 = Project B)
ChoiceB Dummy variable = 1 if the agent chooses Project B in a specific decision round
of the experiment
Compl Does the agent follow the recommendation of the principal in the current decision
round of the experiment (1 = yes; 0 = no)
ComplA Does the agent follow a Project A-recommendation of the principal in the current
decision round of the experiment? (1 = yes, 0 = no)
ComplB Does the agent follow a Project B-recommendation of the principal in the current
decision round of the experiment? (1 = yes, 0 = no)
Conscient Self assessment score conscientiousness SOEP (big 5 personality traits)
DecisionAcc Dummy variable that indicates if the subject is an experiment where decisions
have to be justified (1 = decision accountability; 0 = outcome accountability)
DeltaDiffBonusB Absolute amount to which the expected payoff of alternative B in the respective
experiment exceeds the expected payoff of alternative B in the other experiment
in a particular decision round (from the perspective of an agent in a particular
experiment)
Experiment Experiment the subject is part of (1 = main study; 2 = additional study)
Extraver Self assessment score extraversion SOEP (big 5 personality traits)
FreqChoiceB Frequency with which Project B was chosen (over all decision rounds of the
experiment)
FreqJustReq Frequency with which the agent is required to justify a project choice/project
result
FreqJustReq*NoCompl Frequency the agent is required to justify a project choice/project result after not
following the principal’s recommendation
FreqJustReq2 Squared frequency the agent is required to justify a project choice/project result
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Variables in tests and regressions continued (Experiment 1 and 2)
Variable Description
FreqRecB Frequency of Project B being communicated to the agent [team partner] as the
preference of the principal
InequAveLevF Level of inequality aversion indicated by a measure from Fortin et al. (2007)
JustPresDum Dummy variable = 1 if the agent is in a treatment with justification pressure (JP
or JP-REC)
JustPresDum*RecB Dummy variable = 1 if the agent is in a treatment with justification pressure and
the corresponding principal recommends Project B in a specific decision round
of the experiment
JustPresScore Measure for perceived justification pressure in the treatments JP and JP-REC
(self assessment score; scale range from 1 to 9)
Male Dummy variable = 1 if agent = male
MaxOtherPay Measure which indicates on a 9 point scale to what extent the agent’s decision
are based on the objective to maximize his/her partners (= principal) payoff
MaxOwnPay Measure which indicates on a 9 point scale to what extent the agent’s decision
are based on the objective to maximize his/her own payoff
MeanComplA Average frequency the agent complies with a Project A-recommendation of the
principal
MeanComplB Average frequency the agent complies with a Project B-recommendation of the
principal
Neuro Self assessment score neuroticism SOEP (big 5 personality traits)
Open Self assessment score openness SOEP (big 5 personality traits)
OutcomeAcc Dummy variable that indicates if the subject is an experiment where outcomes
have to be justified (1 = outcome accountability; 0 = decision accountability)
PartnPaySchemVar Variance of the principal’s (= partner’s) payoff scheme of Project B in the current
decision round of the experiment
PaySchemVar Variance of the agent’s payoff scheme of Project B in the current decision round
of the experiment
PercShareB Agent’s percentage share in Taler (experimental currency) if s/he chooses Project
B and state 2 realizes
RecB Dummy variable = 1 if the principal recommends Project B in a specific decision
round of the experiment
Round Decision round of the experiment
Semester Current length of study measure in semesters
Subject Role of the subject (1 = agent; 2 = principal)
Treatment Treatment the subject is part of (1 = BL; 2 = JP; 3 = REC; 4 = JP-REC))
WillRisk Risk attitude (willingness to take risks) measured by a 9 point scale where 0 is
risk averse
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Earnings management during family firm succession: an
analytical perspective on the influence of socioemotional
wealth
Abstract
In order to provide an analytical explanation for earnings management in family firms
prior to a succession, we study a two-period agency setting in which a founder can in-
vest in the future capital stock and may engage in earnings management. We examine
two succession scenarios which differ in terms of who lead the firm in the second period.
To capture dynastic and altruistic motives of the founder, we incorporate the behavioral
concept of socioemotional wealth (SEW). Our model shows that SEW creates manipula-
tion incentives. We find that the founder engages in both accrual-based and real earnings
management in order to reduce inheritance tax payments for the offspring. We show how
the successor’s productivity, inheritance taxation, and internal monitoring influence the
founder’s choice between a family-member and an external manager as the future CEO.
Keywords:
Agency; earnings management; family firm succession; inheritance taxation; socioemo-
tional wealth
JEL-Classification:
D91, G34, M12, M41
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1 Introduction
There is considerable evidence that family firms make up a significant proportion of the
total number of companies, the employed workforce, and the total value added (e.g.,
GDP). For example, La Porta et al. (1999) build a global sample out of 27 of the richest
countries (in terms of market capitalization) and find that 50 percent of the firms within
the sample are family-controlled. Similarly, in Western Europe about 44 percent of all
firms are family-owned (Faccio and Lang, 2002) and in the US S&P 500 founding families
are present in one-third of all firms, controlling over 18 percent of the shares on average
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Given these proportions and the corresponding economic
influence, it is worth to examine if decision making in family organizations differs in
comparison to publicly held firms.
One particularly interesting field for analyses are turnover procedures. As these processes
are often accompanied by policy revisions and restructurings, it is one of the greatest chal-
lenges for corporations to manage changes in ownership and control. This is especially
true for family firms, where the implementation of such a process is also associated with
additional family-related motivations. For this reason the inter-generational turnover in
family-owned companies is one of the most often addressed issues in family business re-
search. Several studies provide insights on how a family firm’s inter-generational turnover
is influenced by, e.g., inheritance taxation (Tsoutsoura, 2015), abilities of family members
(Lee et al., 2003), or non-financial goals (Minichilli et al., 2014). The effects of these
family-related aspects is widespread: examples are succession-related performance differ-
ences (Cucculelli and Micucci, 2008) or investment decisions and R&D activities (e.g.,
Block, 2012; Chrisman and Patel, 2012).1 Following Go´mez-Mej´ıa et al. (2007), these
family-related and non-monetary motivations can be aggregated to the concept socioemo-
tional wealth (SEW). This concept argues that family members evaluate economic aspects
with regard to their influence on the own socioemotional endowment, i.e., additional utility
might come from belonging to the firm (Kepner, 1983), from continuing a dynasty (Kets
de Vries, 1993), or from altruistic behaviors within the family (Schulze et al., 2003).2
1 More detailed views on the idiosyncrasy of family firms can be found in Handler (1994).
2 There are several other factors influencing SEW (see, e.g., Westhead et al., 2001; Habbershon and Pistrui,
2002).
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Another argument for addressing succession in family firms is, that managerial turnover
and the transition of ownership pose a high risk of misconduct. During a succession period
opportunities to alter the own utility are expanded for the person in charge. Common
practices are the manipulation of reports or diverging preceding/subsequent investment
decisions, which can be summarized under the term earnings management. The field
of earnings management is extensively analyzed in the accounting literature, but earnings
management during a turnover in family firms has been less examined.3 For example, there
is no analytical research on earnings management in family firms, as far as we are aware.
Moreover, empirical work studying manipulation activities concentrate either on whether
reporting practices of family firms are of lower or higher quality compared to non-family
firms (Jaggi et al., 2009), or on the question whether founding families use their power
at the expense of minority interests (Yang, 2010). There are only few empirical studies
analyzing how earnings management behavior is affected by SEW (e.g., Stockmans et al.,
2010) and there is apparently no literature addressing earnings management in family
firms with respect to successions. Finally, the majority of the empirical literature on
earnings management in family firms focuses predominately on accrual-based earnings
management,4 which is mainly driven by short-term considerations.5 However, given the
dynastic thoughts of long-term sustainability in family firms,6 it appears reasonable to
examine long-term investment decisions of family companies and to investigate if there
are practices affecting the firm value, that deviate from the economically optimal level,
namely real earnings management activities.
Thus, the objective of this paper is to examine patterns of earnings management in fam-
ily firms during the transition of ownership and control. By considering two different
3 Reviews to the state of research concerning earnings management in family firms can be found in Go´mez-
Mej´ıa et al. (2014), Paiva et al. (2016), and Carrera (2017).
4 Accrual-based earnings management describes practices, where reporting methods are chosen in a way
that they do not adequately reflect the firm’s underlying economics. These activities have no direct cash
flow consequences, instead they only change how transactions are recorded. Real earnings management in
turn describes practices, which actually influence the firm’s value, i.e., it changes the timing or structuring
of real transactions (see Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2012).
5 To our knowledge, Achleitner et al. (2014), Razzaque et al. (2016), Tian et al. (2018), and Avabruth
and Saravanan (2018) are the only exceptions differentiating between real and accrual-based earnings
management.
6 There is a consensus view that family firms attempt to ensure inter-generational sustainability, see
Berrone et al. (2012).
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succession scenarios, we aim at providing theoretical evidence on how family-related so-
cioemotional wealth, inheritance taxation and internal monitoring influence manipulation
activities. The main questions to be answered by this paper are the following:
1. How do incentives for earnings management, right before a succession takes place,
change in two different succession scenarios, namely family-internal succession and
recruitment of an external manager?
2. How is earnings management affected by SEW?
3. How is the decision whether to hire an external manager to run the firm related to
SEW, inheritance taxation, and the productivity of potential successors?
We develop a two-period agency model to compare two succession scenarios.7 The setting
considers an owner-lead family firm where a SEW-sensitive principal/predecessor interacts
with different agents/successors.8 For reasons of simplicity, we assume that all players are
risk neutral and that they provide effort in the periods where they are in charge (the
principal in the first period, the respective agent/successor in the second period). Addi-
tionally, it is the senior’s task in the first period to make a decision about the succession
scenario, i.e., she has to choose whether the junior or an external manager runs the firm.
In terms of real earnings management, our focus is set on activities before the succession
takes place. Thus, only the senior can invest in the capital stock which determines the
long-term value of the firm. Accrual-based earnings management shifts earnings between
periods and can be undertaken by all players.
We find that earnings management incentives are induced by SEW and inheritance taxa-
tion. In the internal succession scenario, where the junior obtains the senior’s firm shares
and assumes the management of the company, our analysis shows that the senior reduces
the first-period accounting income by means of an earnings shift. This accrual manip-
ulation is driven by the utility the senior gains from SEW. Since the junior has to pay
inheritance taxes based on the first-period accounting income, it becomes important for
7 Insights on bequest games with an infinite horizon and inter-generational altruism can be found in, e.g.,
Leininger (1986), Bernheim and Ray (1987), Balbus et al. (2015).
8 We denote the predecessor (she) “senior”. The successor (he) is either the “junior” or an “external
manager”.
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the senior to lower the taxation basis in favor of the junior. Because it is costly and has
no further benefit, the junior does not engage in accrual-based earnings management in
period two. Regarding real earnings management, we find that, dependent on tax rate and
SEW, the senior’s activities either exceed (overinvestment) or are below the economically
optimal level (underinvestment). Our results also show that the senior’s investment in the
firm increases whenever the junior possesses a high productivity and decreases if the junior
is less productive. In the external scenario, the senior decides to hire an external manager
to run the operational business after the company is inherited to the junior. While the
junior aims to improve the economic earnings, the external manager chooses actions in
order to increase his compensation, which leads to agency costs. Similar to the internal
succession scenario, we find that accrual manipulation shifts earnings from the first into
the second period. In terms of real earnings management, the senior’s activities depend on
inheritance taxation and SEW but also on the monitoring costs of the external manager.
Compared to an internal succession, an overinvestment by the senior is less likely.
With our paper we contribute to the analytical earnings management literature. As in-
dicated earlier, this literature is quite extensive and provides various evidence on causes
and effects.9 However, most of these studies investigate either accrual manipulation or
real earnings management.10 We, in turn, consider both types of activities and are thus
able to formulate a suggestion on how the two types might be related. Moreover, a large
part of the accounting literature considers contractual/agency settings where opportunis-
tic earnings management arises due to managerial hidden action (moral hazard). This
kind of motivation is also partly considered in our model. However, our main focus is set
on earnings management incentives driven by socioemotional concerns. Therefore, we add
a behavioral explanation to the question of how family firms might engage in earnings
management during changes of ownership and control.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the analytical model,
Section 3 analyzes two scenarios of succession, Section 4 compares the internal succession
with the external scenario, and Section 5 concludes.
9 Common examples for earnings management relate to, e.g., incentive contract design (Dutta and Fan,
2014), capital market reactions (Fischer and Verrecchia, 2000), or career concerns (Nieken and Sliwka,
2015).
10A notable exception is Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005).
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2 Model setup
We consider a game-theoretical setting consisting of two periods and three risk-neutral
players: the senior (s), her junior (j), and an available external manager (m).11 In the
first period, the senior exclusively holds all firm shares and manages the firm. At the
end of period one, she transfers her shares to the junior. Whether the junior runs the
firm as the CEO or controls the management as a member of the board, is determined
by the senior’s succession plan. This succession decision about the future management is
chosen by the senior at the beginning of the game. Figure 1 displays the two different
succession scenarios: We assume that, following the firm succession, the ownership remains
t = 1 t = 2
Senior runs the firm
External manager is hired
Junior runs the firm
Figure 1: Succession scenarios
in the family. Here, a distinction is made between cases in which the junior takes over full
responsibility for the company and cases where the operating business is delegated to an
external manager.12
Economic earnings
True economic earnings at the end of the periods are given by:
x1 =− d1,s +K(d0) (δs e1,s + θ˜1), (1)
x2 = K(d1,s) (δi e2,i + θ˜2), (2)
11In the following, time is indicated by the subscript t = (1, 2). Whenever one of the three players comes
into play he/she is identified by a second subscript i = (s, j,m).
12We also consider the possibility that the senior runs the company in both periods. However, this scenario
only serves as our benchmark solution (see Section 3.1), which is not depicted in Figure 1.
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with X = x1 + x2 being the terminal value of the firm. First-period earnings contain the
capital stock K(d0) = k0, which is a positive constant that specifies the initial firm size.
Similar to Bhattacharya and Ravikumar (2001), the capital stock is fully consumed after
one period. Since the first period describes the situation before the succession takes place,
the senior is the only possible decision maker. With her effort e1,s and her productivity
δs, she manages the initial capital stock. Productivity and effort are substitutes, i.e., a
low productivity can be balanced by a higher effort such that it is still possible to reach
the same result. In the following, we assume that the productivity of the senior and the
external manager is the same, i.e., δs = δm = 1. In turn, the junior’s productivity is
equal or below their productivity such that δj ∈ {12 , 1}. We make this assumption in order
to capture differences in experience and to analyze how these differences interact with
socioemotional concerns and the succession decision.13
Investment d1,s lowers current earnings but defines the size of the future capital stock.
Correspondingly, the capital stock of period two is modeled as an increasing (concave)
function of the previous investment K(d1,s) =
√
d1,s.
14 Together with effort e2,i and
productivity δi of the respective decision maker, it determines economic earnings of the
second period. The economic earnings xt are also affected by economic risk. The periodical
economic risk θ˜t is an independent and identically distributed random variable with θ˜t ∼
N(1, σ2θ). The strength of the risk’s impact on the economic earnings depends on the size
of the capital stock.15
Accounting signals and inheritance taxation
At the end of each period, the current CEO has to disclose an accounting report which is
based on the underlying economic earnings. The reported accounting signals are defined
as follows:16
13This assumption corresponds to some empirical findings. For example, Cucculelli and Micucci (2008)
show that the firm performance following a succession increases if an external manager becomes CEO.
Bertoni et al. (2016) analyze internal successions and find a lower performance after the transition of
control.
14To simplify the model, we exclude investment decisions in the second period.
15Keep in mind that capital stock K(dt) is multiplicatively linked to economic risk θt.
16Note, that the clean surplus principle does not hold in our model because we only consider two periods,
i.e., the period right before and right after the succession. To make the clean surplus principle hold
further future/past periods would have to be taken into account in order to balance accounting earnings.
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y1 = x1 + b1,s + ˜1, (3)
y2 = x2 − b1,s + b2,i + ˜2, (4)
where ˜t ∼ N(0, σ2 ) is again an independent and identically distributed random variable
that represents accounting noise, which is uncorrelated to the economic risk θ˜t. Since
the person in charge has discretion over the reported numbers, he/she is able to bias
the accounting earnings, e.g., by using judgments in a principle-based accounting system.
We assume that a bias in the current period reverses its effect in the following period.
Consequently, b1,s is added (subtracted) in period one and subtracted (added) in period
two. The same holds for the second-period bias b2,i, however, due to the time horizon of our
model, we do not illustrate its reversal in a third period. As underlying economic earnings
are not affected by these shifting activities, this can be interpreted as accrual-based or
accounting earnings management.
In our model, the accounting signals are used for two different purposes: for contract-
ing with non-family managers and as a base for inheritance taxation. Economic earnings
are not observable and, thus, not a reliable performance measure for contracting pur-
poses. Therefore, an incentive contract must be based on publicly available accounting
numbers.17 Furthermore, because of the transfer of firm shares between generations, in-
heritance taxation must be considered. In the context of a family firm succession, the
inheritance taxation might have a strong influence on business decisions. Given by local
law, inheritance tax has often to be paid by the person who is taking over the firm. For
inheritance tax purposes, corresponding assets are valued at their open market value at
the transfer date (see, e.g., Great Britain’s Inheritance Tax Act, Part IV, Chapter I, Sec-
tions 160-170 or Germany’s §11 and §12 ErbStG, as well as §§199-203 BewG). By these
regulations, the accounting signals of the past 3 years serve as an indicator for the market
value. For simplification, we consider a one-book accounting system (i.e., accounting sig-
nals are also used for taxation purposes) and assume that the first-period signal serves as
the assessment base of the inheritance tax that results from the transfer of the firm shares.
17The use of accounting reports for the purpose of compensation is only relevant in the external scenario
in Section 3.3.
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In our model, the total tax liability amounts to h · y1 where h denotes the inheritance tax
rate. In order to exclude implausible solutions, the range of the tax rate is h ∈ [0, 12).18
The players’ utility functions
Independently of the respective succession scenario, the senior’s utility function (where
i = s) possesses the following structure:
Us = x1 − c1,s + Ψ︸︷︷︸
SEW
Uj . (5)
In both succession scenarios, the senior receives the economic earnings x1. However,
her utility does not only depend on values coming from the first period where she is
actively involved in the ongoing business. In addition, she receives utility from the second
period, or more precisely, from SEW. In our model we consider two socioemotional aspects:
Firstly, there is an effect which results from the dynastic character of the family firm.
Here, socioemotional wealth increases in exercising personal authority, preserving a family
dynasty (Go´mez-Mej´ıa et al., 2007), or ensuring transgenerational control (Zellweger et
al., 2012). We label this as dynastic SEW and assume that the senior’s utility is positively
affected if firm’s owner- and leadership remains in the family. Secondly, family members
are also concerned about the welfare of relatives and show altruistic behavior towards
each other (Schulze et al., 2003; Zahra and Sharma, 2004). Therefore, the future utility
of the junior also generates positive value for the senior, which we label altruistic SEW.
In our model both aspects are captured by Ψ ∈ (0, 1].19 Furthermore, the senior suffers
disutility as a result of her effort and possible manipulation activities in period one: c1,s =
1
2(e
2
1,s +
b21,s
K(d0)2
). The disutility for accrual-based earnings management depends on the
size of the firm, i.e., the capital stock. Since a larger firm leads to higher complexity, it
offers more possibilities for earnings management and makes it also more difficult for an
external auditor to identify these manipulations.
18For simplicity, we only consider inheritance taxation. Effects coming from income taxes do not change
our primary findings and, thus, are not subject of our work.
19Note that we do not cover a scenario where the firm is sold. In this case there would be no utility from
SEW (Ψ = 0).
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The utility function of the junior (i = j) depends on whether he manages and owns the
firm or just owns the firm in the second period. This is depicted in the paths of Figure 1.
Thus, we have:
Uj = x2 − hy1 −

c2,j if the junior runs the firm,
w if the junior hires a manager.
(6)
In both scenarios, the junior obtains the economic value x2 and must pay the inheritance
tax. However, in the first case, the junior also bears disutility c2,j =
1
2(e
2
2,j +
b22,j
K(d1,s)2
) from
running the firm. As before for the senior, the disutility comes from exerted effort and
from manipulation activities.
In the second case, managing tasks are delegated and the junior has to pay the wage to
an external manager. The corresponding contract is based on the accounting income of
the second period such that w = f + v · y2 where f denotes the fixed salary and v denotes
the incentive rate.
Finally, the utility function of the external manager (i = m) is given by:
Um = w − c2,m. (7)
Recall that the manager’s productivity is the same as for the senior, δm = 1. How-
ever, in contrast to junior and senior, an additional parameter λ enters Um such that
c2,m =
1
2(e
2
2,m + λ
b22,m
K(d1,s)2
). With the exogenous parameter λ, we take into account that
manipulations of an owner-manager are only limited by external controls (e.g., external
audit or accounting standards), whereas biasing activities of a non-family CEO might also
be subject to internal controls (e.g., board monitoring), which makes manipulation activ-
ities for an external more costly.20 This is expressed by λ > 1. The manager’s reservation
wage is set to zero without loss of generality.
20We assume that manipulation costs of an external manager are strictly higher than costs of an owner-
manager, who is not affected by internal controls.
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Timeline
The following timeline summarizes the sequence of the player’s actions:
Choice of
succession
scenario
by senior
Effort
(e1,s),
investment
(d1,s),
bias
(b1,s)
Signal
(y1)
Transition of
ownership
and control
Effort
(e2,i),
bias
(b2,i)
Signal
(y2)
Outcome
Figure 2: Timeline of events
3 Earnings management during firm succession
3.1 Benchmark solution
We start with the development of a benchmark solution where no transfer of firm shares
takes place. Here, the senior stays for both periods in the firm where neither her actions
nor her utility are affected by a succession. Thus, we are subsequently able to identify
deviations from economically optimal behavior as a result of the different succession sce-
narios. While staying for two periods, the senior’s objective is to optimize the total firm
value. She simultaneously chooses optimal levels of effort and accrual-based earnings man-
agement for both periods and determines the optimal investment size in period one. We
obtain the following optimization problem:
max
e1,s, e2,s, b1,s, b2,s, d1,s
E[Us] = E[X − (c1,s + c2,s)]
= E
[− d1,s + k0(e1,s + θ˜1) +√d1,s(e2,s + θ˜2)
− 1
2
(e21,s +
b21,s
k20
+ e22,s +
b22,s
d1,s
)
]
. (8)
The solution of the problem is presented in Lemma 1.
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Lemma 1 The benchmark levels of effort, investment and accrual-based earnings man-
agement are given by:
eB1,s = k0, (9)
eB2,s =
√
dB1,s, (10)
bB1,s = 0, (11)
bB2,s = 0, (12)
dB1,s = 1. (13)
Proof: See the Appendix.
The results show positive efforts in both periods, whereas accrual-based earnings man-
agement does not take place. The reason for the latter is that the bias has no effect on
underlying earnings but generates personnel costs. The investment level dB1,s equals one
and, in the following, we interpret deviations from this level, that are not driven by differ-
ences in the productivity, as real earnings management.21 Thus, whenever an investment
level is above (under) the benchmark case (e.g., due to SEW considerations), the manager
undertakes positive (negative) real earnings management.
3.2 Internal family succession
We now assume that the firm is owned and controlled by family members across gener-
ations. Thus, the senior allocates property rights and management tasks of the second
period to the junior. In comparison to the benchmark solution, it is now the junior who
runs the company in the second period. He benefits from the capital stock, which results
from the senior’s investment in the first period, but also has to bear disutility for the
exerted effort and biasing activity in period two as well as for inheritance taxes coming
from the inter-generational transfer of ownership.
21All benchmark levels are denoted with the superscript B.
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To determine the optimal actions of the sub-game perfect equilibrium, we use backward
induction. Thus, we first solve for the optimal levels of effort and accrual-based earnings
management of the junior in the second period. Afterwards, we analyze the first period
where the senior anticipates the actions of her junior, when deciding about the size of the
investment, the level of effort, and the extent of earnings management. Given the junior’s
decisions in period two, the senior’s optimization problem can be expressed by:22
max
e1,s, d1,s, b1,s
E
[
Us(e
F
2,j , b
F
2,j)
]
= E
[
x1 − c1,s + Ψ Uj(eF2,j , bF2,j)
]
. (14)
The corresponding solution to the problem is presented in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 Assume that the junior obtains the firm shares and manages the firm, then the
optimal actions of junior and senior are given by:
eF2,j = δj
√
dF1,s, (15)
bF2,j = 0, (16)
eF1,s = k0 (1−Ψh) , (17)
dF1,s =
Ψ2
(2−Ψ (2h+ δ2j ))2
, (18)
bF1,s = −h Ψ k20. (19)
Proof: See the Appendix.
Apparently, the junior’s effort of period two depends on the senior’s investment in the
previous period, as well as on his productivity δj = {12 , 1}. Another result is, that the
senior’s effort level is below the benchmark (eF1,s < e
B
1,s). This is caused by SEW Ψ, which
tempts the senior to lower the effort the more she is interested in the junior’s utility. The
seemingly counter-intuitive result can be explained by the inheritance tax, which has to
be paid by the junior. He pays inheritance taxes according to the company’s accounting
earnings of the first period. Therefore, by lowering her effort, the senior reduces the
22Note that optimal levels of effort and earnings management in the family succession scenario are marked
with the superscript F .
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junior’s tax base, which in turn increases both the junior’s utility and (via Ψ) the senior’s
utility. This indirect effect of altruistic SEW on the senior’s effort is accompanied by a
negative direct effect of the tax rate, which is why tax rate h and SEW Ψ are substitutes.
Regarding the level of investment, we find that it is also determined by SEW. However,
the influence of Ψ on dF1,s is ambiguous: Firstly, there is a growth effect coming from the
capital stock. As returns are realized in the next period, a higher investment of the senior
increases the capital stock of the junior. A higher capital stock in period two leads also to
a higher effort of the junior and, consequently, an additional increase in the equilibrium
surplus of the junior.23 To which extent the junior is able to generate earnings from the
capital stock through his effort, strongly depends on his productivity. Consequently, it is
also the junior’s productivity that influences the senior’s investment decision via Ψ: the
more productive the junior, the higher the investment level.24 The second effect is again
the tax effect. Following the argumentation from above, the senior can relieve the junior
from the tax liability by lowering the tax base y1 with her investment d1,s. Bringing these
results together, the core insight of the investment and effort choice is, that the senior
renounces a part of her financial outcome x1 in order to improve the junior’s wealth.
The effects of different parameters on the senior’s investment behavior is summarized in
the following result.
Result 1 Assume that h ∈ [0, 12) and that the junior obtains the firm shares and manages
the firm in the second period. Then the senior’s first-period investment increases in
1. the senior’s level of SEW Ψ,
2. the junior’s level of productivity δj,
3. the inheritance tax rate h.
Proof: See the Appendix.
23Remember that θ˜2 has an expected value of one. Thus, the junior’s expected returns without any effort
are given by
√
dF1,s.
24In our model, the future capital stock is implicitly determined by the productivity of the junior. A
similar relation is found by Lucas (1978). He shows that the optimal firm size depends on exogenous
talent or expertise of the manager (see also Aron, 1988).
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Summarizing the earnings management behavior in the internal succession scenario, we
can state that the junior does not engage in manipulation activities (see Equation (16)).
The senior, in turn, undertakes earnings management as described in Result 2.
Result 2 Assume that the junior manages the firm in period two. Then
1. the senior shifts earnings from the first into the second period,
2. the senior’s investment behavior, in the context of real earnings management, crit-
ically depends on the senior’s SEW and on the inheritance tax rate. Whenever the
senior’s altruism is sufficiently high (low), Ψ > Ψ̂ = 1h+1 (Ψ < Ψ̂), the investment
dF1,s exceeds (is below) the benchmark d
B
1,s.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The first part of the result shows that the senior undertakes accrual-based earnings man-
agement (see Equation (19)). She shifts earnings from period one into period two where
the true underlying earnings remain unaffected. Thus, y1 and thereupon, the inheritance
tax base is lowered.
Even though this biasing activity leads to personnel costs, and we know from the bench-
mark that the senior is not interested in accounting signals but only in economic earnings,
she does so in favor for the junior. Thus, accrual-based earnings management is consid-
erably influenced by SEW. More precisely, the senior attempts to increase her utility via
the junior’s utility, i.e., besides lowering her effort (eF1,s < e
B
1,s) as stated in Lemma 2, she
uses accrual-based earnings management to increase the junior’s utility and ultimately,
the own utility. Intuitively, the bias increases in the inheritance tax rate,
∂bF1,s
∂h > 0, to
offset a higher tax payment.
From a real manipulation perspective, the question whether an over- or underinvestment
occurs again critically depends on the senior’s level of SEW, which is shown in the second
part of Result 2. If she is strongly interested in the utility of the junior, an investment
above the benchmark occurs. Since investment creates an immediate loss in period one,
the senior is only willing to overinvest if her interest for the junior is high enough (Ψ > Ψ̂).
Here, the high investment has again two utility increasing effects: the growth and the tax
effect.
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A similar finding is documented by Achleitner et al. (2014), who suggest that, driven
by SEW, family businesses are less likely to engage in value-decreasing underinvestment
practices. However, we also find that there is a reversed case, where the senior invests less
than optimal in order to cut costs in the first period, as current utility has a higher impact
on her total utility (Ψ < Ψ̂). Note, that the critical value for an over- or underinvestment
itself depends on the inheritance tax rate
(
1
h+1
)
. Therefore, it is more likely to observe
underinvestment when the tax rate decreases. Thus, we predict that an overinvestment is
less likely in countries with a low inheritance tax rate or where selling firm shares is not
relevant for inheritance taxation.
3.3 Succession with an external manager
An essential advantage of family firms comes from low agency costs because of the con-
solidation of ownership and management. However, it is not always the case that a junior
takes over the ownership and the operating business, e.g., when children are not interested
in managing the firm. Operational tasks are then often delegated to external managers,
which changes the situation into a classical principal-agent setting, where agency costs
arise because of the possibility of opportunistic behavior (moral hazard). In this chapter,
we take a closer look at the separation of ownership and control in family firms following a
succession. Thus, we assume that an external manager is hired in period two and analyze
how actions in both periods are affected.
Second-period compensation contract
Applying backward induction, we start again by analyzing the actions of the second period.
In our model, agency costs occur for two reasons. Firstly, a lower than optimal effort level
of the manager decreases the residual outcome of the junior, x2. Secondly, the manager
might engage in accrual-based earnings management in order to increase his compensation
w. Both, effort and manipulation activities, are not observable for the junior. For this
reason, the linear contract w also contains the incentive rate v besides the fixed payment
f . Since earnings after the succession x2 are not observable and, therefore, not available
for contracting purposes, the junior has to use the accounting signal y2 as performance
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measure for the contract: w = f+v ·y2.25 The manager in turn privately observes earnings
x2 and has discretion over the reported numbers, which is a leeway to manipulate the
accounting earnings in his favor. However, recall that the manipulation cost is higher for
the external manager than for the internal manager (λ > 1). The optimal contract solves
the following problem of the junior:
max
f,v
E[x2 − h y1 − w] (20)
subject to
E[Um] ≥ 0, (21)
(e2,m, b2,m) ∈ argmax
e′2,m,b′2,m
E[Um(e
′
2,m, b
′
2,m)]. (22)
The junior maximizes the expected firm value net of managerial compensation, subject
to two constraints. The first constraint ensures the participation of the manager and the
second is the incentive constraint for the manager’s second-period actions. The solution
to the problem is presented in Lemma 3.26
Lemma 3 The optimal incentive rate and the corresponding actions of the manager in
the second period are given by:
eE2,m =
λ
√
dE1,s
λ+ 1
, (23)
bE2,m =
dE1,s
λ+ 1
, (24)
vE =
λ
λ+ 1
. (25)
Proof: See the Appendix.
Since we consider a risk-neutral setting, the incentive rate is not affected by risk sharing
25From an agency viewpoint, it would be optimal for the junior to lease the firm to the agent in a risk-
neutral setting. Then the manager would gain the second-period economic earnings and would give
a fixed payment to the junior. However, since true economic earnings cannot be used for contractual
purposes and the performance measure y2 is not congruent to the true economic earnings, agency costs
arise even when players are risk neutral.
26Results in the external succession scenario are symbolized by the superscript E.
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considerations and the size of the firm. Even though vE motivates the manager to work,
it also creates incentives to manipulate earnings. The extent to which the manipulation
occurs depends on the monitoring intensity λ, as comparative statics show: ∂v
E
∂λ > 0.
The first-best effort level can only be reached if lim
λ→∞
vE = 1. In this case, monitoring
eliminates agency costs. However, in any other case, the contract cannot duplicate the
benchmark solution.
First-period reporting
Anticipating the reaction of the external manager, the senior chooses her optimal actions
in period one. These are stated in the next lemma.
Lemma 4 If an external manager is hired in the second period, optimal actions of the
senior in the first period are given by:
dE1,s =
(λ+ 1)2 Ψ2
(Ψ (λ+ 2h (λ+ 1))− 2λ− 2)2 , (26)
eE1,s = k0 (1−Ψh) , (27)
bE1,s = −h Ψ k20. (28)
Proof: See the Appendix.
Even though agency costs arise, the senior still invests in future growth. By working on
the capital stock and providing effort, which positively depends on the investment, the
manager increases firm value. The internal monitoring technology makes it less attractive
for the manager to manipulate earnings and, thus, limits the agency costs. In equilibrium,
a stronger monitoring technology λ in period two leads to a higher first-period investment
of the senior.27 The question whether the investment exceeds the extent in the benchmark
solution is answered in the next result.
27See the Appendix: proof of Lemma 4.
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Result 3 Assume that the senior’s succession plan requires that the junior has the chair-
manship of the supervisory board and an external CEO must be hired. Then the following
observations can be documented:
1. The senior’s accrual-based earnings management equals the level of the internal sce-
nario.
2. The senior’s investment level is positively affected by monitoring technology λ.
3. Real earnings management: senior’s investment level is always lower compared to
the internal scenario. If Ψ > Ψ˘ = λ+1
λ(h+1)+h+ 1
2
(Ψ < Ψ˘), the investment dE1 exceeds
(is below) the benchmark.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Similar to the internal succession setting, the senior’s actions are SEW-driven. She uses
accrual-based earnings management to shift earnings into the second period in order to
avoid a high taxation for her junior. Thus, manipulation incentives do not depend on
whether an internal or external management runs the firm. The question remains if the
senior’s accrual-based earnings management, which increases the manager’s contractual
base y2, has an effect on the manager’s payoff. The answer can be found by taking a look
at the fixed payment. As the participation constraint is binding, it holds that ∂f
E
∂bE1,s
< 0.
Thus, the junior takes the accrual management of the senior into account and lowers the
fixed payment in order to balance out the higher variable payment.
Regarding the investment volume, the extent of deviation from the benchmark solution
depends on the SEW of the senior and on the agency costs. Note that, as opposed to the
internal succession scenario, there is accrual earnings management in the second period
of the external succession scenario (bE2,m > 0), since the manager attempts to increase his
incentive payment. Therefore, second-period accrual management is strictly higher if a
non-family member is CEO, which is in line with empirical studies. For example, Yang
(2010) shows that non-family CEOs exhibit a stronger tendency to manipulate accruals
than family CEOs do. Similar to our findings, it is argued that it is more necessary for firms
with external CEOs to monitor them and to motivate them using incentive compensation
based on accounting earnings than it is for firms employing family CEOs, who reject costly
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manipulation practices.28
The last part of Result 3 shows that real earnings management of the senior again depends
on her SEW: There is a critical value Ψ˘, which determines whether first-period over- or
underinvestment occurs. Moreover, in comparison to the internal scenario, a higher degree
of altruism of the senior is needed for an overinvestment in the first period. Since an
external manager leads to agency costs, which in turn provide lower investment incentives
to the senior, Ψ˘ exceeds Ψ̂.29
0
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2
0.7 Ψˆ 0.8 Ψ˘ 0.9
d1,s
Ψ
dB1,s
dF1,s
dE1,s
Figure 3: Investment levels of different scenarios (parameters: h = 0.35, λ = 2)
Figure 3 illustrates the investment levels of the different succession scenarios as functions
of SEW Ψ. It demonstrates the effect of the critical values of SEW on the real earnings
management behavior. If Ψ < Ψ̂, the senior’s investment is below the benchmark level
in both scenarios. In contrast, independent of the succession scenario, the senior always
overinvests if Ψ > Ψ˘. Although real activity manipulations differ from each other with
respect to their absolute levels, the manipulation strategy is identical. Only in the area
between Ψ̂ and Ψ˘ the real earnings management strategies are different. While the senior
will overinvest if her offspring leads the firm, the investment is strictly below the benchmark
28In addition, Ferramosca and Allegrini (2018) show that the extent of accrual-based earnings management
activities depends on the involvement of family members in executive positions.
29Note that we define real earnings management activities as decisions, which are driven by SEW-
considerations. Decisions, that are solely based on differences in the productivities of the second-period
players (without any consideration of behavioral aspects), are investment decisions. Therefore, in order
to determine real earning management practices of the senior, the productivities of all other players are
set equal one. The influence of a lower productivity of the junior (δj < δm) on investment is investigated
in Section 4.
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in the case of an external manager. Consequently, if the firm’s leadership remains within
the family, an overinvestment is more likely.
4 Senior’s succession decision: internal vs. external
In this section, we identify conditions under which the senior prefers a succession scenario,
where an external manager is hired in period two even though an interested internal succes-
sor is available. The previous chapters show that the senior adjusts her actions dependent
on the succession scenario. However, recall that the senior has authority over the suc-
cession, i.e., she can implement whatever succession scenario she prefers. As an example,
she could establish in the firm’s articles of association that only external managers can
have the executive rights, whereas next-generation family members are solely permitted
to assume duties/responsibilities in the firm’s advisory board.
To study whether the senior prefers a family-member or an external agent as CEO of
the second period, we compare the senior’s equilibrium expected utility in both scenarios:
∆ = E[UFs ] − E[UEs ].30 We find that effects of most parameters are clear and intuitive.
For example, improving monitoring (λ increases) makes it more complicated for external
managers to engage in manipulation activities and, thus, reduces agency costs.31 Cor-
respondingly, hiring an external manager becomes more advantageous, i.e., the senior’s
utility E[UEs ] increases. In contrast, a higher productivity of the junior makes an internal
succession more beneficial.32 For δj = 1, the senior chooses the internal succession since
the junior does not cause any moral hazard problem and provides the same productivity.
However, in case of a less productive junior (i.e., δj =
1
2), the question whether the junior
becomes CEO depends on the agency costs caused by an external manager. If these costs
are sufficiently high, it can be advantageous for the senior to choose a less productive
junior to run the firm. Similarly, a low-productivity junior could also take over the job as
CEO if the additional utility of keeping the management within the family (via dynastic
utility from Ψ) is significantly high. It is straightforward that an increase of both (δj , Ψ)
30Note that the difference is expressed in absolute values. Thus, it can take positive and negative values.
31See Section 3.3 for a closer analysis of the agency costs.
32Recall that there are always capable managers available on the market. These external agents provide a
productivity of δm = 1, whereas the junior’s productivity equals δj ∈ { 12 , 1}.
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reduces the advantage of hiring an external professional.
Regarding the inheritance tax rate h, we find that its impact on the senior’s succession
decision is less intuitive. Result 4 summarizes the effects.33
Result 4 Assume a sufficiently high degree of SEW of the senior (Ψ = 1) and a low
productive junior (δj =
1
2), a higher inheritance tax rate influences the senior’s succession
decision in favor of the external manager, i.e., ∂∆∂h < 0.
Proof: See the Appendix.
We are able to identify three effects coming from an increase in the taxation rate h. The
first effect evokes a decrease of ∆, which results from the taxes’ influence on the investment
level: Initially, a higher tax rate leads to a higher investment of the senior in order to lower
the junior’s inheritance taxation base. This is driven by SEW, which means d1,s increases
particularly strong for high values of Ψ. The increased capital stock then provides higher
expected second-period earnings K(d1,s)(δi e2,i+1). Since the effort positively depends on
the investment, the optimal second-period effort level increases, which additionally leads
to higher earnings. This reaction takes place in both scenarios (internal and external).
However, due to the lower productivity of the junior (δj =
1
2 < δm), the effort level
in the external scenario is strictly higher. Consequently, an earnings difference between
the scenarios increases in the investment d1,s and makes hiring an external agent more
beneficial. For reasons of tractability, we call this process “earnings effect”. Secondly, a
higher tax rate h directly increases the future tax burden. Because of the high dE1,s and the
corresponding lower tax base yE1 , ∆ decreases in h, which we denote as the “tax burden
effect”. The third effect is that a higher tax rate leads to higher agency costs. This is
again caused by the increased capital stock, which makes accrual-based manipulation by
an external more attractive
(
∂bE2,m
∂d1,s
> 0
)
and, due to the larger size of the company, more
difficult to prevent. As agency costs arise, the senior’s expected utility E[UEs ] decreases,
and an increase of ∆ follows. This may be called “agency effect”.
It becomes clear that the decision whether to implement an internal or an external suc-
33Note that the condition 0 ≤ h < 1
2
must be fulfilled. However, the condition Ψ = 1 is not necessary.
The effect of Result 4, i.e., the influence of the tax rate on the senior’s succession decision, holds also for
lower values of Ψ (see the Appendix).
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cession depends on the interplay between the tax rate with various other factors. For the
assumptions named in Result 4, we find that, in equilibrium, the “earnings effect” and
the “tax burden effect” dominate the “agency effect”, i.e., a higher tax rate makes hiring
a non-family CEO more beneficial.
As a consequence, we would predict that internal successions are more preferred in coun-
tries where inheritance taxation is low and agency costs (e.g., because of low corporate
governance standards) are high. A similar result is documented by Tsoutsoura (2015).
She considers family firm sales and family-internal successions, and shows that a higher
inheritance taxation makes the latter scenario less likely. Although, we do not consider
the possibility of a liquidation of the firm in this model, her findings still do correspond to
our result: if we assumed a sufficiently high level of h, the expected surplus of both succes-
sion scenarios
(
E[UFs ] and E[U
E
s ]
)
would become negative, making the firm’s liquidation
a more beneficial option.
5 Conclusion
We develop a two-period agency model to examine earnings management practices of a
family firm at the time of change in ownership and control. By considering two succession
scenarios, we are able to suggest explanations for differences in investment and earnings
management behaviors of family firms.
We show that earnings management strongly depends on the succession scenario which is
implemented by the person who is in charge prior to the succession. If the firm shares
are transferred within the family, accrual-based earnings management of the preceding
owner leads to an earnings shift from the first into the second period. This is driven
by SEW considerations which aim to reduce the inheritance taxation of a successor from
the family. Regarding real earnings management, incentives for manipulations arise again
through SEW. We find that activities critically depend on the degree of altruism. A
significantly high (low) SEW leads to a first-period investment in the capital stock which
is above (below) the economic optimal level. If a successor from the family does not
run the operational business of the firm and instead hires an external manager, earnings
management activities are also affected by agency costs. A further insight from our model
is that the inheritance tax rate can affect the founder’s decision regarding the succession
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scenario. We show that an increase in the inheritance tax rate makes hiring an external
manager in the second period more beneficial compared to the situation where the firm is
led by a family member. Our results show that SEW facilitates inter-generational thinking
and, thus, extends the time horizon of decision-makers. Consequently, we find a positive
influence of SEW on long-term investments.
Our model is able to provide detailed explanations for some empirical patterns regarding
earnings management in family firms during a succession. We suggest that succession de-
cisions, earnings management activities, investment behaviors and performance differences
of family firms are largely explained by simple contractual and socioemotional consider-
ations of the families involved in the businesses. In particular, we identify inheritance
taxation, agency costs, as well as altruistic and dynastic SEW as the main drivers of the
results. Nevertheless, we believe that future analytical research can generate more precise
results that allow predictions beyond the ones we propose. Moreover, as the emphasis of
previous studies is mainly set on empirical methods, we are convinced that accounting
behaviors and succession decisions of family firms should be examined in more controlled
environments.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
In the benchmark solution, the senior does not leave or assigns the firm and is only
interested in the firm value. Since she stays for two periods, she chooses her actions in
order to maximize the sum over both periods. The senior’s ex ante utility is given by:
E[Us] =− d1,s + k0(δse1,s + 1) +K(d1,s)(δse2,s + 1)− 1
2
(
e21,s +
b21,s
k20
+ e22,s +
b22,s
K(d1,s)2
)
.
Differentiating above with respect to e1,s, e2,s, d1,s, b1,s and b2,s leads to the following
first-order conditions:
∂E[Us]
∂e1,s
=0⇐⇒ −e1,s + k0δs = 0,
∂E[Us]
∂e2,s
=0⇐⇒ −e2,s +
√
d1,sδs = 0,
∂E[Us]
∂d1,s
=0⇐⇒ −1 + δs e2,s + 1
2
√
d1,s
+
b22,s
2 d21,s
= 0,
∂E[Us]
∂b1,s
=0⇐⇒ −b1,s
k20
= 0,
∂E[Us]
∂b2,s
=0⇐⇒ − b2,s
d1,s
= 0.
Solving the equation system for e1,s, e2,s, d1,s, b1,s and b2,s, under the assumption of δs = 1,
the solutions are represented by equations (9), (10), (11), (12) and (13). Inserting these
values in the Hessian matrix of the objective function H gives
HB(eB1,s, e
B
2,s, b
B
1,s, b
B
2,s, d
B
1,s) =

−1 0 0 0 1/2
0 −1 0 0 0
0 0 −k−20 0 0
0 0 0 −1 0
1/2 0 0 0 −1/2

.
Since k0 > 0, H
B(·) is negative definite and, thus, the derived solution is a maximum.
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Proof of Lemma 2
In contrast to the benchmark, in the internal scenario the senior is also interested in the
junior’s utility. We obtain the first-period actions by solving the junior’s problem in the
second period (backward induction): The junior’s ex ante utility in period two is given
by:
E[Uj ] =
√
d1,s(δje2,j + 1)− h · (−d1,s + k0(δse1,s + 1) + b1,s)−
e22,j
2
− b
2
2,j
2 d1,s
.
Differentiating the expected utility with respect to e2,j and b2,j , and solving the first-order
conditions yield:
∂E[Uj ]
∂e2,j
=0⇐⇒ eF2,j = δj
√
d1,s,
∂E[Uj ]
∂b2,j
=0⇐⇒ bF2,j = 0.
The senior’s expected utility is given by:
E[UFs ] = − d1,s + k0(δse1,s + 1) −
e21,s
2
− b
2
1,s
2k20
+ Ψ
(√
d1,s(δje2,j + 1)
)
+ Ψ
(
−h · (−d1,s + k0(δse1,s + θ˜1) + b1,s)−
e22,j
2
− b
2
2,j
2 d1,s
)
. (A.1)
Inserting eF2,j and b
F
2,j , and differentiating with respect to e1,s, d1,s and b1,s lead to:
∂E[UFs ]
∂e1,s
=0⇐⇒ −Ψ k0 δs h+ k0δs − e1,s = 0,
∂E[UFs ]
∂d1,s
=0⇐⇒ −1 + Ψ
( √
d1,sδj
2 + 1
2
√
d1,s
+ h
)
= 0,
∂E[UFs ]
∂b1,s
=0⇐⇒ −b1,s
k20
−Ψh = 0.
Solving the linear equation system for e1,s, b1,s and d1,s, and given δs = 1, the solutions
are represented by equations (17), (19) and (18).
Since δj ∈ {12 , 1}, Ψ ∈ [0, 1], h ∈ [0, 12) and k0 > 0, the Hessian matrix HF (·) of the
objective function is negative definite and, thus, the derived solution is a maximum.
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Proof of Result 1
To proof the influence of different parameters on the investment level, note that the con-
ditions δj ∈ {12 , 1}, Ψ ∈ [0, 1] and h ∈ [0, 12) hold:
1. Differentiating (18) with respect to Ψ and simplifying yield:
∂dF1,s
∂Ψ
= − 4Ψ(
Ψ δ2j + 2 Ψh− 2
)3 > 0.
The investment increases in Ψ.
2. Differentiating (18) with respect to h and simplifying yield:
∂dF1,s
∂h
= − 4Ψ
3(
Ψ δ2j + 2 Ψh− 2
)3 > 0.
The investment increases in h.
3. Differentiating (18) with respect to δj and simplifying yield:
∂dF1,s
∂δj
= − 4Ψ
3δj(
Ψ δ2j + 2 Ψh− 2
)3 > 0.
In our model, we assume that δj ∈ {12 , 1}. Thus, the investment is strictly higher if δj = 1.
Proof of Result 2
1. To investigate accrual-based management behavior, we consider the sign of bF1,s. Since
Ψ ∈ [0, 1] and h ∈ [0, 12), equation (19) is always negative and, thus, the senior shifts
earnings from the first to the second period in equilibrium.
2. To study real earnings management, we consider the difference between the investment
levels in the benchmark and the internal succession scenario. Recall that, in order to
determine real earnings management, the productivity of the player may not be considered
(see footnote 30 on page 21). To eliminate productivity effects, we set δs and δj to one.
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Using (13) and (18), we obtain:
dB1,s − dF1,s =
4(Ψh− 1) (Ψh+ Ψ− 1)
(2 Ψh+ Ψ− 2)2 .
Solving dB1,s − dF1,s = 0 for Ψ yields:
Ψ̂ =
1
h+ 1
.
Since h ∈ [0, 12), Ψ̂ ∈ (23 , 1]. Thus, an overinvestment takes place if Ψ > Ψ̂. Otherwise, if
Ψ < Ψ̂, the senior’s investment level is lower compared to the benchmark.
Proof of Lemma 3
To obtain the optimal incentive contract of period two, we must consider the optimal
action levels of the external manager. Differentiating (7) with respect to e2,m and b2,m,
and solving the first-order conditions yield:
∂E[UEm]
∂e2,m
=0⇐⇒ eE2,m = vEδm
√
dE1,s,
∂E[UEm]
∂b2,m
=0⇐⇒ bE2,m =
vEdE1,s
λ
.
In program (20), the participation constraint is binding at the optimum: E[Um] = 0. By
substituting from that constraint into the objective function, the junior’s utility can be
written as:
E[Uj ] =
√
d1,s(δme2,m + 1)− h · (−d1,s + k0(δse1,s + 1) + b1,s)−
e22,m
2
− λ b
2
2,m
2 d1,s
. (A.2)
Inserting the incentive constraint for e2,m and b2,m into the junior’s objective function
leads to:
√
d1,s + v δ
2
md1,s − h · (−d1,s + k0(δse1,s + 1) + b1,s)−
v2 δ2md1,s
2
− v
2 d1,s
2λ
.
From the first-order condition for the optimal v, we obtain the equilibrium incentive rate:
vE =
λ
λ+ 1
.
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The corresponding manipulation activity of the external manager is then given by:
bE2,m =
λ
√
dE1,s
λ+ 1
.
Inserting vE , bE2,m, and e
E
2,m in the expected mangers utility E[Um], which is given by
Equation (7), and simplifying yield:
fE =
1
2
λ
(
2
√
dE1,s − 2 bE1,s + dE1,s
)
λ+ 1
.
In equilibrium, an increase of the senior’s bias bE1,s reduces the fixed payment of the external
manager: ∂f
E
∂bE1,s
< 0.
Proof of Lemma 4
The solutions of the optimal actions of the senior in a succession setting with an external
manager correspond to the procedure explained in detail above for Lemma 2. Therefore,
the proof is omitted.
Next, we study the effect of a stronger internal monitoring on senior’s investment. Differ-
entiation (26) in respect to λ gives:
∂dE1,s
∂λ
= − (λ+ 1) Ψ
3
4
((
−1 +
(
h+
1
2
)
Ψ
)
λ+ Ψh− 1
)3 > 0.
Since h ∈ [0, 12) and Ψ ∈ [0, 1],
∂dE1,s
∂λ
is strictly positive.
Proof of Result 3
1. Accounting earnings management: See Proof of Result 2.
2. To study real earnings management, we consider the difference between the investment
levels of the benchmark and the external succession scenario. Again recall, that effects
from the productivities of the players are not considered in order to determine earnings
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management. Using (13) and (26), we obtain:
dB1,s − dE1,s = 1−
(λ+ 1)2 Ψ2
(2 (Ψ) λh+ (Ψ) λ+ 2 (Ψ) h− 2λ− 2)2 .
Solving dB1,s − dE1,s = 0 for Ψ yields:
Ψ˘ =
λ+ 1
λ(h+ 1) + h+ 12
,
Ψ =
λ+ 1
λh+ h− 12
.
The critical value Ψ˘ is always between 0 and 1. Thus, an overinvestment takes place if
Ψ > Ψ˘. Otherwise, if Ψ < Ψ˘, the senior’s investment level is lower compared to the
benchmark. In contrast, the second critical value Ψ takes no value which fulfills the
condition Ψ ∈ [0, 1].
Comparing the critical values of Ψ of the internal and external scenario gives:
Ψ̂− Ψ˘ =− 0.5
(1 + h) (λ(h+ 1) + h+ 0.5)
< 0.
This shows that the critical value of altruism in the external setting is strictly higher.
Therefore, an underinvestment is more likely if an external manager runs the firm in
period two.
Proof of Result 4
(1) Senior’s succession decision if the junior’s ability is low
For the optimal decision of the senior between an internal and external scenario with a
low ability of the junior, we distinguish two cases of monitoring. For simplification, a high
degree of SEW (Ψ = 1) is assumed. Inserting eF1,s, b
F
1,s, e
F
2,j , b
F
2,j and d
F
1,s in the senior’s
utility E[Us] which is given by (A.1), and we obtain the equilibrium surplus E[U
F
s ] of the
internal succession scenario. To derive the equilibrium surplus of the external succession
scenario, we must consider the modified objective function of the junior which is given
by (A.2). Inserting eE1,s, b
E
1,s, e
E
2,m, b
E
2,m, v
E , fE and dE1,s into the senior’s utility E[Us],
we obtain E[UEs ]. The senior’s utility between the internal and the external succession
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scenario is given by
E[UFs ]− E[UEs ] = ∆. (A.3)
(i) Assume a scenario with a low productive junior (δj = 0.5) and low monitoring
(λ = 1). Then, the difference between the senior’s utility between the internal and
the external succession scenario is characterized by:
∆ =
8h
(
h− 12
) (
h− 78
)2
k0
2 − 4h (h− 78)
(2h− 1.75)2 −
√
(4h− 3)−2
(
2
√
(4h− 3)−2 + 2
)
−
32
(
1
8 +
(
h− 34
)2 (
h− 12
)
k0
2 − 12
(
h− 34
)2
k0
)
h− 5
(4h− 3)2
+
√
(2h− 1.75)−2.
Differentiating the above with respect to h and simplifying yield:
∂∆
∂h
=
32√
(2h−1.75)2
(
− (h− 34) (−1316 + h) (h− 78)√(4h− 3)−2 + 2 (h− 78)3)√
(4h− 3)−2
√
(2h− 1.75)−2 (2h− 1.75)3 (4h− 3)3
+
32
(
−4 (h− 34)3√(4h− 3)−2)√
(4h− 3)−2
√
(2h− 1.75)−2 (2h− 1.75)3 (4h− 3)3
.
Since h ∈ (0, 0.5], ∂∆∂h is strictly negative. In this scenario, a higher inheritance tax
rate makes hiring of an external manager more beneficial.
(ii) Assume a scenario with a low productive junior (δj = 0.5) and a high monitoring
(λ = 2). Then, the difference between the senior’s utility in the internal and the
external succession scenario is characterized by:
∆ =
(
8h
(
h− 12
) (
h− 78
)2
k0
2 − 4h (h− 78)2 k0 + h− 78)
(2h− 1.75)2 +
√
(2h− 1.75)−2
+ 3 (3h− 2)−2 − 2
(
3
√
(6h− 4)−2 + 2
3
)√
(6h− 4)−2
−18h
(
1
8 +
(
h− 12
) (
h− 23
)2
k0
2 − 12
(
h− 23
)2
k0
)
(3h− 2)2 .
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Differentiating above with respect to h and simplifying yield:
∂∆
∂h
= − 22.5
(
h− 32770574915586
) (
h− 102295132707
) (
h− 12254051400463
)(
2h− 74
)3
(3h− 2)3
+
18
(
h2 − 97205h55576 + 15772062
) (
h− 2434127788
)√
(6h− 4)−2 (2h− 74)3 (3h− 2)3
+ 6
−9h3 + 18h2 − 12h+ 8/3√(
2h− 74
)−2 (
2h− 74
)3
(3h− 2)3
.
Since h ∈ (0, 0.5], ∂∆∂h is strictly negative. Therefore, a higher tax rate makes hiring
an external manager more beneficial.
In Result 4, we study the influence of the inheritance tax rate on the senior’s succession
decision. Above, we consider the extreme case of Ψ = 1. However, the same influence of
the tax rate can be obtained if we relax this condition. Therefore, we now assume Ψ = 12 :
(iii) Assume a scenario with a low productive junior (δj = 0.5), low monitoring (λ = 1)
and a lower value for SEW (Ψ = 0.5). Inserting these values in (A.3) and differenti-
ating the expression with respect to h yield:
∂∆
∂h
= − (h− 1.749987) (h− 1.81256) (h− 1.8749865)
32 (h− 1.875)3 (h− 1.75)3
+
(h− 1.8761) (h2 − 3.7489h+ 3.5136)
4
√
(h− 1.75)−2 (h− 1.875)3 (h− 1.75)3
− 1
4
√
(h− 1.875)−2 (h− 1.875)3
.
As in (i), it holds that ∂∆∂h is strictly negative since h ∈ [0, 12).
(iv) Assume a low productive junior (δj = 0.5), low SEW (Ψ = 0.5) and a stronger
monitoring (λ = 2), substitution and differentiation yield:
∂∆
∂h
= − 45 (h− 1.6666) (h− 1.7708) (h− 1.874999)
256 (h− 1.875)3 (1.5h− 2.5)3
− 3 (9h− 14.9921)
(
h2 − 3.3342h+ 2.7792)
32
√
(h− 1.875)−2 (h− 1.875)3 (1.5h− 2.5)3
+
18 (h− 1.87708) (h2 − 3.7479h+ 3.5117)
32
√
(1.5h− 2.5)−2 (h− 1.875)3 (1.5h− 2.5)3
.
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Similar to (ii), it also holds that ∂∆∂h is strictly negative since h ∈ [0, 12).
In all scenarios mentioned above and in presence of a low productive junior, comparative
statics have the same effect. Therefore, a higher tax rate makes hiring an external manager
more attractive. This finding also holds for lower values of Ψ (i.e., Ψ = 1).
(2) Senior’s succession decision if the junior’s ability is high
In case of a junior with a high ability, he is equally productive as an external manager.
Since hiring an external is linked to agency costs, the senior will always decide that his
junior should run the firm. To show this analytically we use (A.3) and assume δj = 1 and
λ = 2:
∆ =− 1296
(
h− 2
3
)3
(h− 0.5)3
((
−h2 + 7
6
h− 1
3
)√
(2h− 1)−2 + 1
24
)
(3h− 2)4 (2h− 1)4
− 1296
(
h− 2
3
)3
(h− 0.5)3
(
0.5
√
(6h− 4)−2 (6h2 − 7h+ 2))
(3h− 2)4 (2h− 1)4 .
Since h ∈ [0, 12), the equation above is strictly positive and, therefore, a family-member
CEO is always preferred.
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A model on subjective performance evaluations and
reciprocal agents
Abstract
A common phenomenon in subjective performance evaluations is the leniency bias. This
work uses an agency model to examine the determinants of the bias and the economic
consequences for the firm. It is shown that the anticipation of reciprocally acting em-
ployees leads superiors to intentionally manipulate the results of subjective evaluations.
Dependent on other influences a positive bias (leniency) enables beneficial reciprocation,
which can increase the firm’s profit. The underlying cause of this is discretion over the
performance measure. It constitutes an additional device of optimization that allows to
provide incentives more precisely.
Keywords:
agency, contracts, subjective performance evaluation, reciprocity, behavioral accounting
JEL-Classification:
C72, D82, M40, M52
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1 Introduction
In order to achieve corporate goals managers often try to align interests of their employ-
ees by means of performance-based compensation contracts. One major task in designing
incentive contracts is the determination of appropriate performance measures. The usual
theoretical approach of addressing this is the analysis and utilization of explicit perfor-
mance measures. However, there are some factors which can complicate the matter in
practice. Firstly, as it is often too costly or too difficult to determine the contribution of
an employee to company performance, firms simply lack the ability to objectively eval-
uate performance (see Baker et al., 1994a, p. 1127). Given that objective performance
evaluation is possible, a second problem arises from the fact that many jobs consist of
various tasks. The use of an explicit contract could cause the employee to focus too much
on aspects captured by the contract and leaving other aspects not included in the con-
tract unconsidered (see Holmstro¨m and Milgrom, 1990, 1991; Baker, 1992). This list of
problems is easily extended.
A common method to overcome these obstacles is to assess and reward individual per-
formances by means of subjective measures. In this case the person in charge enjoys
discretionary power over the performance measures and uses his or her very own impres-
sions to determine evaluation results. Besides its availability for almost all kinds of jobs,
the main advantage is that subjective assessment provides a more holistic picture of perfor-
mance (Prendergast, 1999). There is a vast literature addressing prevalence and benefits
of subjective performance evaluation.1
However, there is also evidence that subjective assessments increase the chance of inac-
curacies and biases. It is, for example, possible that workers waste resources fulfilling
favors for their bosses (Prendergast, 1999, p. 9). Moreover, there are two phenomenons
observable in practice, which show that the quality of subjective evaluations is affected.
These phenomenons are called “leniency bias” and “centrality bias”. While the former
indicates that supervisors are reluctant to give poor ratings to employees, the latter shows
that ratings are also compressed around some norm rather than truly distinguishing good
1 See, e.g., Baker et al. (1994a), Smith et al. (1996), Levin (2003), Murphy and Oyer (2003), Gibbs et al.
(2004), and Rajan and Reichelstein (2009).
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from bad performances (Prendergast, 1999, p. 9).2
The literature analyzing these phenomenons is mostly empirical or experimental (see Bol,
2008, 2011; Bol and Smith, 2011; Breuer et al., 2013), however, there is also research
that examines the topic analytically (e.g., MacLeod, 2003; Kamphorst and Swank, 2015;
Marchegiani et al., 2016). Explanations for these biases are diverse. While some authors
find the lack of rewards for accurate ratings for supervisors (Fox et al., 1983) or the avoid-
ance of undesirable discussions (Varma et al., 1996) as the main causes for inaccuracies,
others claim that cognitive limitations (Ittner et al., 2003) or collusion (Thiele, 2013) lead
to the distortions. Also favoritism (Ferriy and Judge, 1991), inequality aversion (Grund
and Przemeck, 2012), altruism (Giebe and Gu¨rtler, 2012; Golman and Bhatia, 2012), reci-
procity (Sebald and Walzl, 2014, 2015), as well as loss aversion and reference dependent
preferences (Marchegiani et al., 2016) are mentioned as possible causes.
The purpose of this paper is to add another explanation for leniency in subjective per-
formance evaluations and to characterize determinants of the bias. I also address profit
concerns and examine if and how the manipulation increases or decreases the firm’s surplus
as well as agency costs. I assume that leniency is the result of deliberate and economically
motivated manipulations by superiors, who add a positive or a negative bias to the actual
evaluation result in order to enhance the economic outcome. The major driver for this is
that superiors have to deal with reciprocally acting employees. The concept of reciprocity
argues that individuals are driven by motivations where direct utility is gathered through
rewarding or punishing actions (Dohmen et al., 2009, p. 592). More precisely, individuals
tend to consider social aspects, like someone else’s well-being, his/her motivations and
intentions, or the own sensation of fairness, and respond “in-kind” (Falk and Fischbacher,
2006). The literature on this concept is extensive.3
I apply contracting theory and use a principal-agent scenario on the basis of the LEN
model, where a risk neutral employer / supervisor (principal) and a risk averse employee
2 There are numerous papers indicating that evaluation results are biased: Medoff and Abraham (1980),
Baker et al. (1994b), Gibbs (1995), Flabbi and Ichino (2001), Dohmen (2004), Gibbs and Hendricks
(2004), Dohmen et al. (2004), Frederiksen and Takats (2011), Frederiksen (2013), and Frederiksen et al.
(2017).
3 Others are, e.g., Akerlof (1982), Rabin (1993), Fehr et al. (1997), Fehr and Ga¨chter (1998), Rabin (1998),
Levine (1998), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Charness (2004), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004),
Irlenbusch and Sliwka (2005), Dohmen et al. (2008, 2009), and Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009).
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(agent) interact. My model works as follows. By anticipating differences between self-
evaluations of the agent and the actual evaluation result, the principal foresees that the
probability for adverse reactions, i.e., reactions that are able to harm the firm’s out-
come, is increased. Here, I follow one particular line of argumentation in the literature,
which claims that people resist revisions of self- appraisals when confronted with deviating
feedback and instead tend to engage in directing feelings outward.4 In order to prevent
negative behaviors and to enhance the probability of positive and productive reactions,
respectively, the principal distorts the evaluation. However, this intentional biasing of the
evaluation may not solely lead to positive responses. In this regard, I follow discussions
about consequences from biases in evaluations and fairness perceptions and assume that
reactions are not straightforward.5 On the one hand, leniency increases the performance
measure and thereby positively affects the agent’s salary, which then may lead to increased
satisfaction and performance. On the other hand, however, inaccurate evaluations can be
perceived as unfair by the agent. Firstly, the evaluation result does not represent ac-
tual performance, which may lead to frustration. Secondly, the principal’s intention to
manipulate the evaluation is not based on benevolence but on the maximization of her
payoff. Hence, biasing can also reduce motivation, lead to a negative attitude and at worst
result in actions against the organization (Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001; Bol, 2008;
Kamphorst and Swank, 2015; Marchegiani et al., 2016).
I find that even though manipulations may result in demotivation and punishing behaviors,
the principal still manipulates the subjective evaluation result positively under specific cir-
cumstances, as it increases her profits. This confirms the empirical finding of a general
tendency of supervisors to give good ratings, however, the explanation I add now is a
purely economic one. The reason for this result is that the discretion over the perfor-
mance measure serves as an additional device to provide incentives. The opportunity to
shift emphasis between several optimization variables allows the principal to optimize her
surplus more precisely. In comparison with the classic LEN model I find that the overall
profit can be increased whereas agency costs are always increased.
4 See Shrauger and Lund (1975), Baird (1977), Greenwald (1980), Swann Jr. (1987), Baumeister et al.
(1996), and Bushman and Baumeister (1998).
5 Analyses, discussions and different perspectives are found in Akerlof and Yellen (1988), Blinder and Choi
(1990), Greenberg (1990), Cohen-Charash and Spector (2001), Colquitt et al. (2001), Gibbs et al. (2004),
Bol (2008, 2011), Kamphorst and Swank (2015), and Marchegiani et al. (2016).
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My paper contributes to two streams of literature. Firstly, since it concerns particular
patterns in evaluation results, it contributes to the accounting literature addressing char-
acteristics and effects of subjective performance evaluations.6 Secondly, as I explain the
observed pattern with a behavioral concept, I contribute to the analytical literature using
insights from fields of psychology to explain phenomena in (economic) decision making
and characteristics of contract designs.7
My explanation for biased evaluations should be understood to have a complementary
character. Since the authors also use behavioral explanations, my approach is loosely
related to the analyses of Grund and Przemeck (2012), Giebe and Gu¨rtler (2012), Golman
and Bhatia (2012), and Marchegiani et al. (2016). My paper is particularly closely related
to Sebald and Walzl (2014, 2015) because, similarly, I explain leniency effects by means
of reciprocity. However, there are some major (analytical) differences. Firstly, I focus on
effort instead of ability and, therefore, analyze a classic moral hazard problem. This allows
me to also address how the bias is influenced by observability of effort, effort aversion, noise
in the evaluation and risk aversion. Secondly, while Sebald and Walzl (2014, 2015) solely
focus on punishing reciprocal behaviors, I also allow positive responses, i.e., reaction that
are beneficial to the company.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. In the following two
sections I analyze settings which differ regarding informational symmetry with respect to
effort. The first-best solution (Section 3) establishes the benchmark, whereas the second-
best solution (Section 4) describes a more realistic real business life scenario. Chapter
5 compares findings of the preceding sections with each other and with results from the
classical LEN model. Section 6 concludes.
6 For example, Baker et al. (1994a), MacLeod (2003), Bol (2008), Rajan and Reichelstein (2009),
Kampko¨tter and Sliwka (2011), Bol (2011), Bol and Smith (2011), Breuer et al. (2013), and Kamphorst
and Swank (2015).
7 See Rabin (1993), Be´nabou and Tirole (2002, 2004), Ko¨szegi (2006), Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006), Falk and
Fischbacher (2006), Giebe and Gu¨rtler (2012), Golman and Bhatia (2012), Grund and Przemeck (2012),
Sebald and Walzl (2014, 2015), and Marchegiani et al. (2016).
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2 Model
I consider a single period LEN principal-agent model. A risk-neutral principal (she) hires a
risk-averse agent (he) to provide effort e in a newly created project. The project, however,
is a complex good or service such that it is impossible for the principal to objectively
evaluate the agent’s contribution to it. The principal therefore applies subjective criteria
to assess the performance of her employee. Using her personal impressions of the agent’s
work she creates an appraisal in written form. I assume that the report is published,
i.e., at least the department of human resources (HR) is informed about the evaluation
outcome, and that its content thereby becomes verifiable for third parties.8 Consequently,
a contract can credibly be written on the appraisal report, which means it can serve as a
performance measure for the agent. Formally, the report takes the form
y = e+ δ + ε. (1)
The evaluation is based on the agent’s true effort but also affected by some random noise
ε ∼ N(µ, σ2ε).9 With this it is taken into account that the principal’s impression of the
agent’s work is not perfectly accurate. Furthermore, since the principal has discretion over
the evaluation result, she is able to add a bias δ ∈ [−1, 1] to change the evaluation in her
favor. More precisely, the principal can manipulate the evaluation in that she improves or
worsens the outcome. A scenario with δ > 0 would be an example for a leniency bias.
Since y serves as the performance measure of the agent, his compensation contract takes
the form
s = f + vy, (2)
with f symbolizing the agent’s fixed wage and v being the incentive rate.
It is common knowledge that, parallel to the principal, the agent privately makes an
alternative assessment of his own performance, i.e., he forms an expectation on how his
official evaluation result should look like. The problem with this is that he is prone to
8 The scenario of subjective impressions leading to a verifiable report that serves as a performance measure
may fit to the evaluation of a white-collar employee at the lower or middle management level (see Giebe
and Gu¨rtler, 2012, Golman and Bhatia, 2012 or Grund and Przemeck, 2012 for similar approaches).
9 The agent’s productivity is normalized to one.
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thought patterns that deviate from the ones of the “homo oeconomicus”. This is where the
concept of reciprocity comes into play. Technically, the agent compares his effort e with
the official assessment of his work y and develops an own sensation of fairness. Whenever
there appear differences between the official evaluation report and his own assessment of
performance, which is the evaluation result the agent anticipates, his personal self-esteem
is affected in that he perceives ego-threatening or ego-boosting feelings. Based on this
psychological process (see, e.g., Shrauger and Lund, 1975; Baird, 1977; Baumeister et
al., 1996) the agent subsequently engages in a reciprocal (re)action Ω. Possible are both
rewarding and punishing actions. Examples for punishing responses could be diminished
cooperation, the manipulation of information or communication, theft from the workplace,
or the opening of a law suit, etc. Rewarding responses, in turn, can be the voluntary offer
to help coworkers, extra dedication and commitment, and any other behavior positively
influencing the working climate and/or productivity. The return from the project (e.g.
net present value) x is consequently affected by the agent’s effort e ≥ 0 and his reciprocal
response Ω R 0, as well as some noise  ∼ N(0, σ2 ):
x = e+ Ω + . (3)
Once the agent has reciprocated in a positive or negative way, it is not possible for the
principal to make the reaction subject to the agent’s performance evaluation. This is,
firstly, because of the verifiable report already being written, and secondly, due to the na-
ture of the reciprocation, which is not always (precisely) identifiable or directly assignable
to a person.
The principal is aware of the agent’s character traits and having the maximization of profit
in mind she is able to foresee how the agent’s reciprocal habits might interfere with the
project outcome. In order to avoid harmful actions and to increase chances of positive
reciprocal behaviors she uses her knowledge about the drivers of the reciprocal response
when manipulating the evaluation report y with δ. The principal, thus, applies her power
of discretion over the evaluation report to intentionally bias the result in order to maximize
project outcome x. Thereby, δ serves as a second optimization variable besides incentive
rate v and fixed pay f .
While the exact extent of δ remains unobservable for the agent, it is commonly known that
reports can be distorted. This is why the agent also considers the principal’s motivation
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to manipulate in his decision making. Following the discussion of effects from biased eval-
uations (see Bol, 2008, for an overview), I assume that the consequences of manipulation
can be both positive and negative. In fact I consider leniency to have two distinct effects
on the agent. On the one hand, it increases the performance measure, which is beneficial
for the agent’s payoff and therefore increases his utility. On the other hand, however, the
anticipation of deliberate inaccuracy in the evaluation can be perceived as unfair by the
agent. This perception of unfairness should be particularly high if the agent envisions that
the principal’s underlying intention for the manipulation is not altruism but profit maxi-
mization. Accordingly, any conjecture about deliberate inaccuracy may also be related to
a lowered motivation to positively reciprocate or to negative reciprocation at worst. I try
to capture the opposing effects with the following expression:
Ω = ω(y − e)− ψ(y − e)2. (4)
The agent’s reciprocal reaction Ω consists of two parts. While ω ∈ [0, 1] causes reciprocal
actions motivated by the sensation of good evaluations and changes in the salary, ψ ∈
[0, 1] characterizes activities driven by the perception of receiving an imprecise (in other
words, potentially manipulated) evaluation report. Correspondingly, Ω can also be an
emotional reaction, at least the part affected by ψ. Both ω and ψ are given exogenously.
It follows that the direction and the size of the reciprocal response are not straightforward.
Whenever, for example, the evaluation falls short of the agent’s own assessment of his work
(i.e., his anticipated evaluation report), the reciprocal response would harm the principal’s
outcome. In this case a larger positive bias would be beneficial in that it would make the
impact of the reciprocal reaction less negative. If, as a second example, the evaluation
is better than the self-assessment of the agent (i.e., y > e), the reaction is dependent on
the (relative) sizes of ω and ψ. Consequently, increasing the bias in this scenario could
enhance chances for both a positive response as well as an adverse reaction.
Considering all economic and psychological factors the preferences of the agent can be
summarized by the following exponential utility function:
UA = − exp[−r(s− c− κ)]. (5)
In this r > 0 is the Arrow-Pratt measure for absolute risk aversion and c = e
2
2 denotes the
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cost of effort and κ the cost of an involvement in a reciprocal reaction.10
Due to its exponential form, the linearity of wage s, and normally distributed random
variables, the agent’s expected utility can be expressed through its certainty equivalent
CE = E[s]− c− κ− r
2
· V ar[s] (6)
= f + v(e+ µ+ δ)− 1
2
e2 − κ− 1
2
rv2σ2ε . (7)
To complete the setting I summarize the timeline of the agency. Figure 1 below illustrates
the sequence. At the beginning the principal decides about the contract she offers to the
agent. It is common knowledge that the agent’s variable pay is dependent on the incentive
rate and the result of the subjective evaluation, which is subject to the principal’s discre-
tion. Anticipating the agent’s effort decision, the resulting evaluation report (including
the bias), and possible reciprocal responses to the evaluation, the principal determines
contract conditions (fixed and variable pay) and makes an offer to the agent (“take it
or leave it”). Analyzing contract terms and anticipating both the result of the (biased)
evaluation, as well as his own reciprocal response to it, the agent provides his effort in
the project strategically. Simultaneously, the principal gathers impressions on the agent’s
performance, (e.g., through presentations on the project progress, etc.) and considering
the agent’s inclination to reciprocity she determines the extent to which she biases the
report in order to minimize chances of adverse reactions. In the next stage, the principal
writes the official evaluation report, which includes the bias, and publishes it (e.g., sends
it to HR). The agent then compares the report with his own assessment of performance
and, dependent on whether he perceives it as fair or unfair, engages in rewarding or pun-
ishing actions that affect the outcome of the principal. At stage five the agent receives
his compensation contingent on the optimal incentive rate and the optimized evaluation
report in place. In the last stage of the game the project outcome realizes.
10Rilling et al. (2002) find that subjects in experiments perceive it as rewarding when reciprocating cooper-
atively, which indicates there are no cost from positive reciprocation but increased utility. Nevertheless,
the majority of literature assumes that there are cost (see e.g. Fehr et al., 1997). I follow this assumption,
however, due to the different findings and for reasons of simplicity I do not endogenize it.
IV – 10
Contract
(f, v)
Effort
(e),
Bias
(δ)
Evaluation
report
(y)
Reciprocal
reaction
(Ω)
Payment
(s)
Outcome
(x)
Figure 1: Timeline in the agency
3 First-best solution
Before analyzing a real business world scenario with information asymmetry regarding
effort, I determine a benchmark solution in order to enable comparisons. In the first-best
solution the agent’s effort is observable and contractible, which reduces the principal’s
problem such that she only needs to motivate the agent to participate in the game (see
Holmstro¨m, 1979, p. 76). As a consequence, evaluation report y becomes irrelevant in
the first-best solution of the standard model. However, my model intents to address
reciprocal responses conditional on evaluation reports that might be biased and also tries
to compare different scenarios. For this reasons, I assume that in the first-best solution at
hand y continues to exist as a performance measure.11 However, since perfect observability
of effort allows to write an accurate report, I assume that y does not contain noise ε any
longer.
To ensure that the agent accepts a contract his certainty equivalent must exceed (or at
least be equal to) his reservation wage CE0, which implies that there exists an ex ante
binding participation constraint.12 The risk-neutral principal acts as the residual claimant
of project outcome x. Her ex ante optimization problem, thus, specifies as
max
e, f, v, δ
E[Π] = E[x− s] (8)
subject to
CE ≥ CE0. (9)
The problem is solved by backward induction, which means identifying the optimal bias
11One could think of y as a credential or certificate that triggers the reciprocal reaction.
12I assume that if the agent is indifferent between the firm’s offer and an outside-option, he decides in the
best interest of the employer.
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is the starting point.13 The principal’s objective function at this stage denotes
max
δ
E
[
Π
∣∣f∗, v∗, e∗] = E[e∗ + Ω + − s(f∗, v∗, e∗)] (10)
= E
[
e∗ + ω(y − e∗)− ψ(y − e∗)2 + − f∗ − v∗y] (11)
= e∗ + ωδ − ψδ2 − f∗ − v∗(e∗ + δ), (12)
where the stars indicate (known) optimal realizations. As a preliminary result, one can
already see that the reciprocal reaction Ω is independent of the agent’s effort. Whether it
is a positive or a negative response solely depends on the agent’s reciprocal characteristics
and the extent of the bias.
For ω, ψ > 0 optimization of (12) with respect to δ yields
δ∗ =
w − v∗
2ψ
. (13)
Assuming CE0 = 0 and solving the agent’s participation constraint for E[s], one has
to substitute the result into (8) to establish the principal’s ex ante expected surplus.
Considering the optimal bias it has the form
max
e, v, f
E
[
Π(δ∗)
]
= E[e+ Ω + ]− c− κ− r
2
· V ar[s]︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 0
(14)
= e+ ωδ∗ − ψ(δ∗)2 − 1
2
e2 − κ. (15)
Given that there is no noise in y, the agent’s compensation does not contain any risk,
regardless of the incentive rate. Optimization over f ensures that the participation con-
straint is binding.
The results of the remaining optimizations are presented in Lemma 1.
13Normally, δ and e are determined simultaneously after conclusion of contract. However, as the first-best
contract is written on effort, the optimal e is determined ex ante.
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Lemma 1 The benchmark levels for the incentive rate, effort, and the bias denote:
vFB = 0, (16)
eFB = 1, (17)
δFB =
ω
2ψ
. (18)
Proof: See the Appendix.
Similar to the standard LEN model the principal sets an optimal incentive rate of zero
and an effort of one.14 However, in the standard model the incentive rate is zero in order
to protect the agent from risk, whereas in the model at hand risk is not a factor as y
does not contain noise in the first-best solution. The explanation for vFB = 0 lies in the
negative effect of the incentive rate on the reciprocal reaction. This can be seen when (13)
is substituted into Ω, which yields ω
2−v2
4ψ . The principal, thus, minimizes v
FB in order to
benefit more from the reciprocal response. The evaluation bias is the principal’s device to
prevent (or at least mitigate) negative effects from negative reciprocation and to enhance
chances for positive reciprocation, respectively. One property of δFB is, that it is positive,
i.e., the principal always evaluates leniently. The optimal extent of the bias depends on
the (relative) sizes of the reciprocal intentions ω and ψ.15 Regarding comparative statics,
it reveals that δFB is positively dependent on ω and negatively dependent on ψ.
Incorporating the first-best results into the agent’s reciprocal response function it becomes
clear that ΩFB is always positive.
Proposition 1 summarizes the findings from the first-best analysis.
Proposition 1 If the agent shows reciprocal character traits and effort is observable and
accurately assessable, then the principal always evaluates leniently, i.e., δFB > 0. The
agent’s corresponding reciprocal reaction is always beneficial, i.e., ΩFB > 0.
Proof: See the Appendix.
14If productivity is assumed to be one (as happened here), the first-best effort, which is the ratio of marginal
productivity to marginal cost of effort, also becomes one (see e.g. Spremann, 1987, 1988, p. 58).
15Recall that ω symbolizes reciprocal motivation caused by high evaluations and salary changes, whereas ψ
represents reciprocal intentions based on the perception of fairness concerning the accuracy of evaluations.
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4 Second-best solution
In the second-best solution the agent’s true effort is not observable and since the agent
tends to behave opportunistically the principal needs to establish an incentive scheme
which aligns interests. A solution to the problem is implementing a performance-based
incentive contract with a positive incentive rate. However, due to the lack of precision in
the principal’s subjective assessment of performance the agent’s compensation becomes
risky. The principal needs to find a contract that, firstly, ensures the agent’s participation
and, secondly, optimizes the costs and benefits of effort. Accordingly, the participation
constraint is complemented by an incentive compatibility constraint that captures the
agent’s optimal effort decision.
max
f, v, δ
E[Π] = E[x− s] (19)
subject to
CE ≥ 0 (20)
e ∈ argmax
e′
CE(e′). (21)
Again, the model is solved by backward induction, which requires that the principal firstly
selects bias δ. Given a second-best contract, with the optimal values v′ and f ′, the principal
receives her impression about the agent’s performance. The effort is not observable for
the principal, however, she is able to anticipate it, which is denoted with ê. The objective
function has the form
max
δ
E
[
Π
∣∣f ′, v′, ê] = E[ê+ ω(y − ê)− ψ(y − ê)2 + − f ′ − v′y] (22)
= ê+ ω
(
µ+ δ
)− ψ(σ2ε + (µ+ δ)2)− f ′ − v′(ê+ µ+ δ). (23)
For ω, ψ > 0 optimization via δ yields
δ′ =
w − v′
2ψ
− µ. (24)
One can see that the second-best bias is similar to the first-best bias conditional on the
incentive rate. Obviously, expected noise in the performance measure E[ε] = µ diminishes
its size.
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Parallel to the determination of the optimal bias the agent decides about his effort. Denot-
ing the agent’s conjecture about the principal’s bias as δ̂, the agent’s certainty equivalent
has the form
max
e
CE
(
δ̂
)
= E[s]− c− κ− r
2
· V ar[s] (25)
= f + v(e+ µ+ δ̂)− 1
2
e2 − κ− 1
2
rv2σ2ε . (26)
Optimization yields e′ = v, i.e., the second-best effort is dependent on the incentive rate.
In order to determine the second-best incentive rate, the expressions for optimal bias and
(anticipated) optimal effort are substituted into the principal’s ex ante expected surplus,
which leads to the following expression:
max
v
E
[
Π(e′, δ′)
]
= E[x]− c− κ− r
2
· V ar[s] (27)
= e′ + ω
(
µ+ δ′
)− ψ(σ2ε + (µ+ δ′)2)− 12e2 − κ− 12rv2σ2ε (28)
= v +
ω(ω − v)
2ψ
− ψ
(
σ2ε +
(ω − v)2
4ψ2
)
− 1
2
v2 − κ− 1
2
rv2σ2ε . (29)
Optimization specifies the second-best solution, which is presented in Lemma 2:
Lemma 2 The second-best levels for the incentive rate, effort, and the bias denote:
vSB =
2ψ
1 + 2ψ(1 + rσ2ε)
, (30)
eSB = vSB, (31)
δSB =
ω − vSB
2ψ
− µ. (32)
Proof: See the Appendix.
In contrast to the first-best solution the second-best bias can be positive or negative,
dependent on the exogenous variables ψ, ω, and µ. Comparative statics reveal that δSB
increases in ω and decreases in ψ and µ. Regarding ω one can see from (23) that it does
not depend on whether (µ + δ) > 0 or (µ + δ) < 0, an even larger positive bias always
has a positive effect in that it results in a more positive or less negative reaction. Given
that ω represents reciprocal motivation from a high evaluation and salary, respectively, the
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explanation is straightforward. Consequently, the larger ω the more beneficial the effect of
δ on the overall reciprocal reaction Ω and the stronger the incentive to increase the bias.
Also the negative effect of ψ is intuitive. The stronger the perception of fairness, the more
negative the effect of a bias that deteriorates the accuracy of the subjective evaluation.
Assuming µ = 0 the sign of the bias still depends on the size of ω compared to vSB. As
vSB > 0 as long as ψ > 0, it is apparent that δSB also depends on the agent’s risk aversion
r and on the variance of the noise in the performance measures σ2ε . Both factors increase
the optimal bias. For σ2ε the effect is not intuitive because the larger the variation in the
noise of the performance measure, the more difficult it is for the principal to determine
the optimal degree of manipulation, namely, a bias that induces a positive reaction. The
explanation for this seems to be found in the parallel provision of incentives through vSB
and δSB. As (32) reveals, the optimal bias decreases in vSB, which indicates that the two
variables have a substitutive relationship. Regarding the optimal incentive rate in more
detail, it turns out that it is not dependent on ω but only on ψ in terms of reciprocity. It
holds that the higher ψ, the greater the incentive rate. Other comparative statics reveal
that vSB is negatively dependent on σ2ε and r, which is similar to the standard LEN model.
Summarizing these results, one can conclude that discretion over the subjective perfor-
mance measure serves as a second means of optimization for the principal, which allows
her to provide incentives more precisely to agents prone to effort aversion, risk aversion,
and reciprocal motivations. In other words, the principal shifts emphasis in the provision
of incentives among v and δ. The bias is the principal’s only device to encounter conse-
quences from the agent’s reciprocity. However, manipulating the performance measure is
also relevant for costs and in order to remain at an efficient level of compensation emphasis
in the incentive design can be shifted between fSB, vSB, and δSB. The driving factors
behind this are the agent’s fairness perception ψ, which is able to turn reciprocal reaction
Ω negative, and the agent’s risk aversion r. Whenever ψ is high the principal decreases
the degree of manipulation, i.e., diminishes the provision of incentives through the bias,
and puts more emphasis on the incentivisation via v in order to minimize chances of an
adverse reciprocal reaction. Conversely, if r is high the incentive rate is diminished and
more emphasis is put on incentives via δ to induce a stronger reciprocal reaction.
Applying δSB and vSB yields reciprocal response ΩSB and as opposed to the first-best
solution the reaction can be beneficial or harmful.
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Proposition 2 summarizes the main results.
Proposition 2 In the second-best solution the principal biases evaluations positively (i.e.,
δSB > 0) if ω > 2µψ + vSB, with vSB = 2ψ
1+2ψ(1+rσ2ε)
. The optimal bias δSB increases in
the agent’s risk aversion r and decreases in the agent’s reciprocal perception ψ if vSB < ω.
The optimal incentive rate vSB increases in ψ and decreases in r. Biasing the subjective
evaluation induces a beneficial reciprocal response, ΩSB > 0, if 2ψ(ε − µ) − ω < vSB <
2ψ(ε− µ) + ω.
Proof: See the Appendix.
In the following I present two numerical examples in order to illustrate some of the results
of the second-best solution. For scenario a) assume ω = 0.45, µ = 0.1, σε = 2, and
r = 0.5. In scenario b) let ω, µ, and σε remain unchanged and set ψ = 0.6. Figure 2
shows the relation of the optimal bias and the optimal incentive rate dependent on ψ in
scenario a) and dependent on r in scenario b). One can clearly see in scenario a) and b)
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Figure 2: Relation of vSB (black) and δSB (gray) dependent on ψ and r.
that the optimal bias and the optimal incentive rate work in the opposite direction, i.e.,
have a subsitutive relationship. Whenever the agent shows a strong perception of fairness
and corresponding reciprocal motivation, it is efficient for the principal to provide more
incentives through vSB, as it is less costly to put more risk onto the agent. Conversely,
if the agent’s risk aversion is high, it is better for the principal to hold the incentive rate
low and to increase the bias, as it is more profitable to gain the outcome via positive
reciprocation than through effort. One can also see that the optimal bias can be positive
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and negative in both scenarios.
As a second example I present how the agent’s reciprocal reaction is related to the princi-
pal’s bias. Assume ω = 0.1, ψ = 0.6, and ε = −0.5 for Ω1; ω = 0.5, ψ = 0.5, and ε = 0 for
Ω2; and ω = 0.6, ψ = 0.4, and ε = 0.5 for Ω3. Figure 3 indicates that the potential size
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Figure 3: Sizes of Ω dependent on δ.
of a negative reaction can be much greater than the size of a possible positive reciprocal
response. Furthermore, it shows that the bias decreases the better the conditions for an
overevaluation of the agent’s performance and increases the more likely an underevalua-
tion of the performance of the agent. Correspondingly, the bias is the largest (i.e., the
evaluation is the most lenient) if ε is negative and ω < ψ, which is the case for Ω1. The
strongest positive reaction is induced when chances of an overevaluation are high, i.e.,
ε > 0 and ω > ψ. This is the case for Ω3.
5 Comparisons
In order to deepen the understanding on the characteristics of a bias and on how these
manipulations affect the company I conduct a few comparisons.
I start with a comparison of the optimal biases and one can see from (18) and (32) that
the extent of manipulation in the first-best solution can be above or below the bias in the
second-best case. The difference seems to be explained by the principal’s lack of ability
to observe the agent’s effort perfectly in the second-best solution. Information symmetry
regarding effort is advantageous in that it increases evaluation accuracy, i.e., the principal
can determine a greater bias without taking the risk of inducing an adverse reaction.
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However, if the expected noise is small enough the second-best bias can also exceed the
first-best bias.
Regarding the reciprocal responses, I find that ΩFB is always greater than ΩSB. Given
that δFB is more precise it is only logical that the first-best bias also leads to a more
beneficial reciprocal response.
Concerning the principal’s surplus the question is whether it exceeds the surplus in the
classical LEN model. For the first-best solution, it turns out that E[ΠFB] can be smaller
or greater than the principal’s “classic” first-best expected surplus. The same holds for
the second-best solution.16
Finally, I examine whether agency costs in my model are smaller or greater than in a
situation where no manipulation or reciprocity is present. I find that agency costs in my
model are always greater than in the standard LEN model, which means the principal is
not able to adjust the bias in a way that she moves closer the first-best solution.
Proposition 3 summarizes the results.
Proposition 3 The optimal bias in the first-best solution is greater than the bias in the
second-best solution, i.e., δFB > δSB if
µ > − 1
1 + 2ψ(1 + rσ2ε)
. (33)
Regarding the reciprocal responses it holds that ΩSB < ΩFB. The principal’s first-best
expected surplus (E[ΠFB]) exceeds the first-best expected surplus in the classic LEN model
(E[Π∗c ]) if
ω2
4ψ > κ. The principal’s second-best expected surplus (E[Π
SB]) is greater than
the second-best expected surplus in the classic LEN model (E[Π
′
c]) if
4ψ2(rσ4ε + σ
2
ε) + 2ψ
4ψ(1 + rσ2ε)
+ κ <
4ψ2 + 2ψω2(1 + rσ2ε) + ω
2
4ψ(1 + 2ψ(1 + rσ2ε))
. (34)
Agency costs (E[ΠFB]−E[ΠSB]) are always greater than agency costs in the classic LEN
model (E[Π∗c ]− E[Π
′
c]).
Proof: See the Appendix.
16One must not forget that a direct comparison of the surpluses is not flawless because my model considers
two kinds of “effort” (regular effort and the reciprocal reaction), whereas the classic model only considers
regular effort without any chance of further benefits from reciprocation.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper I develop a new agency model to analyze effects of reciprocity on subjective
evaluations and the implementation of effort. Reciprocity is modeled as an involvement
in kind or unkind actions in response to the result of a subjective performance evaluation.
Based on real business-life observations I assume that principals attempt to cover effects
from reciprocity by means of leniency in subjective evaluation. Leniency, however, has two
distinct effects. On the one hand it increases the performance measure and compensation,
on the other hand, deliberate manipulation of evaluation results reduces motivation and,
thus, the willingness to positively reciprocate. Consequently, an optimal contract needs
to consider both, effort and reciprocal motivations.
I find that principals bias subjective evaluations even if they are able to observe effort.
By considering the agents’ characteristics in terms of effort aversion, risk aversion, and
reciprocity and by anticipating potential reactions to subjective evaluations, principals are
able to provoke responses from the agents subsequent to the evaluations. These reciprocal
actions can be beneficial and, thus, are able to increase the principal’s surplus beyond the
extent of the classical model. The reason for this is that biasing the evaluation serves
as an additional means of optimization. However, biasing the performance measure does
not decrease agency costs compared to the classical model. This reflects the fact that the
agent’s fairness perception presents an additional obstacles to the principal.
The analytical results support my hypothesis that the leniency bias might not only be
caused by cognitive errors of superiors, favoritism or a simple reluctance to give bad news.
My model suggests that it can be also the result of a conscious and rational decision
making to motivate employees. I show that leniency does not always result in punishing
behaviors but instead is able to affect profits positively. Future research should elaborate
the bias, the reciprocal reaction, and their effects on company performance and profits
in more depth. Since my results are determined by the characteristics of the analytical
model and limited to its boundaries, laboratory experiments should be able point out in
which particular contexts these conclusions can be drawn.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Differentiating the ex ante objective function of the principal with respect to e and v leads
to the following first-order conditions:
∂E
[
Π(δ∗)
]
∂e
= 0⇔ 1− e = 0, (35)
∂E
[
Π(δ∗)
]
∂v
= 0⇔ − v
2ψ
= 0. (36)
The optimization of δ was already presented in (12) and (13). Solving the equation system
leads to the results presented by (16), (17), and (18). The corresponding second-order
derivatives are:
∂2E
[
Π
∣∣f∗, v∗, e∗]
∂δ2
= −2ψ < 0, (37)
∂2E
[
Π(δ∗)
]
∂e2
= −1 < 0, (38)
∂2E
[
Π(δ∗)
]
∂v2
= − 1
2ψ
< 0. (39)
Since all second-order derivatives appear to be smaller than zero, the solutions found are
maxima. 
Proof of Proposition 1
Assuming that the principal is able to observe effort and, thus, eliminates any noise from
the performance measure, the optimal bias is given by (18). One can see that δFB > 0
whenever ω, ψ > 0.
Regarding the question if the first-best reciprocal response is positive or negative one has
to substitute the optimal value δFB into Ω:
ΩFB = ω(y − e)− ψ(y − e)2 (40)
= ωδFB − ψ(δFB)2 (41)
=
ω2
4ψ
. (42)
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It is easy to see that the optimal reciprocal reaction is positive whenever the agent has
reciprocal character traits. 
Proof of Lemma 2
Differentiation of the respective objective functions with respect to e and v leads to the
following first-order conditions:
∂CE
(
δ̂
)
∂e
= 0⇔ v − e = 0, (43)
∂E
[
Π(e′, δ′)
]
∂v
= 0⇔ 1− v
2ψ
− v − rvσ2ε = 0. (44)
The optimization of δ was already presented in (23) and (24). Solving the equation system
leads to the results presented by (30), (31), and (32). The corresponding second-order
derivatives are:
∂2E
[
Π
∣∣f ′, v′, ê]
∂δ2
= −2ψ < 0, (45)
∂2CE
(
δ̂
)
∂e2
= −1 < 0, (46)
∂2E
[
Π(e′, δ′)
]
∂v2
= −1− 1
2ψ
− rσ2ε < 0. (47)
All second-order derivatives are smaller than zero, thus, the solutions are maxima. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Solving (32) for ω leads to ω = 2µψ− vSB, with vSB = 2ψ
1+2ψ(1+rσ2ε)
. Since ∂δ
SB
∂ω =
1
2ψ > 0,
δSB > 0 if ω > 2µψ − vSB.
The optimal bias is negatively dependent on ψ if ω > vSB as
∂δSB
∂ψ
= −ω − v
SB
2ψ2
(48)
is a negative expression whenever ω > vSB.
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The optimal bias is positively dependent on r because
∂δSB
∂r
=
2ψσ2ε
(2ψrσ2ε + 2ψ + 1)
2
(49)
is a positive expression.
The optimal incentive rate is negatively dependent on r because
∂vSB
∂r
= − 4ψ
2σ2ε
(2ψrσ2ε + 2ψ + 1)
2
(50)
is a negative expression.
The optimal incentive rate is positively dependent on ψ because
∂vSB
∂ψ
=
2
(2ψrσ2ε + 2ψ + 1)
2
(51)
is a positive expression.
Regarding the question if biasing the evaluation induces a positive second-best reciprocal
response, one has to substitute the optimal bias δSB into Ω.
ΩSB = ω
(
y(δSB, vSB)− e)− ψ(y(δSB, vSB)− e)2 (52)
= ω
(
ε+ δSB(vSB)
)− ψ(ε+ δSB(vSB))2 (53)
= ω
(
ε+
ω − vSB
2ψ
− µ)− ψ(ε+ ω − vSB
2ψ
− µ)2 (54)
=
ω2 − (vSB)2
4ψ
+ (ε− µ)vSB − (ε− µ)2ψ. (55)
Solving (55) for vSB yields {2ψ(ε − µ) + ω; 2ψ(ε − µ) − ω}. Therefore, ΩSB > 0, if
2ψ(ε− µ)− ω < vSB < 2ψ(ε− µ) + ω. 
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Proof of Proposition 3
The difference between the optimal biases is
∆δ = δ
FB − δSB = 1
1 + 2ψ(1 + rσ2ε)
+ µ. (56)
Consequently, δFB > δSB as long as
µ > − 1
1 + 2ψ(1 + rσ2ε)
. (57)
Considering the reciprocal responses it holds that
∆Ω = Ω
FB − ΩSB (58)
=
4ψ
(
(µ− ε)(1 + rσ2ε)ψ + 12 + µ2 − ε2
)2
(1 + 2ψ(1 + rσ2ε))
2
. (59)
Since terms in the numerator and the denominator are squared, the expression as a whole
is also positive as long ψ > 0.
In the standard LEN model without behavioral aspects the principal’s first-best expected
surplus equals the agent’s salary which consists of the fixed component, i.e., E[Π∗c ] = f∗c =
1
2 . This expression has to be compared with E[Π
FB], i.e.,
∆ΠFB = E[Π
∗
c ]− E[ΠFB] (60)
=
1
2
−
(1
2
+
ω2
4ψ
− κ
)
. (61)
It is easy to see that ∆ΠFB < 0 if
ω2
4ψ > κ.
The second-best expected surplus of the standard LEN model denotes
E[Π
′
c] =
1
2(1 + rσ2ε)
. (62)
This expression has to be compared with
E[ΠSB] =
4ψ2 + 2ψω2(1 + rσ2ε) + ω
2
8ψ2(1 + rσ2ε) + 4ψ
− ψσ2ε − κ. (63)
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Taking the difference and rearranging the solution leads to
∆ΠSB = E[Π
′
c]− E[ΠSB] (64)
=
4ψ2(rσ4ε + σ
2
ε) + 2ψ
4ψ(1 + rσ2ε)
+ κ− 4ψ
2 + 2ψω2(1 + rσ2ε) + ω
2
4ψ(1 + 2ψ(1 + rσ2ε))
. (65)
Since all variables and terms are positive, it is apparent that ∆ΠSB < 0 if
4ψ2(rσ4ε + σ
2
ε) + 2ψ
4ψ(1 + rσ2ε)
+ κ <
4ψ2 + 2ψω2(1 + rσ2ε) + ω
2
4ψ(1 + 2ψ(1 + rσ2ε))
. (66)
In order to determine the extents of agency costs one has to compare differences between
the respective first-best and second-best surpluses. In the classical model agency costs are
given as
ACc = E[Π
∗
c ]− E[Π
′
c] =
rσ2ε
2(1 + rσ2ε)
, (67)
whereas in my model the costs denote
AC = E[ΠFB]− E[ΠSB] (68)
=
1 + 2ψσ2ε
(
1 + r + 2ψ(1 + rσ2ε)
)
2 + 4ψ(1 + σ2ε)
. (69)
Taking the difference yields
∆AC = ACc −AC (70)
=
−1− 4ψσ2ε(1 + rσ2ε)
(
1
2 + ψ(1 + rσ
2
ε)
)
4(1 + rσ2ε)
(
1
2 + ψ(1 + rσ
2
ε)
) . (71)
As the numerator is negative while the denominator is positive, ∆AC < 0, i.e., agency
costs in my model are always greater than agency costs in the classic LEN model. 
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